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Abstract 
 
Modern accounts of “self-harm” commonly attribute self-inflicted wounds with emotional or 
other psychological “meaning”, while assuming that these acts are a product of twentieth-
century concerns. While self-harm is certainly a modern concept, the attribution of meaning 
to self-inflicted injury – above and beyond the physical existence of the wounds themselves 
– is not new. This thesis explores the way in which medical writers in the later nineteenth 
century understood and explained what they called “self-mutilation”, situating this debate 
within the history of asylum psychiatry (where most discussion occurred). Self-mutilation as 
a concept, it is argued, could only exist within the context of a prior understanding of “the 
self” as a specific physical and psychological entity, and physiological, anthropological and 
psychological approaches to selfhood are closely associated with medical attention to self-
injury. 
 
While it might have been expected that writing on self-mutilation emerged from the 
bureaucratic nature of the contemporary asylum system, and psychiatric concern with the 
expansion of diagnostic nosologies, this was not necessarily the case. In fact, most of the 
alienists writing on this topic did not embrace “medical materialism” and hereditary models 
of illness wholeheartedly, but drew on a wide variety of fields – including anthropology, 
normal psychology, spiritualism and religious and literary allegory – in their efforts to 
understand self-injurious acts. This approach encouraged the idea that self-mutilation 
described more than just a physical wound, but was an act which could be analysed to 
uncover underlying mental or emotional meaning. In the writings and practices of these 
psychiatrists and, indeed, in cases of so-called “insane self-mutilation” reported more 
widely, I show that ideas and attitudes towards self-mutilation in this period can also inform 
the historian about ideas of the human condition, normal versus abnormal behaviour, and 
the very idea of selfhood. 
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Introduction 
 
 The “Truth Hurts,” began a 2006 National Inquiry, going on to state that one in 
fifteen young people (aged 11 – 25) in the UK has practised self-harm.1 The study, as is 
common in modern accounts, used the term self-harm to describe “a wide range of things 
that people do to themselves in a deliberate and usually hidden way”: in particular cutting, 
but also burning, scalding, hair pulling, bone-breaking and ingesting toxic substances. 
Around the same time this report was published, British newspapers also commented on a 
proposal to “allow ‘safe’ self-harming” in psychiatric hospitals, a topic of discussion at the 
Royal College of Nursing (RCN)’s annual congress.2 This discussion (seemingly the only one of 
over twenty debates at the congress to be picked up by the mainstream press) considered 
the role of the nurse in facilitating such systems, reporting on a pilot scheme at St George’s 
psychiatric hospital in South Staffordshire, in which staff advised patients “to use ice cubes 
to freeze their skin or elastic bands to flick themselves with.”3 Such widespread interest 
indicates the high level of concern over the topic of self-harm in the modern media, as well 
as the breadth and variety of opinions on the subject. Nurses involved in the RCN debate 
claimed that psychiatric patients required support, rather than censure, while newspapers 
cited a clinical report from 2004, which had suggested that health service attitudes toward 
people who self-harm were “characterised by ignorance, negative attitudes and, sometimes, 
punitive behaviour by professionals.”4 Conversely, all newspaper reports agreed that “the 
controversial plans [for “safe” self-harm] will be resisted by those who argue that the duty of 
health-care professionals is to prevent harm, not to help cause it.”5 
 None of these reports, however, questioned the idea that self-harm can be 
considered a discrete and constant category. The physical reality of self-inflicted injuries 
appears to suggest to many writers today that the term is simply the description of a 
                                                 
1
 Camelot Foundation, Truth Hurts: Report of the National Inquiry into Self-harm Among Young 
People, (London: Mental Health Foundation, 2006). 
2
 “Allow ‘Safe’ Self-harming, Nurses Urge” Mail Online, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-
384187/Allow-safe-self-harming-nurses-urge.html [accessed 27 October 2010]. 
3
 Polly Curtis, “’Safe’ Self-harm for Patients” Guardian.co.uk, 22 March 2006, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/mar/22/politics.health [accessed 27 October 2010]. 
4
 Sarah-Kate Templeton, “Self-harmers to be Given Clean Blades” Times Online, 5 February 2006, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article727174.ece [accessed 27 October 27 2010]. Also 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence, Self-harm: The Short-term Physical and Psychological 
Management and Secondary Prevention of Self-harm in Primary and Secondary Care, (Rushden, 
Northamptonshire: Stanley L. Hunt Ltd, 2004), p. 28. 
5
 Ben Leapman, “Self-harmers ‘Should Get Clean Blades’”, Telegraph.co.uk, 6 February 2006, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/3336255/Self-harmers-should-get-clean-blades.html 
[accessed 27 October 27 2010]. 
9 
 
universal human tendency, with a meaning that can similarly be understood in universal 
terms.  But what is self-harm? Can we view it as simply a new descriptive term for acts 
previously defined differently? In the mid nineteenth century, asylum psychiatrists certainly 
thought so. When they began to use the term “self-mutilation” to refer to self-injurious acts 
carried out by their patients, many assumed that they were describing an unchanging 
natural category, and incorporated into their definitions accounts going back to antiquity. 
These accounts were newly described as “self-mutilation”, a process that saw them acquire 
a variety of associated meanings they had not previously held. By the last two decades of the 
century, the term “self-mutilation” appeared in the indexes of psychiatric manuals, was the 
focus of journal articles, and received a five-page definition in Daniel Hack Tuke’s Dictionary 
of Psychological Medicine (1892).6  As in modern texts, alienists tended to incorporate a 
wide variety of acts under one headline term. In psychiatric and other medical literature one 
can find many descriptions of self-castration, eye enucleation, limb amputation, hair-
plucking (the term trichotillomania, still in use today, was coined in 1889), knocking, burning 
and skin-picking, all of which were generally regarded to be distinct from suicidal acts. In 
contrast to the modern literature, in which self-cutting is usually emphasised,7 it is rare to 
find record in this period of injuries made using a sharp implement other than cut-throats, 
which were always considered suicidal. This is not to say that such acts of self-inflicted injury 
did not occur. Rather, they were not singled out as the paradigm for self-mutilation and, 
indeed, self-cutting was often not included in psychiatric definitions in this period. This 
reminds us that definitions of self-mutilation cannot exist separately from those doing the 
defining. Self-mutilation – like self-harm – is not a natural entity, but rather a collection of 
disparate acts carried out by equally diverse individuals. In various periods, patterns have 
been created by excluding certain individuals or acts in order to support particular 
generalisations or conclusions. But, while the meaning and parameters of the term have 
been questioned at various times, the central premise – that self-mutilation exists as an 
entity that can be labelled and understood – has not. 
 Such an approach continues to be the case in modern texts on self-harm, in which 
the assumption for grouping diverse acts under one heading is that they are all ways “of 
expressing very deep distress … a means of communicating what can't be put into words or 
                                                 
6
 Daniel Hack Tuke, A Dictionary of Psychological Medicine, 2 vols, (London: J. & A. Churchill, 1892). 
7
 See Steven Levenkron, Cutting: Understanding and Overcoming Self-mutilation, (New York; London: 
W.W. Norton, 1998); Barbara J. Brickman, "'Delicate' Cutters: Gendered Self-Mutilation and Attractive 
Flesh in Medical Discourse," Body & Society, 10, no. 4 (2004): 87-111; Adler and Adler, The Tender Cut, 
p. 6. 
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even into thoughts.”8 In a circular manner, this understanding serves to alter the population 
described by the term, encouraging the exclusion of any act not considered to have been 
carried out for such a purpose. Self-harm, it is strongly believed, is a private act that provides 
a physical vent for inner turmoil.9 Such an explanation is, as the nineteenth-century sources 
reveal, an idea that is by no means obvious. It thus becomes clear that self-harm (and self-
mutilation) has multiple meanings, depending on whether it is considered within a physical, 
psychological, social or political context. The meanings may vary from person to person, 
behaviour to behaviour, culture to culture. By exploring the historical origins of psychiatric 
thought on self-inflicted injury in the late nineteenth century, this thesis challenges the 
assumption that self-harm – however labelled – can have any one distinct or obvious 
meaning. Self-mutilation cannot be considered a representational category. The very use of 
the term creates the category it describes, which cannot exist independently of the field in 
which it is created.10 By examining the attribution of meaning to self-inflicted injury from a 
historical perspective, it becomes clear that self-mutilation emerged from a variety of other 
contemporary concerns and frameworks for understanding human identity. Many of these 
are no longer current, making self-harm quite a different concept from self-mutilation. 
Nonetheless, understanding the creation of the category of self-mutilation encourages us to 
ask similar questions about self-harm today. What’s more, it enables us to highlight certain 
assumptions within today’s literature on self-harm that arose from nineteenth-century 
concerns but subsequently became taken for granted and often divorced from the issues 
that had given them meaning in the first place. Moreover, it was in the nineteenth century 
that it first appeared desirable to create a universal category of self-inflicted injury, 
incorporating multiple acts. Why this was so makes us reflect on the purposes the concept of 
self-harm serves for modern western society. 
 
Historiography 
 Current researchers in the fields of psychiatry, clinical psychology and sociology tend 
to date investigation into self-inflicted injury as beginning with Karl Menninger’s landmark 
                                                 
8
 Mind website, http://www.mind.org.uk/help/diagnoses_and_conditions/self-harm [accessed 21 
August 2012]. Other popular websites often take this meaning of self-harm as un-contested, for 
example: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-harm and selfinjury.org [last accessed 21 August 2012]. 
9
 Adler and Adler, The Tender Cut, p. 24. 
10
 For similar claims about psychological categories, see Kurt Danziger, Naming the Mind: How 
Psychology Found its Language, 1st ed. (London: Sage Publications, 1997), p. 191; Ian Hacking, Mad 
Travelers: Reflections on the Reality of Transient Mental Illnesses (Charlottesville; London: University 
Press of Virginia, 1998). 
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study, Man Against Himself, in 1938, indicating that Menninger was “ahead of his time.”11 
The psychoanalytically-oriented Menninger regarded self-mutilation as an unconscious 
mechanism for avoiding suicide, by the concentration of a “suicidal impulse” on one part of 
the body as a substitute for the whole. Self-inflicted injuries – including “self-mutilation, 
malingering, compulsive polysurgery” and “certain unconsciously purposive accidents” – 
were thus gathered by Menninger under the banner of “focal suicide”.12 Yet, although 
writers today often assume that Menninger introduced the very term “self-mutilation” to 
psychiatry, this was not the case.13 What’s more, Menninger’s work relied heavily on 
categories developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including 
concepts of “neurotic” and “religious” mutilation as well as the notion of “malingering”, all 
of which will be explored in this thesis. 
 So, how do modern authors explore the history of self-inflicted injury? Patricia and 
Peter Adler’s recent sociological study divides the background of the topic into three areas: a 
“pre-history” (from the ancient world to the 1990s!), burgeoning public awareness in the 
1990s, followed by a seeming increase in self-harm in the “cyber era”, post-2001-2002. 
Within a psychiatric or psychological context, their assumption is that, prior to the 1990s, 
self-inflicted injury was only discussed in relation to psychiatric inpatient treatment. This 
view was also taken by medical writers in the early 1990s. Brenda and William Parry-Jones, 
for example, analysed 25 historical descriptions of patients between 1700 and 1900, whom 
they retrospectively diagnosed as bulimic, looking for evidence of self-injurious behaviour, in 
order to support the modern contention that eating disorders and self-mutilation are 
connected. 14 While recognising that self-mutilation had been discussed in the nineteenth 
century, the authors made the entirely unsupported claim that “it seems likely that such 
behaviour was observed chiefly in psychotic or mentally retarded subjects.”15 Such a 
forthright conclusion was presumably drawn from twentieth century concerns, in 
conjunction with retrospective diagnosis of published nineteenth century cases, which are 
by no means representative of all instances regarded as self-mutilation by psychiatrists at 
                                                 
11
 Favazza, Bodies Under Siege, p. 232; Karl A. Menninger, Man Against Himself (San Diego; New York; 
London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985). See also Barent W. Walsh and Paul M. Rosen, Self-
mutilation: Theory, Research, and Treatment (New York; London: Guilford Press, 1988); Adler and 
Adler, The Tender Cut, p. 14. 
12
 Menninger, Man Against Himself, pp. 201 – 308. 
13
 Adler and Adler, The Tender Cut, p. 14. 
14
 B. Parry-Jones and W. L. Parry-Jones, "Self-Mutilation in Four Historical Cases of Bulimia," British 
Journal of Psychiatry, 163, (1993): 394-402. 
15
 Parry-Jones and Parry-Jones, "Self-Mutilation in Four Historical Cases of Bulimia", p. 394. 
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the time.16 The assumption that psychiatric attention to self-inflicted injury in the nineteenth 
century was solely focused on either major mutilations (castration, enucleation and 
amputation) or certified inpatients will be strongly refuted in this thesis. This is particularly 
the case in chapters four and five, which explore “neurotic” and “hysterical” individuals who 
were rarely, if ever, institutionalised. 
 Another assumption often made by clinicians is that, until (and, in many instances, 
beyond) the publication of Man Against Himself, “in both popular and professional thought, 
self-mutilation was regarded generally as a type of suicidal behavior.”17 Surprisingly, despite 
this contention, the topic has not been picked up within the historiography of suicide, a field 
which will be further explored as a background to this thesis in chapter one. Invariably, these 
histories either bypass self-mutilation altogether or fail to acknowledge any distinction – 
either modern or historical – between suicide and other forms of self-inflicted injury, thus 
conveying the erroneous impression that none was made. For example, in purporting to 
discuss the “History of Suicide and Self Harm,” German Berrios focused entirely on published 
literature on suicide, suggesting that the two were one and the same.18 This thesis rejects 
the view that self-mutilation was not considered a separate field from suicide within late 
nineteenth-century psychiatry proposing that, unlike Victorian perspectives on suicide 
(which had emerged from the philosophical debates of the Enlightenment) interest in self-
mutilation per se was a product of very nineteenth-century concerns. Whilst closely 
connected to the asylum system, with its opportunities for observation and classification, as 
well as neurological investigation into impulse and inhibition, the definition of self-
mutilation nonetheless served much broader social and medical purposes, which will be 
drawn out in this study. 
 The major contribution to historical investigation of self-mutilation is the work of 
Armando Favazza, a psychiatrist working in the niche of “cultural psychiatry”, whose Bodies 
Under Siege: Self-Mutilation and Body Modification in Culture and Psychiatry was first 
                                                 
16
 For similar assumptions in twentieth-century psychological literature, see Harold Merskey, The 
Analysis of Hysteria (London: Baillière Tindall, 1979), p. 69; M. M. Robertson, M. R. Trimble, and A. J. 
Lees, "Self-Injurious-Behavior and the Gilles-De-La-Tourette Syndrome - A Clinical-Study and Review 
of the Literature," Psychological Medicine, 19, no. 3 (1989): 611-625, p. 618; Digby Tantam and Jane 
Whittaker, "Personality Disorder and Self-Wounding," British Journal of Psychiatry, 161, (1992): 451-
464, p. 453. 
17
 Favazza, Bodies Under Siege, p. 232. See also Michael G. Gelder, Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry, 3rd 
ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 426. 
18
 G. E. Berrios, The History of Mental Symptoms: Descriptive Psychopathology Since the Nineteenth 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 443 – 454. See also G. E. Berrios and M. 
Mohanna, "Suicide: Clinical Section," in A History of Clinical Psychiatry: the Origin and History of 
Psychiatric Disorders, ed. G. E. Berrios and Roy Porter, (London, New Brunswick: Athlone Press, 1995), 
612-624, p. 612. 
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published in 1987.19 Like Parry-Jones and Parry-Jones, Favazza aimed to shed light on 
modern clinical practice by exploring a particular behaviour historically, again suggesting 
that self-harm might prove to be a universal category. However, Favazza’s detailed approach 
is much more subtle than that of the previous writers, for he makes it abundantly clear that 
the meaning of self-inflicted injury varies depending on the cultural context in which it is 
interpreted. Thus, Favazza includes both what he refers to as “culturally sanctioned”, as well 
as “deviant”, self-mutilation, across a century’s worth of published material, indicating that, 
while people might carry out similar acts in different places or time periods, the meanings 
attributed to them are often diverse. Favazza’s work has certainly been a valuable 
contribution to the literature, and held an important role in persuading clinicians and others 
to acknowledge the diversity of self-inflicted injury, as well as the difficulty of drawing a line 
between accepted and pathological behaviours. In the decades around the publication of 
Favazza’s book, clinicians were engaged in a continual shaping and redefining of various 
types of self-destructive behaviour, with an accompanying alteration in terminology, from 
“self-mutilation” to “non-suicidal self-injury” and “deliberate self harm.”20 Despite their 
importance, however, clinical works like Favazza’s cannot address many interesting historical 
questions, through his assumption that self-mutilation is, at root, an entity that can be 
defined. In this thesis, I ask: Why did self-mutilation become defined as a specific symptom 
of mental illness in the late nineteenth century? What forms of behaviour were so classified, 
and what new angles can these acts, and the ways in which they were understood, offer for 
understanding late nineteenth-century society? In what ways was self-mutilation 
pathologised (for example the creation of new terminology), and what new perspectives 
might this offer on the history of the psychiatric profession and patient care? In what ways 
did nineteenth century patients interpret their “self-mutilation,” and did the creation of the 
category alter the ways in which they viewed themselves? 
 Similar questions have been explored in two historical works that directly focus on 
self-inflicted injury, exploring the emergent concept of “delicate self-cutting” in the 1960s. 
Both Barbara Brickman and Chris Millard have described the creation of a “psychiatric 
syndrome” in this period, with Millard in particular emphasising the way in which both the 
behaviour of cutting and a “cutter profile” were emphasised by the exclusion of all cases 
that did not meet agreed criteria. Cutters were assumed to be white, teenage, intelligent, 
                                                 
19
 Favazza, Bodies Under Siege. 
20
 Erwin Stengel and Nancy Cook, Attempted Suicide: its Social Significance and Effects (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1958); Erwin Stengel, Suicide and Attempted Suicide, (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1967); H. G. Morgan, Death wishes?: The Understanding and Management of 
Deliberate Self-harm  (Chichester: John Wiley, 1979). 
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attractive and female, and the very adoption of the epithet “delicate” served to perpetuate 
gender stereotypes. Male cutting, by contrast, was deemed to be “coarse”.21 As the amount 
of material published by these clinicians on their hospital patients increased, the “cutter 
profile” was subsequently disseminated by the media, and assumed to apply to all 
populations engaging in self-injurious behaviour.22 As with anorexia nervosa a decade 
earlier, by the 1990s self-harm was portrayed in clinical literature, newspapers, popular 
magazines and television programmes in both Britain and the United States as a modern 
“epidemic.”23 The sudden appearance of this self-mutilation “phenomenon” has been little 
questioned: analysis of the emergence of self-mutilation as a medically-defined behaviour 
seems to be an important chapter missing from such debates. 
 This thesis argues that the creation of the category of “self-mutilation” in late 
nineteenth-century England provides an important context for understanding the 
emergence of other discourses on self-mutilation in the twentieth century. It also offers an 
opportunity to explore the boundaries of psychiatry in this period. Self-mutilation, for many 
nineteenth-century psychiatrists, was presented as a dramatic illustration of both scientific 
and popular concepts of abnormal behaviour, particularly those characterised by impulse. 
This encouraged reflection on normal psychology, by emphasising the importance of control 
and balance in the new science of the mind. Within a medical framework, the concept of 
self-mutilation was potentially viewable as “evidence” of either anatomical (brain) lesion, 
pathological instinct or functional disorder, externally visible in life rather than requiring 
post mortem dissection. The unarguable physical presence of external bodily damage 
situated self-mutilation as seemingly objective proof of several possible theories; choosing 
between these might require the input of the individual him or herself (for, unlike suicide, 
self-mutilation furnished the psychiatrist with a living subject for investigation), as well as 
the involvement of contemporary understandings of selfhood and belief in the existence of 
“hidden meanings” behind individual actions. While this approach meant that self-mutilation 
could be regarded as proof of almost any element of psychiatry, psychology or neurology, in 
practice those writing on the topic tended towards a view of the individual that emphasised 
a mental, rather than a physical, context to self-inflicted injury, even when they entered the 
                                                 
21
 Brickman, "'Delicate' Cutters"; Chris Millard, "Self-mutilation and a Psychiatric Syndrome: 
Emergence, Exclusions & Contexts (1967-1976)" (unpublished MA thesis, University of York, 2007) 
22
 Brickman, "'Delicate' Cutters". 
23
 P. M. Rosen and B. W. Walsh, "Patterns of Contagion in Self-Mutilation Epidemics," American 
Journal of Psychiatry, 146, no. 5 (1989): 656-658; Joan Jacobs Brumberg, "From Psychiatric Syndrome 
to ‘Communicable’ Disease: the Case of Anorexia Nervosa," in Framing Disease: Studies in Cultural 
History, ed. Charles Rosenberg and Janet Golden (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 
134-154. 
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topic from a physiological or neurological perspective. Throughout, I use the term 
“physiological” to refer to somatic concepts of self-inflicted injury, which were founded on 
the assumption that self-mutilation could be explained in terms of organic bodily processes. 
Where these are explicitly stated to be located in the brain or nervous system, I use the term 
“neurological” to refer to the framework within which such definitions were incorporated. 
More generally, I use the term “psychological” to apply to explicitly mental explanations for 
self-injury (in particular, but not limited to, the notion of “motive”): an impulse or idea that 
was not specified as located within the bodily functions.24 Modern readers, who may assume 
that organic and psychological processes can be clearly distinguished, will no doubt be 
surprised by the extent of the overlap in nineteenth-century medical thought. Indeed, an 
absolute separation between the late nineteenth-century discipline of neurology, the earlier 
framework of “physiological psychology”, practical and legal attention to behaviour and 
explicit interest in mental processes can rarely be made. This study of self-mutilation thus 
illustrates the complexity of nineteenth-century concepts of psychological medicine, which 
cannot be understood from a simple dualist perspective in which mind and body are 
regarded as separate entities. 
 
Context and Methodology 
 In the twenty-first century newspapers referenced previously, the headlines indicate 
an easy use of current psychiatric terminology, in particular the phrase “(deliberate) self-
harm.” Used as both noun and verb, this diagnostic description is also utilised by the press to 
create a category of person: “the self-harmer”.25 A century earlier, the British Medical 
Journal published an “Address on the Borderland of Insanity” delivered by George Savage, 
former Superintendent of Bethlem Royal Hospital and Consulting Physician for Mental 
Diseases at Guy’s Hospital. This “borderland” – the area perceived by late nineteenth-
century psychiatrists to form a shadowy margin between insanity and sound mind – was 
described by Savage as inhabited by a variety of individuals who could not be certified as 
insane, but nonetheless presented social, legal and moral issues for those around them. 26 
Among these was “the Self-Mutilator.” In both these instances, a hundred years apart, a 
particular type of individual was defined and set apart as a distinct group, outlined by a 
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common behaviour – the self-infliction of injury. In neither instance does the term convey to 
us anything about the individuals within that group, who undoubtedly exhibited more 
differences than they did commonalities. Nor does it tell us anything about the reasons for 
their inclusion within a psychiatric framework: in both instances, this is assumed to be self-
evident. Both terms are used to describe an apparently specific population, depersonalising 
the individuals involved to create an object of scientific inquiry: speaking “in the species 
mode,” as Ian Hacking has termed it.27 
 Yet, in both cases, we are also entering at the end of the story. As this study will 
show, the creation of such categories is in no way self-evident. The approaches of several 
other writers have proved particularly useful in informing my approach. In the first instance, 
Ian Hacking’s insightful model for “making up people” has aided my efforts to unpick a 
category without requiring the deconstruction of the behaviour – self-mutilation – itself, 
thus avoiding the necessity of searching for a false “reality” behind all the various discourses. 
After all, on the surface, self-mutilation appears to be a fairly clear descriptive term. Given 
the obvious physical reality of many such injuries, it would be ludicrous to suggest that, 
before late-nineteenth-century psychiatrists defined “self-mutilation”, self-inflicted injury 
did not exist. Instead, we can suggest that, before the late-nineteenth-century, people did 
not consider themselves to be self-mutilators, nor were they defined by others in this way: 
acts were considered quite separately from individuals.28 Thus, while self-mutilation as a 
physical act may well have occurred throughout history and culture, self-mutilation as a 
specific category was created in the nineteenth century, by diverse methods and for a 
variety of purposes, and with particular consequences for those so defined. It is these 
methods, motives and effects that I explore in this thesis. 
 An additional concern I have faced throughout my research has been the potential 
of my work to exalt the very definitions I wish to deconstruct. The descriptive noun “self-
mutilator” suggests that self-inflicted injury can define the very essence of someone who 
practices it. But even a person affected by profound physical consequences resulting from 
self-mutilation will have many daily experiences that do not involve, or even relate indirectly 
to, self-inflicted injury. Most of the sources I examine, however, describe the encounters of 
these people with the medical profession, whether in asylums, hospitals or general practice: 
other aspects of their lives are noticeably absent. By probing the topic of self-mutilation 
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through such records, I run the risk of doing just what the medical practitioners I study do: 
classifying people by virtue of just one act or experience among many. I thus aim to retain 
this concern at the forefront of my research, regularly questioning the status of self-
mutilation as a category within nineteenth-century medicine, taking my lead from other 
authors in the history of science who have sought to destabilise the very concepts that form 
their starting point for enquiry.29 Accounts of self-inflicted injury, however, are understood 
as telling us more about the authors of these accounts, and their social and political context, 
than the individuals described therein. It should be remembered, however, that these latter 
were real people, whose own interpretations of their often troubled experiences may, or 
may not, have coalesced with those of their doctors. Exploring the psychiatric meanings 
attributed to self-mutilation is in no way intended to be dismissive of the genuine 
engagements that people, past and present, have had with self-inflicted injury, whether as 
practitioners or their carers. Indeed, I aim to offer the opposite perspective: by opening out 
the topic of self-mutilation I suggest that no one meaning should be claimed to be more 
“true” or genuine than any others or, indeed, that no one instance can be regarded as 
representative of the experiences of diverse individuals. 
 Historiographical concerns have also informed my choice of sources. As I did not 
wish to impose a modern understanding of self-harm onto nineteenth-century texts, I began 
with published definitions from this period. Almost all of these were written by alienists – 
asylum psychiatrists – and my research thus extended into the institutions of these 
practitioners. In particular, three of the writers on which I focus (George Henry Savage, 
Daniel Hack Tuke and Theophilus Bulkeley Hyslop) had long-running associations with one 
particular institution: the Bethlem Royal Hospital. Britain’s oldest asylum, Bethlem’s position 
fluctuated during the nineteenth century; it was at various times a focus of scandal and 
supposed maltreatment (particularly, but not only, during the investigations of 1814-15 and 
1852-3)30 and a beacon of hope, held up as a model institution with an exceptionally high 
cure rate.31 Unlike other psychiatric hospitals, Bethlem admitted only “curable” patients: 
those who had been ill for less than a year, and did not seem to be suffering from epilepsy or 
general paralysis of the insane. Patients usually received a year of free treatment (with 
possible extension if showing improvement) before discharge at which, throughout the 
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century, around 50% of those admitted were regarded as cured. The Bethlem Archives hold 
a variety of sources, including Annual Reports, minutes of meetings, a hospital magazine, 
Under the Dome (from 1892) and patient case books throughout the period under 
investigation. Case records offer an interesting, but often problematic, source for the 
historian. Notes are sporadic, often vague and incomplete, and patient narratives are 
predominantly those transcribed and interpreted by doctors.32 Moreover, a large number of 
different individuals might be involved: case books in nineteenth century Bethlem were 
completed ad hoc by all of the Hospital’s medical officers, from superintendents to clinical 
assistants (newly qualified medical practitioners who applied for a six month period of 
asylum experience, and thus changed regularly). Despite these issues, however, patient 
records can be revealing of psychiatric diagnosis and treatment. Akihito Suzuki, for example, 
used the mid-century Bethlem case books to suggest that the family was gradually 
disenfranchised from psychiatric discourse in the 1850s, although the patient often played 
an active role in influencing alienists’ ideas of illness.33 What’s more, case materials were 
extremely important for alienists themselves: their work was based in practice (and often 
teaching) as much as publication.34 They serve as a useful comparison to published material, 
in that they indicate the flexible and changing nature of psychiatric approaches. The 
conclusions alienists drew about self-mutilation in published material are not necessarily 
evident in their practices. 
 A number of Bethlem’s medical officers during the late nineteenth century were 
conspicuous in the self-mutilation debate. George Savage, Resident Physician-
Superintendent between 1878 and 1888, wrote on self-mutilation and moral insanity and, 
later, hysterical self-mutilation (and “the self-mutilator”). Theo Hyslop, at Bethlem from 
1888 – 1910 (first as Assistant Physician, later Superintendent) regarded self-mutilation in 
sociological and psychological terms, which will provide the topic of discussion for chapter 
three, while the work of Maurice Craig, appointed as Junior Assistant Physician in 1894, on 
hysteria will be briefly discussed in chapter five. Alienist and asylum historian Daniel Hack 
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Tuke was also a governor at Bethlem from 1872 until his death in 1897: it was he who 
decided to include self-mutilation in his Dictionary of Psychological Medicine (1892). Other 
alienists of particular interest are George Fielding Blandford, a physician in private practice, 
whose textbook on insanity incorporated one of the earliest attempts to define the term in 
the 1870s, and James Adam, author of the entry in Tuke’s Dictionary and proprietor of 
private asylum, West Malling Place.  
 These alienists were elite practitioners, and their views should not be taken as 
reflecting the opinions of all alienists in this period. Their involvement in teaching and 
research (in most instances) set them a rank apart and may have contributed to their 
interest in a field of investigation that was not necessarily the focus of all – or even many – 
of their contemporaries. Meanwhile, their experiences with wealthy or educated patients (in 
private or middle class charitable institutions) may also have shaped the field of discussion, 
as did the fact that all were known to each other. Nonetheless, their ideas certainly emerged 
from their asylum practice, and many of these alienists were also highly regarded 
spokesmen for the asylum system. Their efforts to define and explain the topic of “self-
mutilation” can thus provide an interesting window into theory and practice of the period. I 
thus examined every case record – at Bethlem and West Malling Place – over a twenty year 
period (1880 to 1900), creating a database of all instances of self-mutilation that fitted the 
definitions provided by practitioners in their published writings. This generated 592 records 
(all from the Bethlem archive: only one case was found at the tiny Malling Place, which will 
be discussed separately in chapter four). In addition, I maintained separate records of 
suicide attempts and food refusal for comparative purposes. 
 In addition to these records, I explore published textbooks and journal articles on 
the topic of self-mutilation, from periodicals including The Journal of Mental Science, The 
Lancet and the British Medical Journal. Published texts outside the field of psychiatry also 
proved important, and were often referenced by alienists. Of particular use were texts in the 
fields of psychology, anthropology, evolutionary biology and sexology, as well as fictional 
works and commentary in popular journals. Newspapers indicated some of the ways in 
which self-mutilation was presented and understood outside a medico-scientific context. My 
major sources were The Times, The Guardian and the Illustrated London News, as well as the 
British Library’s online database of seventy-one local and national newspapers. Later 
chapters also incorporate work from additional archives, examining the case notes of 
patients who were not certified as insane. In chapter three, I analyse the case records of 
patients diagnosed by physicians as “malingering” at the National Hospital for Neurology, 
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Queen Square. In chapter five, I examine patients admitted to the Royal London Hospital for 
the removal of “foreign bodies” and also the extensive folders on “hysterical malingering” 
compiled by dermatologist Frederick Parkes Weber and held in the Wellcome Library. 
 My research focuses on the years 1880 – 1900, a pivotal period in psychiatry and 
psychology. It was in this period that the first major definitions of self-mutilation were 
published, and interest in the topic expanded in Britain. It was also in these decades that 
alienists began to move outside the asylum, offering treatment for “borderland” cases, 
which encouraged extension of the concept of self-mutilation. Chapter one also incorporates 
early material on self-mutilation, from around 1860, while later chapters (particularly the 
last two, on sexology and hysteria) extend into the twentieth century. My examination of 
published sources suggests that alienists related particular “major” or “minor” mutilations to 
certain fields of inquiry: thus, each chapter focuses on a particular act, and a particular 
subset of the Bethlem case records. It should be remembered that these distinctions were 
by no means absolute and, although for the sake of coherency of structure I have limited the 
discussion of archival sources in each chapter to those relating to the specific behaviour 
under investigation, in published material there will be seen to be a great deal of crossover. 
My conclusions aim to take my own imposition of structure onto the nineteenth century 
sources into account. 
Chapter Outlines 
 I begin with a broad overview of the topic, and the way in which it was categorised 
within the asylum, from the 1860s until the early 1890s. Chapter one offers a background to 
asylum psychiatry of the period, indicating how psychiatrists interpreted the individual mind 
as composed of intellect, emotion and volition, and how self-mutilation was regarded in 
terms of the breakdown of one of these mental faculties. In some instances, the emphasis 
on physiological concepts of the will promoted an understanding of self-mutilation as a 
physical phenomenon, revelatory of unseen bodily processes. Such accounts, which here 
focus on the so-called “major mutilations” of castration, enucleation and amputation, show 
little interest in the actual act of self-wounding, or professed motive, assuming the injuries 
themselves to be evidence of physical pathology. Beginning with a discussion of mid-
nineteenth century British physiology, I indicate the ways in which the problematic 
relationship between impulse and “the will” in the work of W.B. Carpenter and Thomas 
Laycock was subsequently adopted by psychiatric theorists, and used to articulate concepts 
of self-mutilation. Much psychiatric literature in England relied on vaguely physiological 
notions of volition, inhibition and impulse, part of a common discourse shared by patients. 
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This view of self-inflicted injury was, however, rarely the only explanation proffered in 
British psychiatry: indeed, without additional interpretations, suggesting that self-mutilation 
was of psychological or social importance, the topic would not have received attention as a 
particular psychiatric symptom. I thus argue that we cannot understand late nineteenth-
century self-mutilation solely as a physiological concept, or as a definition created and 
imposed theoretically. Definitions of self-mutilation stemmed from asylum practice, and 
were regarded to have intellectual and emotional content as much as they were perceived 
as physiological demonstrations of (the absence of) volition. 
 Chapter two explores the parallels drawn by evolutionary theorists between the so-
called mutilations of “savages” and acts of self-inflicted injury carried out within and outside 
asylums in Britain. Here, self-mutilation was viewed as evidence of more than just a failure 
of bodily function, but indicative of a more general state of physical and moral degeneration, 
of both individual and race. This pessimistic perspective led to broad assumptions about the 
character (hereditary or acquired) of the individual, drawn from the self-infliction of a 
wound, and the direct association of certain traits (introspection, selfishness, excitability and 
a lack of emotional control) with the act of self-mutilation. I argue that the topic of self-
mutilation was not located solely within the asylum, but constituted in relation to other 
practices. I relate this to the concept of the body as the physical “self,” with a focus on two 
particular forms of mutilation, skin (particularly face) picking and hair plucking. These two 
highly visible behaviours were incorporated into medical definitions of self-mutilation, even 
though they did not meet the legal meaning of “mutilation” as damage or loss of function to 
some significant part. Such actions, however, marked the most visible areas of the body, the 
head and face, and were thus often the most obvious “abnormal” acts to others. The 
understanding of face-picking and hair-plucking within an evolutionary context ensured that 
these acts were regarded as damaging not only to the bodies of individuals, but also to the 
race, civilization and the state. This suggests that, in addition to serving the scientific and 
professional aims of alienists themselves, the category of self-mutilation needs to be 
situated much more broadly in concerns over social cohesion. 
 Chapter three focuses on what Armando Favazza terms “stereotypic mutilation”: 
repetitive movements, in particular head-banging. While modern writers relate such 
behaviours to autism and learning disabilities, the nineteenth-century understanding of 
head-banging was markedly different.35 Alongside the pessimistic, degenerationist model of 
psychiatry outlined in the previous chapter, another means of approaching psychiatry within 
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the late Victorian period focused on the individual, and an individualist basis was still 
claimed to be the foundation for much asylum practice. This approach had its roots in moral 
treatment – incorporating humanitarian paternalism as well as the potential enforcement of 
social values – but also included new methods of understanding and interpreting the human 
mind within experimental psychology. Indeed, the vast majority of alienists who wrote on 
the topic of self-mutilation explicitly claimed that attention to mental motive was an 
essential element of understanding self-inflicted injury. They assumed that the ideas of the 
insane, like those of the sane, could be interpreted and analysed as part of a rational model 
of understanding, and suggested the view that self-mutilation held intellectual or emotional 
meaning for the individual (whether consciously understood by him or not) that could shed 
light on a broader understanding of normal and abnormal motivation. By incorporating 
notions of self-consciousness, dissociation and the subliminal self (from the writings of 
William James in North America, Frederic Myers in England and Pierre Janet in France) into 
their practices, certain alienists came to view self-mutilation as an act, rather than a wound, 
and thus a mental event quite separate from the physical wounds incurred. 
 Chapters four and five constitute a departure from the first half of the thesis, by 
exploring two specific ways in which late nineteenth-century self-mutilation was constituted: 
“sexual” and “hysterical” self-mutilation. Both labels were applied within and outside the 
asylum, and “hysterical malingering” in particular was in widespread use in general medical 
practice at the turn of the twentieth century. These two concepts of self-inflicted injury were 
interpreted and understood in relation to prior notions of gender-specific attributes, and 
received attention well beyond their actual reported occurrence in asylum and hospital 
records. It would be easy to assume that both concepts were entirely situated within the 
pessimistic doctrine of degeneration. However, a close look at contemporary medical 
practice indicates a much more nuanced picture, whereby psychiatrists might regard an act 
of self-mutilation as threatening society, but also – often simultaneously – as a reaction 
(conscious or ‘unconscious’) to the problematic demands of the social structure: sometimes 
even a form of legitimate social or political protest. 
 In male psychiatric patients, self-mutilation was frequently claimed to be associated 
with sexual pathology. While the concept of “sexual self-mutilation” discussed in chapter 
four might initially appear to be purely descriptive (in that it was usually applied to 
attempted or successful castration), in practice the definition had very distinct parameters. 
Sexual mutilation was perceived to be an exclusively male act (women who injured their 
genitalia did not receive the same attention), and was frequently related to broader 
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discussion of sexual pathology, in particular the two fields seen as of particular concern to 
masculine values in this period: masturbation and homosexuality. Castration was a major 
topic in published texts on the topic of self-mutilation, in psychiatry and beyond and yet, as 
an act, it was relatively uncommon. The interest in castration in this period thus needs to be 
seen in relation to specific medical and social concerns. Unlike in modern texts, it was not 
always assumed that self-castration was necessarily related to either severe mental 
disturbance or gender identity. Other assumptions were, however, made about an individual 
who had injured himself in such a way. The eunuch was claimed to be not only the opposite 
of masculine virility, but the very enemy of society: selfish and impulsive. Castration, it was 
claimed, changed the very personality of the individual. 
 The belief that self-mutilation might originate in a desire for the sympathy of others 
remains strong today.36 In the last decade of the nineteenth century and the beginning of 
the twentieth, this so-called “senseless desire for sympathy” was positively linked to the 
diagnosis of hysteria.37 Chapter five examines the position of women around the turn of the 
twentieth century through the way in which the “hysterical self-mutilator” was represented. 
American doctors George Gould and Walter Pyle retrospectively created the category of the 
“needle girl,” building on English surgical reports of “hysterical self-mutilation.” This chapter 
therefore concentrates on self-mutilation through the insertion of pins and needles into the 
skin, or the swallowing of similar foreign bodies. So-called “hysterical self-mutilation” 
emerged from a complex combination of influences. These included physiological interest in 
the hysterical symptom of cutaneous anaesthesia; an emphasis on individual character 
through the perceived manipulative tendencies of the hysterical female and the social and 
political problem of “malingering”, as well as a psychological interpretation: that hysterical 
mutilation had its origins in the unconscious mind. Generally assumed to be female, the 
“motiveless” hysterical malingerer was often contrasted with the pursuit of gain claimed to 
be evident in her male counterpart. Nonetheless, she was regarded as similarly deceptive, 
even when her emotional needs were perceived as being beyond the patient’s conscious 
control. Thus, it was within a hysterical context that self-mutilation became particularly 
associated with character, through the personification of the hysterical self-mutilator. 
 These outlines should give some idea of the complexity of the topic, and the vast 
number of elements which contributed to the emergence of the category self-mutilation in 
late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Britain. Were alienists who considered this 
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category exploring behaviour or motivated action? The individual body or the social 
environment? Universal truths or individual cases? There were, and are, no clear answers to 
these questions, a situation of which many Victorian psychiatrists were surprisingly well 
aware. While this thesis concentrates predominantly on British sources, it should 
nonetheless be seen within a wider context (as indicated by the inclusion of texts from other 
countries, where referenced by British writers): part of a broad concern over degeneration, 
social unrest and gender roles within the western world at this time. Literature on self-
mutilation appeared in French (automutilation), German (selbstverstümmelung) and North 
American texts within psychiatry, psychology and other fields of medicine, including 
dermatology. Just as the topic cannot be neatly incorporated into a scientific discipline, so 
nineteenth-century psychiatric debate can rarely be said to be wholly national, although it 
could certainly serve nationalistic policies. Thus, sources from other countries are often 
included in my discussion, whether as a comparison to English definitions of self-mutilation, 
or evidence of a broader context to concerns over national health and social unrest. 
 This comparative approach will, I hope, encourage reflection on the position of 
psychiatry in late Victorian England. Traditionally assumed to be something of an intellectual 
backwater, the topic of self-mutilation indicates that many alienists were very interested in 
developments in normal and abnormal psychology in other countries, as well as other fields 
of research.38 Thirty years ago, Michael Clark identified late Victorian psychological medicine 
in Britain as having incorporated, for the first time, the efforts of psychiatrists to combine 
normal and abnormal psychology into a single, unified framework, as well as to integrate 
psychiatry into contemporary discussion of broader philosophical, scientific and social 
questions.39 Clark’s sensitive account of the period is persuasive, yet historians today 
continue to dismiss the period in sweeping statements about degeneration, eugenics and 
custodialism.40 While recognising that all these concerns are certainly relevant, this thesis 
will indicate their inadequacy to do justice to late nineteenth-century psychiatric theory and 
practice, which also incorporated other frameworks, including the psychological and 
spiritual. While material and spiritual approaches to mental illness are often regarded as 
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incompatible from a presentist perspective, this thesis shows that this was by no means the 
case in the late nineteenth century: thus, the various layers of explanation for self-inflicted 
injury offered by alienists in this period might often appear contradictory by modern 
standards. The sheer variety of explanations, and the manner in which certain elements 
were accepted or rejected across disciplines will, I hope, give the reader pause for thought in 
his or her conceptions of self-harm today. The “hysterical self-mutilator” bears many 
similarities to the “cutter profile” described by Brickman and Millard in the 1960s: yet this 
was just one of a number of late nineteenth century incarnations of self-mutilation, 
indicating the importance of examining the reasons for the adoption of particular models 
rather than accepting them as pre-existing entities. What, I ask, ever made it seem desirable 
to combine so many different elements into one general category in the first place? 
 Finally, while writing this thesis, the reactions I have encountered from those around 
me have often been surprising. While not quite so vehement as the “disgust” Armando 
Favazza reported while researching Bodies Under Siege in the early 1980s, it is evident that 
the topic invites much conjecture.41 Historians of medicine, often in a manner rather at odds 
with their own work, have regularly asked me “why” people in the nineteenth century 
mutilated themselves (as if there might be a universal explanation), whether they exhibited 
the “same” behaviours as today (suggesting that self-mutilation might be a natural entity), 
or asking whether more women “cut themselves” than men: never apparently stopping to 
consider that these very questions might perpetuate myths about self-mutilation. I have also 
frequently been questioned as to my own motives for pursuing the topic: one apparently so 
bizarre that only a “self-mutilator” would find it of interest. I choose not to address this 
question here. By so-choosing I aim to emphasise the way in which such classification is 
potentially disempowering and delegitimising. I thus highlight, once again, the problematic 
nature of defining a group of people as diverse as those who appear in this study purely by 
one arbitrary characteristic, which, as this thesis shows, may then lead to a host of 
associated (and frequently unfounded) assumptions. Rather than assuming interest only 
stems from self-involvement, I invite the reader to explore the way in which unpicking the 
category of self-mutilation can lead us to question the very nature of identity and the 
existence of a unified self. 
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Chapter One 
From Self-Injury to Self-Mutilation: Medicine and the Somatic Self (1864 – 1894) 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the term “self-mutilation” began to 
appear in asylum psychiatric literature: seemingly a new addition to the medical lexicon, 
endorsed by inclusion in Daniel Hack Tuke’s Dictionary of Psychological Medicine in 1892.42 
Alienists (asylum psychiatrists) generated the majority of published discussion on the topic, 
and I, therefore, begin by outlining the context within which this debate emerged: 
nineteenth-century asylum psychiatry. What purpose did the creation of a new category of 
psychiatric symptoms serve for alienists and their patients? To what did it refer? Why was 
the category created in the second half of the nineteenth century in particular? What factors 
influenced the ways in which self-mutilation was described and presented by alienists? By 
examining the key theories behind literature on self-mutilation, I will outline the importance 
of the asylum context in early discussion of the topic, which subsequently moved beyond 
the asylum walls. It should be recognised from the start, however, that disciplinary 
boundaries were porous and often contested. In their efforts to describe the mental make-
up of the individual as a balance between the so-called faculties of intellect, emotion and 
volition, alienists frequently incorporated material from other fields, including physiology, 
evolutionary biology, experimental psychology and anthropology. Throughout, I argue that 
self-mutilation cannot be regarded simply as a descriptive category of behaviours witnessed 
by alienists in their patients or, indeed, as an effort by alienists to gain “psychiatric power” 
through the classification of behaviour.43 Instead, the concept was closely related to 
psychiatric theory and practice, in addition to social and political concerns outside the 
asylum. 
Prior writing on asylum psychiatry provides a backdrop for this thesis. Following a 
short introduction on the emergence of terminology, I begin with an outline of the ways in 
which self-mutilation can be located within this historiography: in particular, through 
associations with suicide. I indicate the complexity of a debate which borrowed from, but 
nonetheless claimed to be distinct from, the suicide literature. The relation to suicide is used 
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to highlight the importance late nineteenth-century alienists placed on the idea of “motive”: 
insane behaviour, it was newly felt, could not be taken for granted as “irrational”, but had to 
be interpreted at the level of causation. Indeed, as the second section of the chapter argues, 
the belief that examination of self-mutilation might promote the discovery of some universal 
motivational force underpinned most psychiatric efforts to analyse the topic. This force, or 
“motive power” (as it was often termed) was, in itself, a complicated construct that can – 
and could – be interpreted in a variety of ways. Some alienists, inspired by German 
neurologist and psychiatrist Wilhelm Griesinger, adopted a somatic interpretation of this 
force, based on physiological descriptions of reflex action and inhibition, in addition to 
associations with the physical sciences, in particular thermodynamics. Nonetheless, analysis 
of early British publications on the topic indicates that many alienists viewed self-inflicted 
injury in relation to explicitly mental, as well as biological, categories – intellect, emotion and 
“the will” owed as much to faculty psychology as to a model based in the natural sciences.44 
In addition, an interest in the role of external factors – such as the environment or society – 
is often evident. 
The notion of “motive” incorporated all three methods of interpreting behaviour: 
biological, psychological and socio-environmental. It also incorporated assumptions about 
the nature of mind, generally perceived by alienists in this period as divided into the three 
distinct faculties indicated above.45 For late-century alienists, there were thus three ways of 
studying the development of mind: the biological evolution of its structure; its 
manifestations (in particular, the study of civilization), and the development of the 
individual.46 All three of these perspectives will emerge in the study of self-mutilation 
outlined here. The final section of this chapter also investigates the ways in which these 
theories relied upon – but could also be contradicted by – asylum practice. Thus, the 
fundamental question underpinning many of these concerns did not, for Victorian alienists, 
necessarily centre on a distinction between biological and metaphysical concepts of mind: 
or, indeed, a divide between physical and emotional pain. Instead, alienists focused on the 
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differentiation of the individual from his environment. Was it, they wondered, a malfunction 
in the individual’s biology or moral character (perhaps directly inherited) that made him or 
her present behaviours, like self-mutilation, which appeared to contradict the so-called 
“natural impulse” of self-preservation? Or was the “unnatural” state of civilization and 
society to blame, prompting human beings to damage their own bodies? The topic of self-
mutilation within asylum psychiatry can thus be regarded as closely related to efforts to 
define the “self” as an individual with distinct mental and physical limits. Understanding the 
limits of the individual opened up ethical, social and political questions, which could not be 
solved simply by an appeal to naturalistic theories of development. Nonetheless, many 
alienists continued to hope that a physiological approach to behaviour – seemingly made 
externally visible by acts of self-mutilation – would shed light on both abnormal and normal 
psychology. A search for meaning behind acts of self-mutilation was thought to aid in the 
explanation of medical and moral concepts of the will and self-control, as well as efforts to 
integrate the nineteenth century “self” into wider society. 
 
1.2 Terminology: The Creation of a Category of Self-Mutilation 
 The concept of “self-mutilation” appears to have emerged from a slightly earlier 
interest in “self-injury”, and the two terms continued to be used interchangeably. Although 
there are linguistic differences, both purported to be a neutral description of an observed 
act or wound. From January 1844, standardised admission papers to the Bethlem Royal 
Hospital (which, until 1853, was not incorporated under the Lunacy Acts) enquired whether 
a patient was “disposed to suicide, or otherwise to self-injury,” suggesting separate, albeit 
related, symptoms of mental disorder.47 Self-injury, while ostensibly distinct from suicide, 
referred to a wide variety of acts, including refusal of food and attempted suicide: as 
indicated by the diversity of answers listed in the Bethlem admission papers. Many patients 
were listed merely as “Suicidal,” often with no further detail appearing elsewhere. Other 
entries, however, provided information on suicide attempts or, alternatively, what might 
appear to a modern reader to be non-suicidal forms of self-injury. For example, in 1853, 23-
year-old Henry Millbank “picks himself” and “has now several sore places on his head, face 
and legs from picking and scratching himself”, while Sophia Warner has “a disposition to 
injure herself by knocking her head against the wall and biting herself”.48 Self-mutilation 
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seems to have represented a more discrete category, although it was often admitted that 
the distinction from suicide was “perhaps a somewhat artificial distinction”, although it was 
still emphasised that “there is a distinction”.49 Unlike the medical term “injury”, however, 
the word “mutilation” implied active intention and dramatic consequence, with strong 
associations to punishment as well as to crime, issues that will recur throughout this thesis. 
The acts described as self-mutilation varied from disabling to relatively minor injuries. By the 
1890s, the definition extended to flesh-picking, biting, hair-plucking, punching or knocking 
against objects, cutting or otherwise removing part of the body, swallowing or inserting 
foreign bodies such as needles, and eating rubbish.50 
 In 1755, when Samuel Johnson first published his famous Dictionary, he indicated 
that the word “self” was “much used in composition” but did not provide separate 
definitions for any of the nearly 100 terms he gave – including “self-slaughter”, “self-
harming” and “self-preservation” – illustrating them entirely by quotation.51 Johnson did not 
include “self-mutilation” or “self-injury” in his list: nor did John Ash in his Dictionary of 1775 
(among 114 compounds of self).52 Nineteenth-century dictionaries, medical or otherwise 
(except Tuke’s), also did not include “self-mutilation”, despite a seemingly ever-increasing 
number of derivatives of “self” from the mere eight included in Bailey’s Etymological 
Dictionary (1730).53 By the publication of what was later to be called the Oxford English 
Dictionary, these “self” compounds ran to several densely-printed pages. 54 While such an 
increase can be viewed as indicating the emphasis placed on individualism by many 
Victorians, terms like “self-mutilation” and “self-sacrifice” can equally be viewed as 
indicating the reverse: a dissolution of “self”.55 These two approaches to selfhood will form 
the topics of chapters two and three respectively: on the one hand, concerted efforts to 
integrate disparate elements into the creation of an individual (a self, which might be 
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mutilated); on the other, the depiction of self-mutilation as a breakdown of self, revealing 
disintegration of mind and personality. 
 It was only in the Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary (1933) that “self-
mutilation” was first included, as an “obvious compound” of “self.”56 However, the discarded 
slips sent in by volunteer readers for the first edition do, in fact, include a quotation for the 
term.57 The quote, from Grote’s History of Greece (1862), reads “[i]t appears that Grecian 
reserve always stopped short of the irreparable self-mutilation of Atys.”58 While not a 
psychiatric reference per se, this quotation comes closer to psychiatric use of the term than 
those in later editions of the dictionary. Following the myth of the castration of Attis, the 
ancient cult of Cybele reputedly practised self-castration, which was cited by Victorian 
alienists as an example of historical self-mutilation.59 From the decision to exclude “self-
mutilation” from the first edition but include it in the 1933 supplement, we might conjecture 
an increasing use of the term within the public domain, although not necessarily in a medical 
sense. The OED’s readers were all volunteers, from a variety of backgrounds: none of them 
were necessarily interested in or familiar with asylum psychiatry. While several of the books 
chosen by the editors to be scoured for references did fall within the field (including 
Maudsley’s Pathology of Mind and Tuke and Bucknill’s Manual of Psychological Medicine), 
the very lack of clarity within psychiatric definitions is often indicated in quotations chosen 
from medical works.  
 This can be seen in the term “self-destruction”, illustrated in the Dictionary by one 
of many quotations from Allbutt’s System of Medicine (1899), from alienist Henry Rayner’s 
piece on “Melancholia and Hypochondriasis”: “Very commonly attempts at self-destruction 
or self-injury are made.”60  Five pages previously, Rayner had made a similar point, but with 
different wording: “Perversion of self-feeling may culminate in self-loathing or hatred … 
resulting in neglect of health, or even in self-mutilation and self-destruction.”61 That neither 
quote was suggested as illustrative of either “self-injury” or “self-mutilation” indicates both 
the lack of agreement over terminology within psychiatry, as well as perceptions (lay and 
medical) that self-injurious behaviour was akin to suicide, and thus did not need separate 
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definition. Such a relation is, of course, highlighted in both quotes when viewed in isolation. 
However, in the same article, Rayner distinguished between suicide (intentional self-
destruction) and “self-homicide” (when death occurred following self-mutilation without 
suicidal intent), emphasising an interest in motive to which I shall return.62 
Despite the lack of clear definition, the term “self-mutilation” was in regular use by 
the mid nineteenth century (before its adoption by alienists), as indicated by searches of 
both medical journals and newspapers. I carried out a keyword search in The Times and 
regional and national papers in the 19th Century British Library Newspapers database: in 
every case, this dated the appearance of the word in the early to mid-1840s (see Figure 1, 
below). Use of the term quickly increased to reach – and subsequently overtake – the rate at 
which the newspapers themselves were expanding (as shown by the control searches using 
the term “word”, use of which one would not expect to alter significantly), between around 
1860 and 1890. 
 
Figure 1: Graph showing references to “Self-Mutilation” in newspapers, 1830 - 1900 
Press use of the term was varied. When physical acts were referred to, these were often in 
relation to military service, such as The Morning Post’s article on the “Self-Mutilation of a 
Deserter”.63 This might suggest that, as with “malingering” (an idea explored in chapters 
three and five), the term “self-mutilation” was originally borrowed from military parlance, 
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although it does not appear to have been included in these dictionaries.64 Newspapers were 
quick to apply the term to other acts of self-inflicted injury, however, most often in those 
regarded as insane. For example, The Cornwall Royal Gazette referred sympathetically in 
1845 to the “distressing” self-mutilation of “a very handsome and accomplished young 
woman” who plucked out one of her eyes and was subsequently sent to Hanwell Asylum as 
a “confirmed maniac”.65 Yet both “self-injury” and “self-mutilation” were also used 
figuratively, particularly to suggest injudiciousness or cruelty behind a political act. Thus, the 
Liverpool Mercury, referred to Sir Robert Peel’s emigration scheme as “selfishness and self-
injury in one” while, a quarter-century later, a correspondent in The Times claimed “the 
Conservative party, since its self-mutilation in 1846, has been condemned for 20 years to 
political extinction.”66 
The complicated political and social meanings apparent in newspaper articles made 
“self-mutilation” a loaded concept well before alienists picked it up: the perceived threat of 
political upheaval and the military crime of malingering will form recurring themes in this 
thesis. Yet the press context also indicates why, when “self-mutilation” began to appear in 
medical journals, the term was used unproblematically, and felt to need little explanation. 
 
Figure 2: Graph showing references to “Self-Mutilation” in medical journals, 1840 - 1900 
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In medical journals (The Lancet, British Medical Journal and the Journal of Mental Science), 
the term self-mutilation does not appear before the 1850s, and increases in use slightly later 
than in newspapers, with peak use of the term around 1890, as shown in Figure 2. What, 
though, did alienists mean by the term self-mutilation, and how did they explain it? Modern 
and historical sources indicate the close relation of self-injury to suicide. However, while 
suicide has received much attention in medical history, other forms of self-inflicted injury 
have not. Before exploring self-mutilation in more detail, it is thus important to situate it in 
relation to the existing literature on suicide, explaining the similarities – and, more 
importantly, the differences – between the two topics in late nineteenth-century psychiatry. 
 
1.3 The Historiography of the Asylum: Self-Mutilation and Suicide 
On 13 October 1900, Harriett Taylor was admitted to the Bethlem Royal Hospital 
after transfer from Holloway Prison where she had been held on remand since her 
“attempted suicide” on October 2. A fifty-year-old single woman, Taylor was described as of 
“fair height, well made & well nourished ... [with] fairish hair which has lately been shaved 
on the top of her head, as she attempted suicide a short time ago by cutting her scalp.”67 
The “delusions of persecution” Harriett had apparently exhibited in prison had seen her very 
quickly transferred to Bethlem. However, the “suicidal” act that led to her arrest – a cut 
wound well away from any major blood vessels – was not something usually considered 
suicidal by alienists. Nonetheless, doctors at Bethlem attributed the wound to suicidal 
thoughts, just as the police, hospital and prison authorities had done. Cases like Taylor’s 
indicate the close relation of self-mutilation to the study of suicide. In another patient, a 
similar wound might have been interpreted as “self-mutilation”, leading to the important 
question: How does an act become defined as one or the other? 
Much of the historiography of suicide has focused on the complementary practices 
of “medicalization” and “professionalization”: explanations offered by historians of 
psychiatry in the 1970s and 1980s to explain the growth of the asylum system.68 Thus, 
histories of suicide have tended to focus on the expansion of asylums in the nineteenth 
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century,  during which the total population rose from 11,272 in 1844 to over 80,000 by 
1900.69 This is usually thought to have been accompanied by the rise of the professional 
alienist: in 1841, these doctors set up a professional body – the Association of Medical 
Officers of Asylums and Hospitals for the Insane (from 1865 re-named the Medico-
Psychological Association, henceforth referred to as the MPA) - and, in 1853, they started 
the Journal of Mental Science. By the end of the nineteenth century, the MPA had almost 
600 members, something Edward Renvoize has suggested provides evidence of alienists’ 
efforts to cast themselves as specialists in “psychological medicine”, defining their field 
through classification and publication.70 Although early nineteenth-century therapies, 
particularly the concept of moral treatment, were introduced by lay practitioners, most 
historians have agreed that such treatment was subsequently “medicalized,” showing the 
increasing emphasis laid on somatic explanations of insanity by a new generation of 
medically-trained alienists from the mid nineteenth century.71 These aetiologies could be 
interpreted in terms of biological heredity or vaguely defined “nervous impulses”: both of 
these principles came into play in the classification of suicides and suicidal acts, which, to 
some alienists, seemed to be objective symptoms of mental illness. This notion was, 
however, complicated by the difficulty of determining the relationship between suicide and 
insanity, an on-going philosophical and medical debate from the eighteenth century until 
well beyond the period covered by this thesis. 72 
Can we write a study of self-mutilation in similar terms, emphasising observation, 
classification, medicalization, professionalization and “social control” (the efforts by doctors 
and other authorities to impose a framework of values onto their patients)? It could, for 
instance, be suggested that the topic of self-mutilation was closely connected to concerns 
over mechanical restraint in asylums. Histories of suicide reveal a strong association 
between the classification of suicidal behaviour and the “non-restraint” movement of the 
1840s and 1850s, as Anne Shepherd and David Wright suggested in their study of patients 
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admitted to two county asylums.73 Mid-century asylum medical officers played on 
widespread anxiety about suicide rates by suggesting that an asylum might provide the only 
protection from self-homicide, in the absence of previously-used methods of mechanical 
coercion.74 Conversely, as Shepherd and Wright correctly indicate, the Commissioners in 
Lunacy and the popular press perceived any instance of suicide in an asylum as tantamount 
to neglect.75 Such a view is borne out by dialogue between the Lunacy Commissioners and 
Bethlem Hospital medical officers in the Annual Reports, where any suggestion of blame in 
the case of a suicide was vociferously refuted; in one instance, reported in 1893, this 
persuaded the Commissioners to alter their verdict.76 Creating a distinction between self-
mutilation and suicidal behaviour could provide another buffer against such accusations. In 
the Ipswich Asylum Annual Report for 1871, for example, the superintendent discussed a 
case in which a patient died several weeks after having torn out his eye, stating, “[t]he only 
remark I should wish to make upon this case is that I never considered it one of suicide, but 
simply one of self-mutilation”.77 Self-mutilation, then, although essentially related to suicide, 
could be presented quite differently, more akin to accidental injury than an intentional act: 
in the same report from Ipswich, a list of “accidents” included “one patient [who] bit off the 
first joint of her little finger whilst in a state of epileptic delirium”.78 
Debate over self-mutilation was thus connected with some of the issues surrounding 
suicide. Some alienists felt that “it will be found as a rule on inquiry that the intention in 
their infliction [acts of self-injury] is suicidal in character – whereas instances of wilful self-
mutilation, for its own sake, are much more rare”.79 Thus, within the asylum, responses to 
self-mutilation were often similar to the treatment of suicidal patients, clearly outlined by 
Shepherd and Wright.80 Disapproval of mechanical restraint in the mid nineteenth century 
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encouraged many asylum officers to resort to so-called “chemical restraint” (the use of 
sedatives): most, however, preferred to stress the importance of vigilance.81 This need for 
“constant watching” (with a limited number of staff) demanded recognition of those 
patients likely to be suicidal. In addition, as Olive Anderson has recognised, the 1860s saw an 
increasing interest in exploring the pathology of suicide attempts (as opposed to completed 
suicides), which led to the perception of suicide as an individual, and not a social, problem.82 
Such an attitude certainly informed understanding of self-mutilation, which was generally 
(though not always) presented as a deviant behaviour rooted in morbid changes in the 
individual’s brain or character.   
Thus, it appears as no surprise that discussion of self-mutilation emerged within the 
asylum system, which offered (indeed, required) opportunities for the observation of 
behaviour, in addition to necessitating a response to self-damaging acts that might incur 
negative publicity for the institution. However, I would suggest that the case of Harriett 
Taylor indicates that a broader approach to the subject is required. It is important to 
acknowledge that Taylor’s own evidence played an important part in the decision to 
categorise her as suicidal (rather than self-mutilating). She told doctors she had been: 
Hypnotized & subjected to X rays by some unknown person; this person told her she 
was a wicked woman, & must kill herself, hence she made her suicidal attempt, she 
was alone at the time but distinctly heard this person's voice.83  
 
Exploring the motive behind the act was thus an important factor in determining the 
difference between suicide and self-mutilation and the legal necessity of deciding outside 
the asylum (for only suicide was a crime) might well have influenced debate over self-
mutilation.84 Indeed, alienists analysed the motives and “hidden meanings” behind self-
mutilation in a way which was very different from how other behaviours in the asylum were 
discussed (refusal of food or persistent removal of clothes, for example, were often simply 
dismissed as troublesome, although the former could be just as dangerous to health as self-
inflicted injury). As Taylor’s case indicates, attention to motive required input from both 
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alienist and patient, suggesting a two-way process of negotiation, which has been 
recognised in other psychiatric contexts.85 
In a paper published in The Lancet twenty years before Harriett was admitted to 
Bethlem, Thomas Brushfield, the Superintendent of Brookwood Asylum, divided “danger to 
self” into two kinds: that with and without a suicidal motive. As previously indicated, certain 
acts suggested to alienists at this time that the motive for self-injury was not a suicidal one, 
as in a case of castration described by Brushfield: 
In the following example it was at first doubted whether the remarkable act of 
dismembering himself was or was not done with suicidal intent, but the patient 
subsequently admitted that it was done for the express purpose of making away 
with himself, otherwise the nature of the act led me at first to believe otherwise.86 
 
Despite his preconceptions, Brushfield claims to have accepted his patient’s professed 
motive for the purposes of defining his behaviour. Likewise, he re-categorised a female 
patient admitted as “suicidal”, asserting that “her motive for doing this [cutting off her hand] 
was a non-suicidal one”, which resulted from the “primary suggestion” of reading a 
Scriptural quotation, which prompted “auditory hallucinations” commanding the 
commission of the act. The doctor related these hallucinations to the patient’s life 
experiences (and a potential cause of her illness): long-term grief over the loss of a child. 87 In 
practice, then, alienists applied a variety of different criteria – medical, physiological, 
cultural and environmental – in determining the motives of their patients. It was not only 
Harriett Taylor’s assertion that she had attempted suicide which was deemed important, but 
also her circumstances that caused her case to be treated as suicidal rather than self-
mutilating. The background given in the case notes suggests the lonely and difficult life of an 
aging spinster at the turn of the twentieth century. When Harriett’s sister-in-law was asked 
to provide a case history, she declared that “[n]one of the family have seen much of her for 
14 years,” and was thus unable to answer. The sister-in-law’s testimony also indicated that 
Harriett’s belief that she was a “wicked woman” and had “committed some awful crime” 
might not simply be a delusion: her family had cut her off because she “[h]ad been kept by a 
gentleman who has given her a house” and was thought to be intemperate. 
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The suggestion that Harriett Taylor had attempted suicide could, therefore, be 
interpreted by alienists as a rational response to a socially unacceptable lifestyle, the 
courage required for commission perhaps precipitated by intemperance. Although her wild 
behaviour and delusions might be judged to correlate with the “accidental” nature of the 
self-mutilations previously described, neither the patient’s own testimony, nor the 
preconceptions associated with her lifestyle did, and she was designated suicidal. The 
distinction between suicide and self-mutilation was thus not something that was simply 
waiting to be discovered, but instead had to be created. This was also the case with the 
description of an individual as “suicidal”, as Åsa Jansson has recently acknowledged. In a 
paper examining “suicidal propensities” in asylum literature, she refutes the implication in 
other histories that there might be a “real” number of suicidal persons, recognising that the 
term “suicidal” was not a descriptive category, but a concept requiring various layers of 
attribution.88 Yet, while alienists like Brushfield emphatically and repeatedly claimed that it 
was important to distinguish between suicidal and non-suicidal motives, they rarely 
suggested why this might be the case.89 Although, as previously noted, suicide was a criminal 
offence outside the asylum, once someone was incarcerated there would appear to be little 
practical or legal need for making a distinction: both suicide and self-mutilation could result 
in death, and, in both cases, intervention was often required. Thus, for a number of writers, 
it would appear that the motive behind self-mutilation was not explored solely in order to 
differentiate such acts from suicide, but could be regarded an end in itself. 
Here, I would like to draw attention to one final connection between self-mutilation 
and suicide: the debate over “sane” and “insane” suicides. Although much secondary 
literature on suicide has concentrated on the way in which suicide was “medicalized” in the 
early nineteenth century, it has also been shown that this was never an absolute or even 
process and, indeed, proved controversial in the second half of the century in particular.90 
High profile murder-suicides, such as that of George Victor Townley in 1865, drew sceptical 
comments from medical professionals over the widespread belief that every suicide was a 
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sign of insanity.”91 However, even those alienists who insisted that many, if not most, 
suicides were committed by sane individuals continued to insist that the topic fell within 
their domain, discussing motive in “sane” as well as “insane” suicides. 92 These analyses, such 
as French physician Brierre de Boismont’s examination of suicide notes (rarely left in 
“insane” suicides according to the author), offered a broad overlap between normal and 
abnormal psychology: alienists transferred explanations from one group to the other, 
explaining “insane” beliefs as “rational” (albeit argued from false premises) and using their 
understanding of the insane to predict or explain normal psychology.93 Thus, some alienists 
came to view suicide attempts in asylum patients as a “natural and reasonable” response to 
mental illness: for example, to the extreme misery of melancholia.94 Similar interest in 
normal psychology is also apparent in the topic of self-mutilation, through attention to 
human motivation in general, which will be explored in chapter three. 
This background in the historiography of asylum psychiatry highlights the central 
question of this thesis: why did self-mutilation become a particular topic of debate in the last 
two decades of the nineteenth century? I have argued that neither an explanation located in 
concepts of professionalization and “social control” nor a practice-based approach 
emphasising “non-restraint” offers a complete answer to this question. Although both these 
elements were certainly relevant to late nineteenth-century efforts to define self-mutilation 
(the former explaining the drive to classify, and the latter the imposition of regulations and 
interventions, based on the practical consequences of injurious acts), neither can explain the 
interest alienists had in distinguishing between different types of self-injurious acts. A more 
satisfactory explanation requires attention to both psychiatric theory and practice, and the 
relation between these two approaches. Most of the alienists writing on self-mutilation 
explicitly rejected entirely determinist approaches to mental illness and its symptoms. Some, 
such as the eminent George Savage, even came to object to the use of classification at all.95 
All stressed the importance of connecting a patient’s illness to his or her life experiences, 
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environment and inborn “character”, using both the subjective impressions of the patient 
and the alienist’s own inductive conclusions on the mental meaning behind physical acts of 
self-mutilation.96 Within such a context, the topic of self-mutilation often became attributed 
with psychological, as well as physiological, meaning: indeed, it is often hard for a modern 
reader to decide whether to regard these practitioners as “materialists” or “spiritualists”, for 
they often took elements from both strands of argument. However, it is to somatic 
interpretations that we will turn first in order to explore what alienists termed as “self-
mutilation”, and, indeed, who utilised such a concept. 
 
1.4 Physiology and Morbid Instincts: Self-Mutilation as Perversion of the Will 
The construction of a model of self-mutilation based in the perversion of “natural” 
instincts was first outlined by Wilhelm Griesinger. A translation of Griesinger’s lecture at the 
opening of the Psychiatric Clinic in Zurich includes the first mention of “self-mutilation” in 
the Journal of Mental Science. Griesinger (1817 – 68) was a German neurologist and 
psychiatrist, who explicitly rejected traditional psychological and metaphysical classifications 
of mental disorder. These took into account the way in which an insane person’s speech, 
manner or actions differed from those in normal life, but Griesinger instead preferred a 
division of symptoms into psychical depression, exaltation and debility.97 This means of 
classification, he hoped, would assist in uncovering associated lesions of brain or nerves, and 
thus progress the medico-scientific side of psychology, by rooting diagnoses in physiological 
research. Although most psychiatrists, British and Continental, agreed that much 
investigation was needed before the physical nature of insanity could be firmly located, 
Griesinger suggested that, in the absence of hard evidence of pathological change, diagnoses 
must be made along the “entire collection of nervous symptoms”. He divided such 
irregularities into “anomalies of sensibility” and “disorder of the motor power”, indicating a 
number of sub-categories in each group. Self-mutilation, to Griesinger, rather than being a 
psychical symptom became associated with those insanities marked by “decreased 
sensibility, by anaesthesia or analgesia”. He cited as example a patient who “in part from 
wantonness, and in part to compel the attendant to send for the physician, had deliberately 
smashed the first phalanx of his thumb with a brick. This man told me he had not suffered 
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the least pain”.98 For Griesinger, elevating the status of the physiological symptom meant 
that the direct motive for self-mutilation could be discarded: the lack of pain was the 
causatory factor, not the patient’s desired result. Ten years later, forensic psychiatrist 
Richard von Krafft-Ebing also claimed that the “loss of the pain-sense is of great significance 
in insanity”, clinically so because it “may lead to intentional self-injury, brutality in the 
manner of carrying out suicide ... [or] accidents.”99 Since a brutal suicide would presumably 
have the same result (biologically, legally and spiritually) as any more peaceful method, one 
might wonder why Krafft-Ebing should stress this particular issue. In addition, this quotation 
indicates the physiology of pain could, for some physicians, be regarded as a directly 
motivating factor in self-mutilation. 
Although Krafft-Ebing (or his translators) did not use the term “self-mutilation”, his 
concern over “brutality” also seems to be reflected in the increasing tendency in British texts 
to prefer the word “mutilation” to “injury”. Many of the first alienists who touched on self-
mutilation, including the naturalist William Lauder Lindsay, botanist William Carmichael 
McIntosh and the aforementioned James Adam were Scottish, a point which hardly seems 
coincidental for the word “mutilation” had entered the English language from Scottish 
criminal law.100 Indeed, all three men may well have known one another. All studied 
medicine at Edinburgh University in the 1850s, and Lindsay and McIntosh were later 
colleagues at the Murray Royal Asylum in Perth (Adam’s birthplace). On Lindsay’s early 
death in 1880, Adam (who was, at that time, superintendent of the Crichton Royal 
Institution and Southern Counties Asylums in Dumfries) pasted an obituary of the older man 
into his diary.101  Adam referred directly to the Scottish legal tradition in his definition of self-
mutilation, discussing a “quaint treatise”: Alexander Seton’s 1699 Treatise of Mutilation and 
Demembration and their Punishments.102 Seton’s text was not specifically about self-
mutilation but described the crime (in Scotland) of mutilating another: demembration was 
the cutting off of a “member” (necessary part of the body), while mutilation meant the 
“privation of office”, but not removal: a distinction not adopted in nineteenth-century 
psychiatry.  
For Seton, unlike nineteenth-century alienists: “Mutilation and Demembration are 
Names of Crimes: and one who wants a Hand or other Members on other occasions, is not 
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properly call’d Mutilatus or Demembratus, fed Mancus.”103 Such a distinction was lost within 
psychiatry, where “self-mutilation” might refer to both injury and action, while the individual 
behaving in such a way could also be referred to as a “self-mutilator”.104 This ensured that 
many tensions were incorporated into the idea from an early date, further complicated by 
the tendency of alienists to refer to a variety of behaviours by the term. Seton, in contrast, 
had been careful to list which parts of the body should qualify as “members”, distinguishing 
his treatise from those of nineteenth-century alienists who, unlike Seton, included damage 
to hair or skin in their definitions.  Many of Seton’s legal concerns were displaced into moral 
terminology in nineteenth century works. In particular, Seton declared that: 
... it cannot be denyed, but to cut off, mutilat, or disable a necessary Member of the 
Body, is one of the greatest injuries that can be done to it; for not only doth it 
deform the Body, but renders it unfit for Action; and in many places makes the 
injured person incapable of the Office of the Priesthood.105 
 
When nineteenth century doctors reflected on the “desperate injuries” – or, indeed, 
“brutality” – inflicted by patients upon themselves, they expressed a similar horror, 
suggesting that, in the words of Arthur Conan Doyle’s fictional surgeon, “mutilations ... are 
worse than death.”106 Indeed, in moral terms self-mutilation remained viewed as akin to a 
crime (although, unlike attempted suicide, it was not): thus, alienists frequently related such 
acts to those diagnoses thought to be most connected with criminality: moral and impulsive 
insanity. Thus, Adam highlighted Seton’s horror of castratio viridium as “one of the most 
atrocious demembrations”. Indeed, Seton’s only reference to self-inflicted injury was that 
“when a man does it [i.e. castrates] himself he is sui homicida, and so punishable with death 
and confiscation of goods, and its equivalent if one suffered himself willingly to be castrated 
by another”.107 Although this was not the case in nineteenth-century British law, it did not 
prevent alienists and others reacting to self-castration as if it were a criminal offence, as we 
shall see in chapter four. 
 But what of the physiological context in which self-inflicted injuries might be 
understood? While Griesinger’s classification of insanity was not adopted outright within 
British psychiatry, the view that self-inflicted injury was based on a combination of the 
absence of sensation and the influence of an “insane impulse” often appeared in texts 
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published in English in the second half of the century. These ideas were easily incorporated 
into the materialist and somatic approaches that many historians have claimed to be 
dominant in later nineteenth-century alienism.108 The influence of phrenology in the earlier 
nineteenth century has been well-documented for its role in encouraging contemporary 
alienists to draw parallels between mind and brain, as well as inspiring efforts to localise 
brain function in health and illness (physiological psychology and neurology).109 The “failure” 
of psychiatrists to uncover brain lesions that could be associated with diagnoses of mental 
illness has led to a particular historical representation of the late nineteenth century as a 
period characterised by pessimism and rigid determinist views of the heredity of mental 
illness. While all these concerns were certainly influential, closer examination of the field 
does indicate certain contradictions in such an approach. As Michael Clark has recognised, 
many alienists continued to hold faith in the search for brain lesions, or otherwise re-
classified their ideas in terms of loose concepts such as “nerve force” or “nerve power” 
(associated with the “motive power” referred to previously).110 Others began to stress 
alternative approaches, based in pragmatism and attention to the unique combination of 
individual, social and environmental factors in every case. 
 In his 1886 presidential address to the MPA, George Savage speculated on the value 
of his early days working on the physiology of insanity. Savage is a recurring figure in this 
thesis, for he wrote on self-mutilation in a number of different contexts, and was 
superintendent of Bethlem for a full decade. Born in Brighton in 1842, he is most famous 
today for having been one of Virginia Woolf’s doctors, and the lengthiest analysis of his life 
and work remains that by Stephen Trombley, in a rather dated volume on Woolf that 
potrays Savage as an old-fashioned Victorian moralist, espousing outmoded and unscientific 
definitions of insanity.111 Yet this is certainly not the view of Savage that we receive from his 
contemporaries; president of every psychiatric organisation at one time or another, and host 
(at Bethlem) of the majority of MPA meetings, Savage was a central figure in late Victorian 
psychiatry. Indeed, he was well-known outside medical circles, for he was knighted in 1912 
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(whereupon his portrait was included in Vanity Fair’s “Men of the Day” series) and, on his 
death in 1921, his obituary appeared in the mainstream press, as well as medical journals.112 
Savage’s main interest appears to have been in practical psychiatric education, rather than 
theory, and it is perhaps his lack of theoretical publications that has led to his relative 
neglect by historians, in preference to his associate (and occasional sparring partner) Henry 
Maudsley. Along with his close colleague, Daniel Hack Tuke (with whom he shared editorship 
of the Journal of Mental Science for sixteen years), Savage established (and examined) a test 
for doctors in the field of psychiatry in 1886.113 He also promoted the introduction of a 
certificate in mental nursing, lectured for many years at Guy’s Hospital, and received classes 
of students within the wards at Bethlem. His own psychiatric practice was connected to his 
role as teacher, as he described it in 1885: “though, perhaps, very much has not been 
published to the world, yet the daily classes of students diffuse the results of their 
experience gained in Bethlem”.114 
 Savage’s approach to insanity reflected individualism: he kept personal notes of all 
his Bethlem cases, and encouraged his students to do the same.115 His early days in 
psychiatry had, he noted, been spent studying brain sections “by the thousand”. Yet, in 
1886, he concluded that “without learning very much from the sections, I think I have learnt 
a good deal while cutting them, and thinking over them, and the cases from which they were 
derived”.116 Rather than situating insanity within the individual brain, divorced from any 
context, Savage here indicates the way in which a fruitless search for brain lesions might 
enable other ways of thinking about madness, emphasising reflection, introspection and 
socio-environmental concerns. Thus, Savage reminded his colleagues that flexibility, and not 
dogmatism, was essential to psychiatry, for “[t]he definition is after all but the summing up 
of the knowledge of to-day; it is not an absolute reflex of nature”.117 Despite his words, 
Savage’s textbook (like most of this period) was divided into sections by diagnosis, 
suggesting that these were discrete categories. However, the concerns he expressed in his 
lectures – in particular that, by naming a disease, “you erect an idol with special qualities” – 
reminds the historian that we cannot explore contemporary psychiatric practice through 
published definitions alone: textbooks were an entry-point for the student, not a summary 
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of all the ideas and experiences of a practitioner.118 For Savage and his colleagues, interest in 
self-mutilation was strongly connected to the observation and classification of individual 
cases within the asylum, which indicates one of the reasons as to why self-mutilation 
emerged in an asylum context. Thus, in 1880, Tuke noted that “the literature of self-
mutilation appears to be rather scanty”, stressing the importance of the publication of 
further individual case studies for analysis: this was certainly something which increased 
after this date.119 
 A number of historians have also explored the ways in which physiological and 
psychological frameworks were combined within so-called physiological psychology. Rather 
than assuming that physical science was the dominant category in such contexts, Lorraine 
Daston and Roger Smith have both indicated the importance of prior philosophical principles 
to neurological explanations of mental functioning.120 Thus, where discussion of self-
mutilation in the late nineteenth century was associated with physiological models of 
sensation these were, in turn, reliant on prior philosophies of human behaviour. In 1789, 
Jeremy Bentham had famously suggested that pleasure and pain were the over-riding 
principles of motivation in man: it is for these two “sovereign masters … alone to point out 
what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do.”121 The pleasure/pain model 
was promoted in nineteenth century psychology in the work of Alexander Bain.122 Bain’s 
emphasis on pain and pleasure as the “two great primary manifestations of our nature” 
frequently conflated physical experience and mental function (using the terms pleasure and 
pain to apply to both physical sensation and the subjective feelings of misery and 
happiness).123 Bain has thus been well-recognised as playing an important part in the 
proliferation of parallels between physiological and psychological models of mental action, 
an important background for texts on self-mutilation.124 Unlike Griesinger, Bain incorporated 
experimental physiological psychology and the old techniques of psychology by 
introspection into his work. British alienists, as we shall see, tended towards a similar 
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approach, connecting a perceived somatic basis for insane acts (in lesions of the brain or 
nerves) with the environmental and hereditary factors thought to influence moral and 
emotional insanity. 
The first papers published in British psychiatric journals in the 1860s and ‘70s 
discussing self-mutilation thus referred the topic to so-called “natural laws”. Lindsay 
explored the pathology of mind in animals, while McIntosh also incorporated his view of 
natural history in exploring the concept of “morbid impulse”.125 McIntosh’s paper appeared 
first and, indeed, he had begun publishing on morbid instincts while he was Lindsay’s 
subordinate in Perth, submitting two papers to the Medical Critic and Psychological Journal 
(edited by Forbes Winslow, author of the first psychiatric and forensic text on suicide).126 An 
assumption that morbid instincts could be understood as the contravention of “natural 
laws” is clear in all McIntosh’s papers, in which he sought a universal explanation for so-
called “perverted impulses” (including self-mutilation) in damage to the faculties of volition 
and emotion. While utilising the language developed by a number of other alienists, 
McIntosh’s explanations and extended classification relied predominantly on the 
physiological principles of Thomas Laycock (who had taught him at Edinburgh and remained 
a friend). Laycock was an important contributor to mid nineteenth-century physiological 
psychology, in particular for his application of reflex theory to the brain and mental 
processes.127 McIntosh’s concept of “morbid impulse” reflected the idea that human 
behaviour was regulated by the dual processes of impulse and inhibition. His own distinction 
between morbid impulse and “purely instinctive acts” also appears to incorporate the 
divisions of mental action formulated by W.B. Carpenter (Laycock’s rival), who added a third 
dimension to the simple divide between conscious and unconscious behaviour.128 For 
Carpenter, instinctive actions occurred in response to external sensation. Other automatic 
acts, however, might occur in response to an idea, located within the individual but of which 
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he or she was nonetheless unaware. Such a process, Carpenter termed “unconscious 
cerebration” in the fourth edition of his textbook Human Physiology (1853).129 
Carpenter specified that many of the behavioural symptoms of insanity might be 
explained by unconscious cerebration, and McIntosh similarly referred the vast majority of 
insane acts to morbid impulse. The latter’s ideas most closely equated with Laycock, 
however, in that his explanations were associated with an emphasis on the “inherent 
purposefulness of the biological organization”.130 This process is apparent in McIntosh’s 
understanding of natural instinct as holding a specific function: the morbid nature of an act 
was thus revealed by the instinct’s absence or a contravention of its purpose. Thus, 
McIntosh divided morbid instincts into four types in relation to the natural instinct they 
were assumed to contravene. In his earliest article, he took these from Unzer’s Principles of 
Physiology, where they were listed as self-preservation, self-maintenance, propagation of 
the species and love of offspring.131 Later, he shifted more closely to the categories 
described by Laycock, in which instincts were divided up by physiological process: first 
“alimentary” and then “sexual”, followed by less biologically explicit functions: the domestic, 
personal and social (self-mutilation came under personal).132 While stressing that wider 
factors than physiology played a part in the recognition and development of such 
“perversions”– for “their occurrence is found to be regulated by the degree of civilisation, 
mode of life ... and the prevailing tendencies of the age, which indelibly stamps them with its 
characteristic features” – he nonetheless related every morbid impulse to a corresponding 
natural process, indicating that both should be regarded in absolute terms.133 
We can thus view the emergence of definitions of self-mutilation as part of an ethos 
in which, on the one hand, volition and self-control and, on the other, brain biology, were 
emphasised within scientific and popular language. Roger Smith has noted that many 
physiologists used examples of insanity to support these theories, as the “simplest and most 
vivid evidence” of the existence of inhibition was thought to be what happened in its 
absence.134 Self-mutilation, as in many of the reports already discussed, could thus be 
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characterised as a “morbid instinct” (representative of “delirium” or extreme intellectual 
disorder) or as an example of “uncontrollable impulse”. These descriptions appealed due to 
their apparent scientific respectability, as emphasised in McIntosh’s relation between 
morbid impulse and reflex functioning and his use of comparative examples from the animal 
world. Even those alienists who claimed to take an anti-materialist stance might use similar 
reasoning (often omitting any direct reference to physiological research). Bethlem’s Theo 
Hyslop claimed that loss of control in asylum patients provided direct evidence of the 
existence of the will in the normal self, illustrating this with two examples of self-injurious 
behaviour. 
A patient was brought to Bethlem bound hand and foot, at his own request, in order 
to prevent self-mutilation, which proved an ungovernable impulse to him. Another 
patient begged and implored that mechanical restraint might be employed to 
prevent him injuring himself.135 
 
Such cases, Hyslop felt, indicated that impairments of the will could occur even when the 
patient understood his or her actions: understanding did not necessarily lead to self-control, 
demonstrating that the will was a separate process from intellect. 
 McIntosh himself did not discuss self-mutilation in his early papers on morbid 
instinct, and it was not until his publication in The Journal of Mental Science that this 
appeared as an example. Still holding firmly to Laycock’s emphasis on the teleology of 
nature, McIntosh asserted that self-mutilation was a natural process in certain animals. 
Referring to the “wonderful power of self-mutilation” in crustaceans (his own special study) 
he indicated that mutilations in nature often served a purpose: “Under ordinary 
circumstances ... such self-mutilations in the crustacea are intended for the safety of the 
animal, whereas in man, for the most part, they are essentially morbid.” In other words, in 
man, self-mutilation was proven to be unnatural (and thus connected with pathology), 
because it served no purpose.136 He had previously referred similarly to suicide, claiming 
that: 
 Man in a state of nature seldom or never commits suicide, because his instincts and 
 impulses are natural, even though they may be exaggerated, whereas in civilization 
 nothing is more common.137 
 
Such statements indicate the complexity of notions of self-mutilation: it was not, as will be 
shown, necessarily an obvious conclusion that self-mutilation in man was “morbid”, either 
through description of acts or by analogy to the natural world: other factors influenced 
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McIntosh’s decision to draw a distinction here between human and animal life, attributing a 
use to self-mutilation within nature, while regarding it as indicative of disease in mankind.  
 Although McIntosh did not elaborate on the morbid nature of self-mutilation in man 
– simply listing various self-injurious acts without any attempt at explanation – later medical 
writers related self-mutilation in man directly to the effects of civilization: a response to a 
seemingly unnatural environment, which, it was supposed, caused a failure of natural 
selection. This idea became a strong theme in degenerationist literature in Britain following 
the publication of William Greg’s “On the Failure of ‘Natural Selection’ in the Case of 
Man”.138 Many writers have commented on the increasing fear of racial and national decline 
across Europe in the final decades of the nineteenth century, as expressed within the fields 
of criminology, psychiatry and aesthetics.139 This ethos shifted self-mutilation from a topic 
connected with a positivist progressive notion of purposeful evolution within nature (as it 
was, for the most part, in McIntosh’s paper), to one instead associated with pessimistic 
theories of decline. This is particularly evident in a later comparison between human and 
animal behaviour, reported to the Irish Academy of Medicine in 1885,  describing the “self-
mutilation” of a lioness. The Journal of Mental Science chose to re-print the case appended 
to an asylum case study of a patient showing “persistent self-mutilation,” emphasising the 
perceived relation between human and animal behaviour.140 The former paper included a 
collection of cases of animal self-mutilation in captivity, beginning with the tale of a lioness 
in Dublin zoo who chewed off her tail followed by a paw. Similar habits, the author stated, 
were “not uncommon” among other animals in confinement despite being, as one listener 
claimed during the following discussion “so foreign to animal instinct”.141 Thus, the 
unnatural environment of animals in captivity was here implied to have caused the 
development of morbid behaviour, something the author emphasised by extrapolating, in 
this instance, from human to animal, rather than (as in McIntosh’s paper) the reverse. Unlike 
modern texts, alienists did not speculate as to whether confinement itself might exacerbate 
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tendencies toward self-mutilation.142 Thus, it was certainly not suggested that increased 
levels of self-inflicted injury might occur in asylums due to incarceration. The asylum (unlike 
the zoo) was viewed as just as natural – if not more so – than the society beyond its walls. 
 The debate over the role of civilization in prompting self-mutilation also complicated 
the already uncertain relationship between self-mutilation and insanity, and alienists 
wondered whether the act itself proved insanity or could only do so in conjunction with 
other symptoms. McIntosh himself did not regard self-mutilation, even in extreme cases, as 
necessarily indicative of outright insanity. Alienists thus found it difficult to diagnose cases of 
self-mutilation, which rarely fitted neatly into prior categories of madness. James Shaw, for 
example, suggested an extremely broad definition of “self-injury apart from suicidal 
tendency”, which he characterised “as a result of excitement, terror, delusions, or 
unconsciousness” and hence occurring in “acute mania; pubescent insanity; agitated 
melancholia; puerperal insanity; monomania; epileptic insanity; [and] delirium tremens” – in 
other words, almost every psychiatric classification!143  
 The extreme nature of certain acts meant that the involvement of alcohol was often 
assumed, as in Shaw’s final example. This offered a simple solution, such that the act itself 
was not required to hold any meaning. Thus, in 1863, the British Medical Journal printed a 
case from The Express detailing the “extraordinary self-mutilation” of barman’s wife, Jane 
Brickland, who had amputated her own left hand while intoxicated.144 The suggestion that 
the patient had “for some time past ... given way to drinking habits” meant that no further 
comment on the case was thought necessary. On other occasions, the involvement of 
alcohol added a moral to such reports. In 1885, The Lancet described a man who had 
fractured his leg while in a state of delirium tremens. Apparently annoyed by the pain of 
walking, he had subsequently cut off his own foot with a carving knife: an act that had 
apparently horrified the patient on recovering his senses. The writer concluded with the 
lesson that “during his recovery he will doubtless have time to reflect upon the senseless 
and idiotic act which his drink cravings gave rise to”.145 This seeming senselessness might 
also be incorporated into certain psychiatric approaches. For example, when Lindsay 
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associated self-mutilation with the diagnosis of mania, he suggested that in animals it was 
“characterised by a morbid destructiveness that vents itself on the animal’s own person, if 
there be no opportunity for giving it an outlet on man or other enemies or prey.”146 In 
addition to associating self-mutilation with a psychiatric diagnosis, this connection also 
implied that the so-called “maniac” was impulsive and animalistic, associating self-mutilation 
with aggression. However, in asylum practice, although self-mutilation might be linked with 
a general propensity for destructiveness (as in George Fielding Blandford’s description of 
suicide or self-mutilation in “acute insanity”), diagnosis was frequently more ambiguous.147 
Textbooks referencing self-mutilation tended to include it in descriptions of melancholia, 
due to the presumed link with suicide, although a connection with moral and emotional 
insanity added much uncertainty.148 
 An analysis of cases of self-inflicted injury at the Bethlem Royal Hospital between 
1880 and 1900 indicates a slightly greater tendency to associate self-mutilation with 
melancholia, as in figures 3 and 4 (although it would be hard to ascertain whether this was 
because self-mutilation occurred in cases exhibiting other symptoms associated with 
melancholia, like extreme mental depression, or whether alienists assumed that those who 
injured themselves were suffering from melancholia). At any rate, more than sixty per cent 
of patients who injured themselves were diagosed with melancholia, while less than half of 
the total Bethlem patient population was. Nonetheless, a considerable number of patients 
with a variety of other psychiatric diagnoses were also considered to exhibit self-injuring 
behaviour, making it unclear with which mental disorder the symptom should be associated. 
 
Figure 3: Chart showing diagnoses of "self-mutilating" patients at Bethlem, 1880 – 1900 
Figure 4 (right): Chart showing total diagnoses at Bethlem, 1880 – 1900 
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 The first case report specifically detailing self-mutilation in a patient in the Journal of 
Mental Science clearly highlights these diagnostic complications. In 1877, William Brown, 
Assistant Medical Officer at the Newcastle-upon-Tyne Borough Lunatic Asylum, described a 
case in which symptoms fluctuated, his patient (W.H.S) having many lucid intervals. He thus 
diagnosed the young man as suffering from “Monomania with Self-Mutilation and a Suicidal 
Tendency,” implying that these symptoms formed the special focus of the illness.149 Indeed, 
when W.H.S (a young boot-riveter), was admitted to the asylum, the outbreak of insanity 
was dated from the time of his self-mutilation (the removal of one of his testicles) just one 
day before. W.H.S was quiet, and even “rational”, happily describing the infliction of his 
injury. 
He answered questions rationally, and stated that he had mutilated himself with a 
table knife, and that, in consequence of it being blunt, he had made four or five cuts 
before effecting his purpose. He stated that he considered it proper to remove the 
organ, and asked reporter if he was going to remove the other testicle.150 
 
The impulse to self-mutilation (and, later, to acts regarded as explicitly suicidal) was thus 
viewed as the basis of W.H.S’s illness, a “distinct and especial” monomaniacal delusion.151 
This meant that the patient could not be trusted, and Brown referred regularly to his 
“taciturn” manner and “suspicious look”, viewing both as indications of a suicidal or self-
damaging propensity. This led to further enquiry into the patient’s motives, and Brown 
recorded wide-ranging suggestions, gleaned from the patient, his family and previous 
doctors, in addition to the alienist’s own interpretation of the patient as suicidal. Thus, as we 
shall see in the following section, the diagnosis of “impulse” was rarely regarded as self-
evident in asylum practice, and usually required further levels of explanation rather than 
forming the basis for a diagnosis (such as impulsive insanity) in itself. 
 
1.5 Exploring Intellect: Uncontrollable Impulse or Mental Motive 
One of the earliest psychiatric textbooks to include the topic of self-mutilation was 
George Fielding Blandford’s volume of lectures delivered at St. George’s Hospital, first 
published in 1871. Lecture VII, The Acts of the Insane, contained a short section on self-
mutilation.152 These lectures remained in print throughout the nineteenth century, the 
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fourth edition being published in 1892, and Blandford’s active membership of the Medico-
Psychological Association may have promoted discussion of his ideas among members.153 
Like many of the second generation of alienists, Blandford was medically trained: indeed, his 
son later claimed that his specialisation was “accidental ... and I believe he would have found 
a less restricted line of practice congenial.”154 It is thus not surprising to find the physician 
exhibiting strong interest in somatic representations of insanity, such as pathological 
anatomy and neurology: two of the twenty lectures dealt with pathology, while another 
covered morbid appearances of the brain and other physical structures, including the so-
called “insane ear”. He also, however, had a well-documented interest in delusional beliefs 
and associated acts, something often seemingly coloured by his social background. Educated 
at Tonbridge School and then Rugby, Blandford was judged by his contemporaries as 
“exceptionally fitted to deal with the insane of the private class”155, an elite background 
which undoubtedly encouraged his strong sense of social propriety. Many of his published 
writings cover the contested diagnoses of moral and impulsive insanity,156 while his 
infamous certification of the young Edith Lanchester in 1895 (claiming that her co-habitation 
with a lover was a form of “social suicide”) was mocked by journalists and even other 
members of his profession.157 
Later, Blandford’s colleagues suggested that he had a particular interest in exploring 
symptoms and treatment in his work, rather than emphasising the classification of 
insanity.158 It was perhaps this approach that focused his attention on self-mutilation, for it 
was certainly shared by all the other alienists who later picked up the topic. Blandford 
described self-mutilation in naturalistic terms, as a universal behaviour with no clear 
definition or categorisation. As McIntosh had also suggested, Blandford claimed that 
“morbid impulses”, including self-mutilation, might indicate evidence of an intellectual 
defect: however, this alone could not prove insanity, and the patient’s subjective motive and 
understanding of his act also required examination. While clearly influenced by physiological 
concepts of insanity, Blandford also showed a determination to differentiate psychiatry from 
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physiology by examining in greater detail what lay behind any impulse. In impulsive insanity, 
the patient was “impelled, it is said instinctively” to commit an act – criminal or otherwise – 
he thus could not necessarily explain or understand why he had acted as he did, despite 
knowing the act was wrong.159 Yet, nonetheless, Blandford emphasised that all such 
impulses sprang from an “idea or thought of some kind,” either “sudden” or “fixed,” which 
confirmed that the patient had an intellectual defect: thus, in the case of self-mutilation, he 
stressed that “[a]ll such acts are done from delusion, not from mere impulse, as the acts of 
suicide.”160 
Despite offering an early suggestion that self-mutilation might be distinct from 
suicide in terms of underlying emotional and intellectual factors, Blandford showed little 
interest in outlining the delusory ideas he mentioned. Perhaps this reflected his early move 
away from asylum practice: after just three years at the exclusive Blacklands House in 
Chelsea, the physician moved into private practice in 1863. Such a shift may have left him 
with fewer opportunities for exploring the background of his patients’ actions, as well as 
necessitating a higher degree of discretion: the absence of any archival records associated 
with his practice also makes his interest in self-mutilation far more difficult to explore. A key 
feature of Blandford’s interest in self-mutilation was, however, certainly shared by 
colleagues who took up the subject: an interest in “moral insanity”, in relation to a general 
emphasis on conduct as a means to judge the mental state of the individual. This approach 
can be seen in the definitions of self-mutilation produced in subsequent decades. The 
longest of these was written by James Adam for Tuke’s Dictionary of Psychological Medicine. 
Adam’s career trajectory was similar to Blandford’s, although from a less salubrious start. A 
medical graduate, he had chosen to specialise in psychiatry after an early career as an army 
medical officer, serving in the Indian Mutiny of 1857. He subsequently traced a path through 
several large English and Scottish pauper asylums before purchasing West Malling Place, a 
small private asylum in Kent, in 1883. Adam remained here, treating a small circle of upper 
class patients, until his death in 1908, after which one obituary remarked that his 
publications on self-mutilation evidenced his interest in the “scientific side of his life’s work”, 
represented by a systematic investigation of cases.161 Given that Adam published little else, 
it is entirely possible that the obituarist had struggled to find much else to say about him. 
However, for the historian, it remains interesting that Adam chose self-mutilation as a 
speciality for, unlike his colleagues, his writings on the topic were not incorporated into 
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teaching lectures or textbooks, but intended to stand alone. In these papers, Adam sought 
to bring together a number of reported cases of self-inflicted injury; since, he said, the 
number recorded appeared to be small, it became still more important to bring these to the 
notice of the profession, in order that causation might be investigated.162 
Using similar techniques to Blandford and McIntosh, Adam began his definition of 
self-mutilation by legitimising the topic as an important area for scientific enquiry through 
retrospective diagnosis: providing an account of cases dating back to “the earliest ages” to 
indicate the “real” (i.e. universal) nature of the pathology described. These early acts were 
then compared and contrasted with those observed by the Victorian alienist. Adam claimed 
that the best way to throw “additional light ... upon the obscurity which surrounds the 
whole subject” was through “an endeavour to trace some of the motives which have 
prompted to the commission of the acts at various periods of history, and under various 
religious conditions.”163 Through such a method, he sought to shed light on normal 
psychology, as well as the relation of the individual to society under particular 
circumstances: cultural anthropology and psychology are thus considered as topics of some 
importance in the two following chapters. Indeed, self-mutilation did not for Adam (as for 
McIntosh and Blandford) necessarily indicate insanity; although the “borderland” between 
madness and sound mind formed a shady area, as reflected in his rather ambiguous claim 
that: “All the states of mind leading to self-mutilation, self-torture, &c., hitherto considered, 
are compatible with reputed sanity, although they are to insanity near akin, and generally 
indicate more or less mental derangement.”164 The widely agreed proximity between self-
mutilation and sanity reinforces my argument that attitudes to self-mutilation are not 
necessarily fixed or obvious. For late nineteenth-century writers such as Adam, self-
mutilation might indeed be carried out by sane individuals through religious conviction 
(although, like the “borderland”, this term was difficult to define: religious delusion, for 
Adam, indicated outright insanity but nowhere did he suggest how the two might be 
differentiated), as a demonstration of endurance and strength of will, as attempted suicide 
or in order to manipulate others.165 In insanity, these explanations might continue to play a 
part, as might the effect of hallucinations or delusions (which Adam illustrated by the 
example of a patient who plucked out her eyes to prevent disturbing hallucinations). 
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However, Adam concentrated particularly on one further explanation for insane self-
mutilation, the “sexual self-mutilation”, which will be discussed in detail in chapter four. 
 But how did Adam reach his conclusions? Were they formed by “objective” 
description of his patients, or were other factors involved in the way in which he framed 
self-mutilation, and highlighted particular behaviours? It would appear misleading to view 
historical concepts of self-mutilation solely through published material. After all, the 
alienists who theorised on the topic were all in asylum practice, and their ideas were formed 
and shaped by the context in which they worked. Publications tended to concentrate on rare 
or unusual cases – particularly the dramatic examples of so-called “major” mutilations 
(castration, amputation and enucleation), while acknowledging the existence (as Adam did) 
of “minor” mutilations, including skin-picking and hair-plucking. While the small private 
asylums of Adam and Blandford provide little material for contextualisation, much more 
information can be gleaned from the medium-sized Bethlem Royal Hospital, whose 
superintendents almost all contributed to debate on the topic. We have already seen, from 
these cases, the difficulty alienists had in classifying and diagnosing cases of self-mutilation. 
In what other ways did they explore and interpret the ideas and actions of their patients?  
 Between 1880 and 1900, a total of 592 patients at Bethlem (or 11 per cent of the 
total patient population within this period) carried out some form of self-inflicted injury.166 A 
slightly higher number of female patients were recorded as engaging in these behaviours 
than men, although the difference was not huge (63% of self-injuring patients were female, 
compared with 58% of the asylum population). The complicated relation with suicide is 
indicated in Figure 5, below. 
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Figure 5: Graph showing the percentage of self-mutilating patients at Bethlem considered 
to be suicidal or dangerous, 1880 - 1900 
Less than half of the patients who injured themselves in some way were reported to be 
suicidal, and only around a quarter carried out acts considered in the case book to be suicide 
attempts (in addition to exhibiting apparently non-suicidal forms of self-injury).167 What’s 
more, these two categories were not always connected: patients who were regarded as 
suicidal were not necessarily those who engaged in seemingly suicidal acts. However, it does 
appear that patients who injured themselves were more likely to be classed as suicidal than 
those who did not, for only 25-35% of total admissions were recorded to be suicidal. These 
patients were no more or less likely to be considered dangerous, despite the association of 
self-mutilation (by both Lindsay and Blandford) with wild and violent acts – between 20-25% 
of all patients were similarly thus classified. 
 Examining asylum case records can be instructive in two distinct ways. From a 
simple statistical standpoint, we can quickly judge whether or not alienists who wrote about 
self-mutilation were simply reporting the behaviours exhibited most frequently in their 
institutions. Figures 6 and 7 reveal the statistical disparity between acts occurring within the 
asylum, and the behaviours that alienists and other medical professionals focused on in their 
published works. Between 1840 and 1900, I found a total of 69 papers using the term “self-
mutilation” published in the three major British medical journals previously examined. These 
papers referred to 89 instances of self-mutilation, with just over a quarter of these (24) 
being castration or genital injury. As shown by Figure 6, below, this made castration the 
dominant form of self-inflicted injury published in medical journals of the mid and late 
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nineteenth century. In addition, a number of cases also described amputation and 
enucleation, with a few articles (predominantly in the Journal of Mental Science) referencing 
the “minor mutilations” of skin-picking and hair-plucking. Figure 7, however, indicates the 
behaviours recorded in the Bethlem case records. While nearly half of the published papers 
relate to castration, amputation and enucleation, less than ten per cent of the Bethlem cases 
are of similar acts. Far more prevalent in this twenty-year period are the large number of 
individiuals picking their skin or pulling out hair (particularly female patients) or knocking 
themselves against something (a behaviour seemingly dominant in male patients, or 43% of 
the total, compared to 28% of female patients). 
 
Figure 6: Graph showing types of self-mutilation in medical journals, 1840 – 1900 
 
Figure 7: Graph showing types of self-mutilation in Bethlem patients, 1880 - 1900 
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The figures indicate that publications on self-inflicted injury did not simply describe what 
was observed within asylums. Publications concentrated on dramatic acts: writers and 
journal editors presumably assumed that extremes would be of most interest to readers. 
However, as has been previously indicated, this approach has misled historians into thinking 
that these behaviours were prevalent, and analysing them according to modern 
interpretations.168 It could also, as we shall see in chapter four, mislead contemporaries into 
perceiving certain acts (castration) as far more frequent occurrences than practice 
suggested. Thus, understanding of self-inflicted injury was not constructed by statistical 
analysis, but through a complex interplay of factors within an institution: the practical 
maintenance of order and prevention of harm within the asylum, as well as interaction 
between doctors and patients in determining the focus of enquiry. Thus, while the 
volitionary model of self-mutilation certainly held much currency in late nineteenth-century 
psychiatry, exploring the topic purely from this perspective runs the risk of privileging 
explanations couched in these terms. Attention to concepts of impulse and inhibition 
certainly did not prevent either patients or physicians from attributing additional meaning to 
self-injurious actions. The final section of this chapter will explore the interplay of the 
concerns outlined above in interactions between asylum physicians and their patients. 
through the medium of the case record. 
 
1.6 Motive and Idea: Interpretation of Self-Injury at Bethlem 
 As has already been indicated, differentiation between self-mutilation and suicide 
usually required the patient’s assertion that a certain act had been performed with suicidal 
intent. Indeed, the very definition of suicide was usually made, by physicians and patients’ 
families, through acknowledgement of intent, rather than by judging whether an act was 
life-threatening. Thus, some patients were described as having attempted suicide when they 
had swallowed harmless substances, having “believed” them to be poison.169 The motive 
explicitly attested to by the patient might thus be taken very seriously by the alienist in his 
attempts to categorise. Indeed, suicide usually required a further explanation on the part of 
the patient – why did he or she wish to die? It was here that the notion of “uncontrollable 
impulse” was often suggested by patients, a concept also invoked in many cases of self-
mutilation that were not specified as suicidal. Concepts of impulse utilised a common 
discourse between patients and doctors around the physiological understandings of impulse 
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and inhibition already outlined. Such somatic explanations, equated with damage to the 
nerves, served to absolve the patient from any suggestion of blame: moreover, it also 
appeared attractive to relatives and doctors by suggesting that no one could have prevented 
an injury, except perhaps through such controversial measures as mechanical restraint. 
Indeed, despite the disapproval of the Commissioners in Lunacy of any use of restraint, 
when an act of self-mutilation occurred they sometimes performed a dramatic U-turn. In 
1889, Isabella Morant managed to remove one of her locked gloves (the “over-use” of which 
had been disapproved of at Bethlem in the Times controversy of the previous year)170 and 
“very speedily enucleated her eyeball & threw it away from her.”171 The patient had 
regularly stated her determination to remove her right eye, indicating that it had offended 
her: these “religious delusions” (which had also led Mrs Morant to amputate her right hand 
prior to admission) ensured that the patient had been under restraint for several days. 
When informed of the occurrence, the Commissioners wrote to Bethlem to express their 
regret. Yet they also added that “[t]hey presume the glove worn by the patient was a strong 
one”,172 hinting that the physicians might have been lax in their application of restraint. 
This contradictory position on restraint reflects the complexity of physiological 
debate, situated as it was between unconscious reflex action and a philosophical emphasis 
on free will.173 At the Crichton Royal Institution, James Adam described a patient, admitted 
in 1875, who “about an hour and a half after admission gouged out her right eye, which now 
represents a horrible wreck. ... Restraint is employed to prevent her gouging out the other 
eye.”174 Although he himself had not been at the institution at the time (indeed, most of 
Adam’s reports of major mutilations were second-hand: the case of “sexual self-mutilation” 
which will be explored in chapter four also occurred well before the alienist met the patient 
in question), Adam certainly paid much attention to the patient, Mrs Blacklock, after he 
became superintendent in January 1880. In October of that same year, he reported that he 
had abolished the locked bed from the institution, indicating that Mrs Blacklock had been 
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under regular nightly restraint for five years. After visiting her during the following two 
nights, Adam declared that “careful nursing and nourishing with a generous diet and a 
moderate amount of stimulant” had been substituted for the use of restraint, indicating that 
they might similarly improve the patient’s self-control.175 His conclusion in the case of Mrs 
Blacklock reflects the doctor’s general emphasis on the role of the social environment of the 
asylum in both care and cure.176 When Adam left the Crichton Royal Institution in 1883, he 
reported that Mrs Blacklock: 
Attends and enjoys the various amusements, and she enters with spirit and 
 animation at times into the dances, she plays the piano, and altogether leads a life 
 of as much composure and comfort as can be expected in a case of the kind, in 
 which recovery cannot be hoped for.177 
 
Restraint, it seems, could only be regarded as beneficial if the impulse were truly 
neurological (and even this might be treated otherwise, by medication or diet, as Adam 
suggests). If, instead, idea preceded impulse, the patient must be helped to address this 
themselves, a suggestion that some patients reflected on, blaming their illness on their own 
lack of self-control. In 1900, for example, Mary Ellison made a promise to the doctors at 
Bethlem not to injure herself in her crochet work, writing that, however: “I find it impossible 
to pull myself together again as I have let myself go too far in every way mentally, morally & 
spiritually. ... I have wilfully & permanently lost my self-control & not through mania.”178 
Both Isabella Morant and Mrs Blacklock had claimed that their enucleations had 
been performed as punishment, under the influence of a higher power. The proximity of 
both amputation and enucleation to the Scriptural injunction that “if thy right eye offend 
thee, pluck it out...” was often remarked upon by alienists, even in instances where the 
patient themselves suggested no such relation.179 This serves to remind us that religious 
motivations for action remained at the forefront for many late Victorians, despite what has 
widely been regarded by historians as an increasing secularisation of society. Thus, notions 
of divine punishment were made prominent in many published psychiatric explanations of 
self-mutilation which, moreover, ignored the frequent references to judicial punishment for 
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supposed earthly crimes indicated by other patients in asylum case records. Despite his own 
regular church attendance, James Adam regarded religion as especially responsible for 
exacerbating an underlying human impetus to self-mutilation, suggesting that “many, 
perhaps most ... self-inflicted tortures have at all times had their origin in unduly 
exaggerated religious fervour, enthusiasm, or fanaticism.”180 This was also the case for other 
writers. Alienist James Shaw regarded “self-mutilation” as occurring solely during religious 
monomania, as did the French writer Henri Dagonet in his 1894 Traité des maladies 
mentales.181 For Dagonet, it was during “la mélancolie religieuse … que l’on a observé les 
examples de mutilations les plus inconcevables.”182 
The emphasis of doctors on religious explanations was not necessarily shared by 
their patients. Just as doctors might regard a patient’s self-injury as physical evidence of 
mental illness, patients similarly suggested that the objective physical reality of their wounds 
was “evidence” of a particular fear, such as the claims of Eccles Aston that he was being 
vivisected, which the patient supported by showing doctors wounds that they claimed the 
patient himself had picked into his skin.183 While such notions were often brushed off rather 
abruptly by alienists, who regarded such patients as scheming and manipulative, it is 
interesting to note that this dismissive attitude did not seem to promote reflection on their 
own use of self-mutilation as a form of “positive” external proof of internal “unsoundness of 
mind.” Other patient explanations received more serious attention, however, in particular 
the notion of endurance. Frederick Humphreys, for example, stated that he had burnt his 
arms because he had trained himself to bear pain.184 Alienists similarly suggested that this 
“endurance” model of self-mutilation functioned in sane, as well as insane, subjects. James 
Adam suggested “American Indians” as an example of this, but other practitioners looked 
closer to home, focusing on the importance laid on duelling scars as exemplars of masculine 
endurance in contemporary German university culture.185 The difficulty of classifying such 
acts as insane further suggests that notions of self-mutilation were not necessarily obvious 
for, when explanations were based on the notion of exhibiting strength of will (rather than 
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its loss), they became viewed as rational, reflecting the importance laid on such notions 
within Victorian industrial society.186  
Exploring the words of patients, as reported by their doctors, can also remind us of 
some of the difficulties in interpreting nineteenth-century medical concerns. When the 
young Charles Hipwood was admitted to Bethlem in 1889, it was stated that the patient had 
told his mother that he “cut his cheek bec[ause] he ... wanted to see if he c[oul]d feel 
anything,” but informed his keeper that “he liked to see the blood that followed.” However, 
when he told the medical officers of “something dreadful that is going to happen & ... great 
suffering wh[ich] he will have to bear,” they furnished an additional explanation: Hipwood 
was “apparently trying to prepare himself [for this suffering] by inflicting pain on himself 
now.”187 Although diagnosed with melancholia, Hipwood’s actions were nonetheless 
interpreted as rational within the context of his illness. The patient’s first reported 
explanation, however, also indicates another way in which self-mutilation was regarded as 
“evidence” by some patients: in this instance, evidence of existence. Hipwood’s emphasis on 
“feeling” (implying both sensation and emotion) reminds the historian of the difficulty of 
distinguishing between physical and emotional pain in nineteenth-century texts, 
emphasising the proximity of physical and mental suffering in a system of medicine which 
assumed a close relation between bodily and mental states. 188 Charles had apparently told 
his mother that “he had been a humbug all his life & unfit to live”, that he was “ungrateful” 
and “insensible to anything”.  Similarly, Charlotte Nash Young “said that she had no feeling & 
cut her arms, thinks that she has no blood in her body ... and bit herself on the wrist to see if 
it would bleed.”189 In this instance, all three aspects of proof of existence are combined: 
feeling might be interpreted either in sensational or emotional terms, while the existence of 
blood in the body was assumed to be physiological proof of the reality of being. 
The physiological role played by blood could also be connected with notions of 
treatment or healing, indicating a further problem for historians in assuming that self-
mutilation was seen as an unequivocally negative behaviour. Self-treatment was a 
widespread explanation for many forms of self-injury recorded in case books: self-castration 
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was claimed as preventive of the supposedly deleterious effects of masturbation,190 self-
cutting cast as therapeutic bloodletting, while other forms of injury might be claimed an 
attempt at self-operation, for example to remove a perceived blockage to an organ (either 
medical or supernatural). Since the vast majority of these equated – often very directly – to 
contemporary medical practice, such explanations were particularly hard for alienists to 
recognise, threatening their own efforts to incorporate psychiatry and psychology into the 
practice of medicine. A particularly clear example is formed by self-cutting which, early in 
the definition of self-mutilation, did not seem to form part of a pathological model at all (it is 
possible that this may even help to account for the relative scarcity of such injuries in later 
case notes). In 1860, for example, Elizabeth Taylor was reported as having shown: 
latterly some indications of a wish to injure herself, […] to draw blood which she 
fancies would relieve her [.On one occasion...] without any obvious cause or 
previously speaking of it, she rushed into a chemist's shop & asked to be cupped 
immediately, as the only means to relieve the distress of her head. ... She states that 
she hears a supernatural voice "go & bathe" "go & be cupped", that she attempted 
in consequence of this command to draw blood from the temporal artery of [the] 
left hand - she has wounds on her right temple & left hand - she states that she tried 
to injure herself with scissors."191  
 
The complicated dialogue here between self-injury and self-treatment is apparent: although 
a practice discarded by many physicians by the mid-nineteenth century, bloodletting was 
still widely available as a treatment for any type of illness, physical or mental, making it hard 
to define Taylor’s actions as self-injurious. Throughout the nineteenth century, patients 
continued to claim that bleeding constituted self-treatment, whether to bring on 
menstruation,192 or, like Elizabeth Taylor, to relieve pressure in the head.193 As late as 1900, 
56-year-old Alexander McCullock was said to have declared “that he had bled himself with a 
razor, because medical men were not now allowed to bleed & this relieved his head”.194 
Given the proximity of these explanations to recent medical models of disease, it hardly 
seems surprising that patients like McCullock refused to accept the word of their doctors 
that their acts were irrational or, indeed, that they were mad at all. 
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Thus, the variety of explanations given for self-mutilation in asylum case notes, 
some of which were perceived as beneficial (in particular the very prevalent notion of injury 
as healing and relief), indicates once more that the attitudes adopted by alienists were not 
necessarily obvious – or even widely accepted. Indeed, such differential models for self-
inflicted injury continue to be posited today, with self-harm often classed as a “coping 
mechanism” rather than a pathological behaviour.195 Perhaps surprisingly, this does not 
seem to have affected the assumption that self-mutilation is, nonetheless, a psychiatric 
issue, a belief which, if not created, was certainly exacerbated by the elevation of a 
pathological model of self-mutilation above any other type of explanation in the late 
nineteenth century. This understanding, however, was not always or solely couched in 
somatic terms. While the principle of “uncontrollable impulse” often appears in published 
papers, explanations for self-mutilation provided in case books indicate a much more 
nuanced approach, encompassing environmental, social and spiritual elements. In 1891, 
George Savage read a paper to the Psychology Section of the British Medical Association, 
pointing out that:  
Insanity is a relative term after all. What is abnormal in one state of society may be 
quite sane in another, and what are reasonable acts at one age of the same 
individual may be symptoms of insanity at another.196  
 
Several years later, he presented another paper emphasising the use of conduct in order to 
define insanity, nonetheless noting that this “must be recognized as varying with the 
individual; what is abnormal in one being natural in another.”197 Behind these two 
quotations, and much of the material presented in this chapter around efforts to define self-
mutilation, is a transparent effort to uphold the importance of variation and individual 
freedom within a wider context of social progress. Thus, we can see this late nineteenth-
century debate over the role of the individual (by his conduct and heredity) and wider 
society (through environment and culture) in the aetiology of mental illness as part of a far 
broader question, over the proper relation between self-knowledge and social fulfilment. 
Savage’s paper thus blames both “self-culture” and the “artificial relationships of society” 
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for producing insanity.198 The tension between these two elements will be explored in the 
following chapter. 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an over-view of psychiatric writing on self-mutilation, 
indicating how psychiatrists interpreted self-mutilation in terms of a breakdown of volition 
and the faculties of intellect or emotion. In some instances, an emphasis on neurological and 
physiological concepts of impulse and inhibition advanced an understanding of self-
mutilation as a physical phenomenon, revelatory of unseen physiological processes. Such 
accounts show little interest in the actual act of self-wounding, or professed motive, 
assuming the injuries themselves to be evidence of physical loss of will. This view of self-
inflicted injury was, however, rarely the only explanation proffered in British psychiatry, 
despite its seeming popularity in Germany. Indeed, without additional interpretations, 
regarding self-inflicted injury as of psychological or social importance, the topic would not 
have received attention as a particular psychiatric symptom. While this certainly led to some 
conceptual confusion, wherein generalisations were drawn from biological, metaphysical 
and moral perspectives on self-mutilation, it should also remind us to hesitate before 
judging late nineteenth century psychiatry as explicitly somatic, environmental or 
psychological in approach. Indeed, most alienists utilised all three of these concepts, which 
they did not regard as contradictory. As this chapter has argued, it is more instructive to 
view the development of a category of self-mutilation within the context of efforts to 
explore and define what it was to be human, an idea which underwent a particular shift 
during the second half of the nineteenth century.199 
I have thus outlined the ways in which alienists developed an interest in self-
injurious behaviour, encapsulated in the term “self-mutilation,” from the 1860s into the 
1880s. While the application of this categorisation to the historiography of 
professionalization is recognised, this thesis takes a very different approach to the topic, 
instead exploring definitions of self-mutilation both within and outside the asylum in 
relation to understandings of the self. An investigation of asylum practice has indicated that 
those alienists who explored the topic of self-mutilation were not simply describing what 
they saw in their patients, but selecting particular material in relation to their other 
concerns: biological, social and environmental. In order to determine the various ways in 
                                                 
198
 Savage, "The Influence of Surroundings on the Production of Insanity", pp. 533-5. 
199
 Roger Smith, Being Human: Historical Knowledge and the Creation of Human Nature (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007). 
67 
 
which definitions and theories intersected with asylum practice, historians of psychiatry 
need to make far greater use of the archival records of asylums, which have here been used 
to highlight the contradictions between theory and observation, as well as the willingness of 
alienists to adapt their ideas in relation to individual cases. We can, nonetheless, see certain 
general trends in nineteenth-century psychiatric explanations of self-mutilation. From the 
mid-nineteenth century in particular, explanations of human behaviour were increasingly 
cast in naturalistic terms, by analogy to animal behaviour and reliance on physiological and 
neurological concepts. Such a shift also caused a reformulation of concepts of pain, which 
was no longer seen as motivating human behaviour, following the Benthamite model, but 
rather as a medical concern.200 The concept of morbid instinct, however, required an 
understanding of motive, located in the universal model of natural science. Such a model 
assumed that behaviour throughout the natural world was purposive, a principle that was 
often applied to man and his surrounding environment. The major question, which will be 
explored in the following chapter, was whether mankind could truly continue to be regarded 
as natural, and thus bound by the same laws as the animal world, or whether acts like self-
mutilation indicated the “unnatural” state of civilized man. 
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Chapter Two 
Anthropology and the Evolutionary Body: Mutilated Development (1870 – 1900) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 As the previous chapter has indicated, the category of self-mutilation incorporated a 
variety of diverse acts, with similarly varied explanations. What, it might be wondered, made 
it seem useful or desirable to combine these acts under one heading? What caused alienists 
to attempt to develop universal principles underlying self-mutilation, when much of the 
evidence from their patients pointed to the contrary? In this chapter, by setting self-
mutilation within the context of contemporary ideas in anthropology and the natural 
sciences, I aim to indicate the importance of integration to late Victorian psychiatry. By this 
term, I imply two things. First, the efforts of alienists to incorporate their professional field 
into the frameworks of other contemporary disciplines, in particular those of evolutionary 
biology and anthropology. This was not simply an effort to improve the status of psychiatry 
by association with legitimate scientific practice. Rather, the centrality of evolutionary 
debate to later nineteenth-century science and medicine encouraged a widely held belief in 
the unity of nature. In appealing to developments in other disciplines, alienists sought to 
uncover universal ideas relating to mind and body, in order to better understand and treat 
their patients. As George Savage put it: 
I feel yearly more and more convinced that unity is the one characteristic of natural 
working, in this planet at least, and that a law once discovered, whether it be 
discovered among the planets or the plants, has far-reaching powers which at first 
may not be seen.201 
 
The incorporation of various types of injury under the banner of self-mutilation fitted 
comfortably within this ethos. Further, the term integration is intended to denote something 
more specific to psychological medicine. The idea of unity had very definite connotations 
within psychiatry and psychology, for it implied not only harmony within nature as a whole, 
but also the importance of unity within the individual. Just as disparate acts and ideas were 
incorporated into a seemingly neat, objective category of self-mutilation, so nineteenth-
century writers also saw the integration of various “faculties” in the make-up of the 
individual self, as outlined in the previous chapter. Attention to self-inflicted injury in the 
later nineteenth-century can, however, be used to show that the broader concept of 
integrated selfhood is similarly not a prior and unchanging category. 
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 This chapter focuses on the external physical nature of self-injurious wounds: the 
ways in which injuries were read as evidence of the biological structure of the individual, 
including the ways it was assumed this indicated the mental state, providing a broader 
perspective to the physiological approaches to volition examined in the previous chapter. In 
the next chapter, I will concentrate instead on “inwardness”: exploration of self-mutilation 
as revelatory of an internal psychological state through intent, motive or hidden meaning. 
While such approaches might appear to a modern scholar to be distinct, in both chapters I 
intend to make it clear that such concerns were combined in a complex – at times seemingly 
contradictory – manner in late nineteenth century psychiatric theories. We can nonetheless 
see, as the previous chapter has indicated, the extrapolation of claims about an individual’s 
biological nature from his or her self-mutilation as part of a broad shift from religious to 
natural explanations of self-inflicted injury and bodily denial (although, as we have seen 
already, religious explanations remained evident in many areas). In viewing self-mutilation 
as a bodily phenomenon, within the bounds of contemporary medicine, alienists combined a 
volitional model of neurology and physiological psychiatry with the environmental and 
developmental perspectives of sociocultural evolutionists, as will be outlined in the first 
section of this chapter. By placing self-mutilation on an evolutionary scale, alienists came to 
view it as a primitive behaviour. Motives behind self-injury were thus assumed to be 
similarly primitive, such as the love of “self-adornment” and vanity that Darwin claimed 
motivated body modification in so-called savage societies. 
 These explanations were complicated by the political implications of such a view of 
the relation of self-mutilation to the human body, whereby debates also entered into 
concern over what society – and the individual’s relation to it – could or should be. 
Nineteenth-century alienists were not unaware that an individual’s actions might be 
perceived in different ways depending on the social and cultural context in which his 
conduct was exhibited.202 Indeed, this formed a large part of their interest in comparative 
anthropology. Nonetheless, anthropological explanations for religious asceticism, in addition 
to attention to the “mutilations” witnessed in other cultures, provided an attractive basis for 
the development of universal psychological truths about self-mutilation, either regarded as 
indicative of savage traits or, as the second part of this chapter emphasises, in relation to 
evolutionary concepts of habit and instinct. What assumptions did naturalistic definitions of 
self-mutilation lead to? The belief that self-mutilation was a pathological symptom within 
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psychiatry, based on an anthropological model which characterised impulsive behaviour as 
evolutionarily primitive, promoted a general tendency to explain mind in a developmental 
manner. Mental disorder was thus regarded as strongly linked to the physical development 
of the individual: asylum patients were viewed as impulsive children, with attempts to treat 
self-mutilation regarded as educative. Mechanical restraint was re-conceptualised within 
this context as encouraging the development of good “habits” and self-control, improving 
tasks such as reading and painting were encouraged, and physicians attempted to instil a 
sense of moral responsibility into their patients by forming mutual bonds of “trust.” Such 
methods, strikingly similar to the lay religious therapies developed by the Quaker York 
Retreat from the 1790s, remind us that conceptual change is not necessarily accompanied 
by therapeutic development. 
 Further, as the final section indicates, in suggesting a reversal of the process of 
evolution psychiatrists often adopted a more pessimistic outlook than the positive progress 
imagined by sociocultural anthropologists. Comparisons with the ritualistic behaviour of the 
“savage” appeared to indicate the failure of the self-mutilating patient to develop (physically 
and mentally), and thus became regarded as evidence of a regression to a primitive state. By 
extension, such a state appeared to hold implications for the future of civilization and even, 
if physical anthropologists like Francis Galton were to be believed, the biological 
degeneration of race. But why was self-mutilation seen as a concern even for those who did 
not regard heredity as of fundamental importance in discussion of insanity? And why were 
face-picking and hair-plucking (the two self-injurious acts on which this chapter will focus) 
censured as much in asylum case records as more extreme acts of physical violence to the 
body? Patients who injured themselves in this way were regularly suggested in case books to 
be “selfish”, a correlation that is by no means obvious from a modern perspective.  This 
chapter will conclude that the questions raised by psychiatric attention to self-mutilation 
reflect a multitude of contemporary social and political issues, by association with 
sociological concerns over the need for “altruism” in modern society, which can be extended 
to political reflection on the relative merits of Liberal individualism and collectivist Socialism. 
 
2.2 Adornment and Vanity: Self-Mutilation on the Evolutionary Scale 
In 1897, American ophthalmologists George Gould and Walter Pyle included a 
section on self-mutilation in their Anomalies and Curiosities of Medicine. By far the largest 
part of this drew on anthropology to relate a wide variety of “peculiar custom[s] among 
savages,” including facial piercings, scarification or castration for religious or ceremonial 
purposes. All these cultural practices were of significant interest to the medical and popular 
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press in this period.203  The description of non-Western, culturally-sanctioned self-mutilation 
was frequently compared to apparently insane acts of self-injury in Western countries, 
implying the universal nature of such behaviour. These techniques were also adopted by 
British alienists, such as James Adam.204 More recently, Armando Favazza used a similar 
approach, although drawing very different conclusions. Favazza, recognising the way in 
which self-harm is often stigmatised in modern psychiatry, offered examples of what he 
regarded as culturally-sanctioned mutilations to suggest that self-inflicted injury is not 
necessarily an insane or criminal act and, indeed, is regarded as normal or pathological only 
by the external societal response.205 Gould and Pyle, meanwhile, offered non-Western 
examples of so-called self-mutilation to emphasise the pathological nature of such acts, 
drawing a link with “ignorance” and “barbarism.” Self-mutilation was identified as signifying 
an absence of the features of civilised behaviour, and thus a lower stage of evolution, as in 
the writings of alienists like McIntosh and Lindsay discussed in chapter one. For the 
American doctors, it was the civilising influence of Christianity, “condemning as it did the 
barbarous customs of self-mutilation and self-murder, [which made] these practices seem to 
disappear gradually.”206 While others certainly had a markedly different perspective on 
religion (as, for example, James Adam’s equation of self-mutilation directly with religious 
observance), this association between civilization and the Christian religion was widespread. 
Even agnostic or atheistic writers in the field of anthropology tended to chart the 
development of civilization through religious and cultural observances, in particular a 
perceived progress from polytheistic to monotheistic religion.207 The importance of such 
ideas within psychiatry and psychology should not be underestimated, for the notion of 
progression from larger to smaller units (e.g. from tribe to family to individual) increased 
emphasis on a concept of selfhood located specifically within the individual. Henry 
Maudsley, for example, directly applied principles from natural development to human 
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intelligence, for “the analogy of nature rather prepares us to expect that the same progress 
from the general to the special, should be exhibited”.208 
Anthropology as a formal discipline emerged in the late nineteenth century from 
debates within comparative ethnology over the origins of man: in particular, whether the 
human race was one species (the monogenist perspective) or many (polygenist). It was not 
until 1884 that the discipline was formalised with the first university post in anthropology 
created (for Edward Burnett Tylor), and a section for anthropology set up by the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science.209 It is interesting to note that the BAAS did not 
form a section for psychology until 1921: many early psychologists, such as W.H.R. Rivers, 
Charles Myers and William McDougall, situated themselves within the anthropology 
section.210 However, as historian of anthropology George Stocking has indicated, 
formalisation is just one aspect of a larger picture, including the development of a general 
scientific framework of ethnology in the 1830s and ‘40s and its widespread replacement by 
“social evolutionism”, inspired by the publication of On The Origin of Species in 1859.211 Like 
the psychiatric debate over self-mutilation and selfhood, these notions were rooted in very 
broad questions over the state of civilization and social progress, in this instance extending 
from the belief that the evolution of mankind could be traced through a hierarchy of 
contemporary cultures, with Western civilization as its peak.212 Such progressive, West-
centric notions of civilization shaped debate for several decades and, as many historians 
have noted, frequently formed the basis for the justification of colonialism: an important 
background to consider, despite falling outside the remit of this thesis.213 In the later 
nineteenth century, however, an increasing number of writers began to question whether 
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the effects of civilization itself might be detrimental.214 Within all these texts, however, the 
external body and visible behaviours were judged as measurable elements of the effects of 
natural selection in mankind, indicating the level of mental development in the individual.215 
From the importance laid on external characteristics, we can understand the 
evolutionist interest in expression (seen as the visible element of mind) but also the 
fascination of anthropologists with facial “mutilations” and cranial “deformities,” judged to 
be external evidence of a primitive state of mind.216 These were listed among the 
characteristics to be recorded in the Anthropological Institute’s Notes and Queries on 
Anthropology for the Use of Travellers and Residents in Uncivilised Lands.217 First issued in 
1874, this short volume aimed to instruct travellers in the anthropological method, enabling 
them to collect data to be interpreted by “armchair anthropologists” in Britain.218 Turn of 
the century medical texts are replete with images of similar “mutilations”, as shown below. 
 
Figure 8: From Gould and Pyle’s Anomalies and Curiosities of Medicine (1897), p. 749 
In addition to the above, Gould and Pyle also included an engraving showing the bound feet 
of Chinese women: such illustrations were intended to indicate a dramatic difference from 
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Western cultural ideals. The adoption of similar approaches by alienists, who frequently 
used external signs, including self-mutilation, to measure the internal state of mind or brain, 
is hardly surprising given the absence of clear disciplinary boundaries in this period. One of 
the first figures examined by Stocking is James Cowles Prichard, whose Researches into the 
Physical History of Man (1813) was at the centre of British ethnology of the mid-nineteenth 
century.219 Yet the medically-trained Prichard was also visiting physician to a lunatic asylum, 
and his treatise on insanity – in particular his controversial category of moral insanity – 
remained a popular text for alienists throughout the century.220 Towards the end of his 
career (Prichard died in 1848), the doctor expounded the concept of the “psychic unity of 
man”; a notion which, as indicated above, lay behind psychiatric efforts to use 
anthropological investigation of “mutilations” in other cultures to prove that self-inflicted 
injury was a universal human behaviour.221 The underlying assumption that motivation was 
also universal was rarely questioned before the twentieth century: hence alienists used very 
diverse practices as examples of their theories, including the self-castration performed by 
the Russian religious cult (the Skoptsy) and the tradition of eunuchism in the Chinese 
Imperial Court.222 Some of these examples will be explored in more detail in chapter four. 
The widespread use of these analogies – particularly the conflation between physical 
characteristics and mental traits – ensured that certain behaviours within an asylum, 
including self-mutilation, tended to be judged as “primitive.” Such associations worked in a 
similar circular manner to anthropological assumptions: an uncivilized way of life was 
thought to explain differences in intellect or morals, just as a difference in mental 
characteristics between civilised man and savage explained different modes of living. One 
frequent correlation was that made between the “impulsive” and “emotional” state of 
savages and asylum patients. This relied upon a model of individual and racial development 
which assumed that the repression of instinct, including the control of reflexive emotional 
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responses, provided a marker of civilization. Such an emphasis is seen particularly clearly in 
the model of psychology developed by Herbert Spencer, who described a gradual 
developmental transition from instinctive to rational action.223 In a paper read to the 
Anthropological Institute in June 1875, Spencer suggested that anthropologists should pay 
the same attention to differences in human psychology as they paid to physical variation 
between races: Spencer himself laid particular emphasis on emotional divergence.224 
Spencer judged that “[m]ental evolution, both intellectual and emotional, may be measured 
by the degree of remoteness from primitive reflex action.”225 Such a description added a 
reassuring element of control to the physiological model  discussed in chapter one, which 
could seem to reject the notion of free will, by indicating that volition could be acquired.226 
This notion of “self-control” loomed large in psychiatric and psychological texts, and 
provided a common language often adopted by patients. 
“Impulsiveness” was thus often stressed in descriptions of self-mutilation, 
particularly in the so-called “minor” mutilations on which this chapter focuses: hair-plucking 
and skin-picking. As already indicated in chapter one (Figure 7), these behaviours were the 
most common types of self-mutilation in the late nineteenth-century asylum, accounting for 
38% of male patients and 63% of female patients who engaged in some form of self-
injurious act. They were often highly visible acts, as indicated in the photograph below. Such 
images were used to draw a variety of conclusions regarding the patient’s state of mind and 
associations between mind and behaviour. 
                                                 
223
 Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Psychology, 2nd edn. (London: Williams and Norgate, 1870-2). 
224
 Herbert Spencer, "The Comparative Psychology of Man," Mind, 1, no. 1 (1876): 7-20. 
225
 Spencer, The Principles of Psychology, p. 584. 
226
 For more on the “free will” debate, see Roger Smith, "The Physiology of the Will: Mind, Body, and 
Psychology in the Periodical Literature, 1855-1875," in Science Serialized: Representation of the 
Sciences in Nineteenth-Century Periodicals, ed. G. N. Cantor and Sally Shuttleworth (Cambridge; 
London: MIT Press, 2004), 81-110. 
76 
 
 
Figure 9: Mary Stoate at Bethlem, 1895 (Bethlem Art & History Collections Trust) 
The image shows a young woman admitted to Bethlem in February 1895.227 Her restless 
behaviour and frequent outbreaks of laughter on admission saw Mary Stoate diagnosed with 
hysterical mania. While in hospital, this diagnosis was corroborated by a description of Mary 
as impulsive, untidy and careless in dress and, when she began pulling out her hair in August 
this was seen as further evidence of such characteristics. Yet, despite her wildness, Mary 
Stoate was simultaneously considered to be solitary and reserved. The case book, completed 
by Clinical Assistant Dr Pring, reports that: “Patient keeps standing up in the position 
indicated in the photograph, continually picking her head. Remains by herself, doesn’t talk”. 
This suggested that Mary’s behaviour was believed to indicate her preoccupation with her 
own troubles, evidenced by an unwillingness to socialise: the photograph was represented 
as visual evidence of this state of isolation. In the image, Mary’s head is tilted downwards 
and sideways, looking away from the photographer as if she hasn’t noticed he is there. One 
hand is folded across her chest, while the other is raised to her head, although she doesn’t 
seem to be have been pulling out her hair when the photograph was taken (there is no 
blurring to suggest movement), but instead cradling her head with her fingers. It hardly 
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seems surprising that such an image might be used to emphasise a connection between 
mind and behaviour, for Stoate herself encourages this by both her pose and the exposure 
of her scalp. Mary was eventually discharged uncured, but visited the Hospital a year later, 
at which time she was considered entirely recovered. 
 How should we view this representation of psychiatric patients? Considering the 
acts of skin-picking and hair-plucking from a sociocultural evolutionary perspective helps to 
explain how, for the nineteenth century alienists writing on self-mutilation, these patients 
could be categorised with those who exhibited the more physically destructive behaviours of 
castration, amputation and enucleation. Just as evolutionary development was thought to 
progress along a gradual scale, alienists insisted on a progression of self-mutilation, from 
major injuries through to the “nervous, fidgety, restless habits” that “less perhaps in 
magnitude, are common among nervous people who are not insane.”228 Indeed, the extent 
of such behaviour at any given time was regarded as a “valuable criterion” of a patient’s 
nervous condition: an indication that the “excitable”, “emotional” or “reserved” (and thus 
particularly susceptible) patient had lost all self-control and was in danger of outright 
insanity.229 In effect, self-mutilation made the internal state of insanity externally visible to 
the physician, in the same way that the physical characteristics and modes of life in savage 
populations were correlated with their mental and moral make-up by anthropologists.230 
Moreover, hair-plucking and skin-picking were behaviours that appeared quite directly 
comparable to savage behaviour. Many anthropologists in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, as W.H.R. Rivers later observed, were particularly interested in the 
material culture that could be directly observed in savage communities, including “such 
obvious practices as tattooing, distension of the ear-lobe, circumcision, etc.”231 In his 
controversial theory of “sexual selection,” Darwin similarly made heavy reference to 
anthropological accounts of body modification in other cultures when exploring the 
influence of beauty in determining the “marriages of mankind”. Although suggesting that 
“[h]ardly any part of the body, which can be unnaturally modified, has escaped,” he 
nonetheless concentrated on the face, which, “with us is chiefly admired for its beauty, so 
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with savages it is the chief seat of mutilation.”232 The photographs taken by anthropologists 
invariably emphasised such “deformities”, as in the image below, taken at the Wellcome 
Tropical Research Labs in Cameroon in 1911.  
 
Figure 10: Photograph of a group of Nyam-nyam showing their sharpened teeth 
(Wellcome Library, London) 
The group in this photograph have clearly been told to display their sharpened teeth, in 
order to emphasise this element of their appearance, although their clothing and stance 
would distinguish them far less clearly from the Western researchers who photographed 
them. The baring of the teeth also promotes animalistic associations, by requiring the 
people photographed to snarl, probably not their usual expression, but potentially 
interpreted in this way by viewers. 
  The second edition of Notes and Queries on Anthropology (1892) included a long 
section on “artificial deformities”, of which the vast majority related to the head and face 
(three out of four sections).233 This section was associated with that of “personal ornaments” 
by a note indicating that the practice of “tattooing and circumcision &c.” had been placed 
elsewhere, “although in one sense they may be regarded as kinds of artificial 
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deformation.”234 Just as alienists considered most forms of bodily damage under the heading 
of self-mutilation, the anthropological viewpoint also conflated “in one sense” every type of 
body modification, no matter how or why performed, including binding, amputation, 
castration, scarification, tattooing and piercing (and even though so-called artificial 
deformities were investigated under anthropography (physical anthropology) and piercing 
and tattooing under ethnography (social anthropology)). Such an approach highlights the 
interesting contradiction in Darwin’s account of sexual selection: by regarding facial 
alterations as unequivocally mutilating, they could be separated from the beautifying 
procedures of westerners, such as make-up, hairstyle or ear-piercing. Despite this, 
mutilations were deemed to stem from efforts to appear attractive, represented as an 
extreme or perverted version of the “natural” need of physical beauty for attracting a sexual 
partner. Degenerationists simply reversed this process, regarding decorative ear-piercing 
and tattooing in western societies as evidence of a reversion to savage tendencies, for 
example the assertion that “[t]he ludicrous custom of piercing the ears for the wearing of 
ornaments, typical of savagery and found in all indigenous African tribes, is universally 
prevalent among our own people.“235 
Darwin’s concern with breeding led him to emphasise the relation of all mutilations 
in savages to sexual selection, thus insisting that the “lower” animal instincts were the main 
motivations for such behaviours: “self-adornment, vanity, and the admiration of others.” 
Meanwhile the observation that, in most tribes, men were more finely ornamented than 
women Darwin attributed to the “characteristic selfishness of man.”236 Never mind that he 
had previously suggested that a need for the admiration of others advanced the 
development of the “social instincts” responsible for the development of civilization: here 
vanity was held as demonstrative of the supposed selfishness of savages, a prior belief which 
also meant that those motivations for body modification which might have been considered 
related to higher feelings (such as religious sentiment), were relegated by Darwin to the 
status of lesser motives. The assumption that body modification was associated with vanity 
was also taken up in Notes and Queries, where no other possible motives were reported.237 
If piercing, scarification, and other modifications were deemed evidence of vanity and 
selfishness in savages then it hardly seems surprising that self-mutilation became similarly 
regarded within an asylum context. By beginning with the individual case study, many 
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alienists reversed the process explored by anthropologists, in which the biological evolution 
of the species was seen as metaphorically extendable to both the evolution of civilization 
and the education of the individual.238 Instead, in a case study, alienists might regard the 
individual as representative of a broader human state. Thus, a line could be drawn from 
patient to population at large, indicating the damaging effects that a lack of sociability in the 
individual might have for the progress of civilization, and the biological future of the race. 
Self-mutilation provided a distinctive focus, externally visible, and easily comparable to the 
traits of savages. There were, of course, dissenting voices. In his 1887 study on totemism, 
anthropologist James Frazer, for example, emphasised the relation of mutilations to 
religious practice. 
In order, apparently, to put himself more fully under the protection of the totem, 
the clansman is in the habit of assimilating himself to the totem by dressing in the 
skin or other part of the totem animal, arranging his hair and mutilating his body so 
as to resemble the totem, and representing the totem on his body by cicatrices, 
tattooing or paint.239 
 
Although introducing an apparent interest in cultural relativity, in that he attempts to 
explore closely the claimed value of certain physically damaging acts within non-western 
societies, Frazer’s ideas nonetheless fitted into evolutionary arguments in other ways. As we 
have already seen, religious practices were also frequently judged on a progressive scale, 
and it would have been no surprise to many alienists that self-injurious practices might be 
connected with what they viewed as primitive superstition, an assumption that also 
accorded well with the assumption that religious delusions were frequently to blame for acts 
of self-mutilation within the asylum. 
 
2.3 Civilization and Self-Control: the Re-Interpretation of Mechanical Restraint 
Despite the widespread interest in evolutionary thought in Victorian psychiatry, 
there are a number of complications to the anthropological view of self-mutilation. While 
this perspective is certainly evident in many publications, it is also apparent that, in practice, 
not every individual who mutilated themselves within the asylum was considered impulsive, 
introspective or emotional. Skin-picking and hair-plucking were also not always regarded as 
analogous behaviours:240 for example, Figures 8 and 9 (below) show that the former was 
more closely associated with melancholia than the latter. This diagnosis accounted for 68% 
of patients who picked their skin, while only 20% were regarded as suffering from mania. In 
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patients who plucked their hair, the difference between melancholia and mania was much 
less marked: 53% of patients were diagnosed with melancholia and 37% with mania. 
 
Figure 11: Chart showing skin-picking at Bethlem by diagnosis, 1880 - 1900 
 
Figure 12: Chart showing hair-plucking at Bethlem by diagnosis, 1880 - 1900 
Nonetheless, skin-picking and hair plucking were often regarded as closely related in 
asylums, in part because around 11% of patients exhibited both behaviours. One link 
between the two lay in the suggestion that both might be caused by skin irritation, although 
this was often discounted when patients failed to corroborate the theory. Still, most of the 
early texts discussing both behaviours were written by dermatologists seeking such a 
physiological cause, and it was a French dermatologist, Henri Hallopeau, who coined the 
term “trichotillomania” (still used to describe compulsive hair-plucking today), in 1889.241 In 
addition, however, both behaviours, while not necessarily causing long-term damage, were 
highly visible, altering the appearance of the head and face. We might regard this emphasis 
as part of a more widespread medical interest in the head and face that lay within many 
theories related to psychiatry during the nineteenth century: phrenology, physiognomy, and 
the suggestions of Alfred Wallace that natural selection in mankind acted on the intellect 
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and social emotions, with change made visible in the skull and face.242 However, there is no 
evidence that alienists explicitly made this connection. 
 Although those evolutionists who saw progress as inevitable, such as Darwin, 
regarded mutilations in savages at the opposite end of the scale from decorative practices in 
western civilizations, it is not surprising to find that others considered new forms of 
aesthetic surgery in the West “cosmetic mutilations.” Gould and Pyle expressly stated that 
such mutilations were a reversion to primitive vanity: “It is quite possible that some of our 
modern operators have overstepped the bounds of necessity, and performed unjustifiable 
plastic operations to satisfy the vanity of their patients.”243 Sander Gilman offers an 
interesting explanation of such concerns around cosmetic surgery, arguing that facial 
alterations in the 1880s and ‘90s aimed to allow an individual to “pass” by disguising visible 
racial or moral attributes, such as “too-Jewish” features, or a “drunkard’s nose.” 244 The face, 
after all, was strongly believed to indicate a person’s character; hence the importance 
attached to composite photographs in late nineteenth-century criminology, which aimed to 
illustrate a common facial “type” for any specific social element.245 Rooted in Enlightenment 
ideas of self-improvement, surgery allowed a person to “remake the self,” appearing happy 
and healthy and thus (deceptively) normal. Yet the deception provoked disapproval over the 
possibilities of cosmetic surgery. In contrast, the visibly disfiguring actions of face-picking 
and hair-plucking might be regarded as making unhappiness visible, marking the insane body 
as different (and thus socially dangerous): in effect, un-making, or destroying, the self. 
Such social and political concerns can be viewed most explicitly in relation to gender. 
At Bethlem, far more women engaged in hair-plucking than men (73% of these patients 
were female). As with many other insane behaviours (for example undressing in public, the 
destruction of property or eating “ravenously”), such self-mutilations were interpreted as a 
rejection, consciously or otherwise, of social propriety. Long hair in women is “universally 
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admired”, claimed evolutionary anthropologist Winwood Reade, like many of his 
contemporaries connecting hair directly to femininity.246 Hair was not simply related to 
ideals of beauty, however, but also other elements of “proper” behaviour. In the Sherlock 
Holmes Adventure, The Copper Beeches, the detective is consulted by Violet Hunter, a 
governess who has just been offered a surprisingly lucrative position on the condition that 
she cuts off her hair. Miss Hunter is horrified by the suggestion: indeed, her prospective 
employer’s words sound almost obscene. “I could hardly believe my ears ... I could not 
dream of sacrificing [my hair] in this off-hand fashion.”247 Eventually, she decides she cannot 
afford such principles, and cuts off her hair to accept the situation. Although on the surface 
much of this tale, including Miss Hunter’s repeated use of the melodramatic term “sacrifice” 
might appear to be a misogynistic comment on the vanity of women, more is implied. 
Holmes repeatedly tells Watson that “no sister of his should ever have accepted such a 
situation”248 and the absence of any family members to advise and protect Miss Hunter is 
used to emphasise the governess’ vulnerability. In cutting her hair in return for payment, it is 
suggested that Violet Hunter has prostituted herself. Indeed, in female Bethlem patients, 
cutting the hair short was often viewed as self-mutilation. In 1893, 30-year-old Edith Blyth 
was described as having, under an impulse, “cut off all her hair, cut her hand, and her 
foot.”249 By grouping these three behaviours together, apparently compelled by the same 
impulse, it was indicated that cutting the hair was a similar act to wounding any other part 
of the body. 
The rejection of feminine beauty through hair-plucking might make such women 
seem politically dangerous, like the “manly women” and “glorified spinsters” discussed in 
Judith Walkowitz’s City of Dreadful Delight, who cut their hair short and had other goals in 
life than marriage:250 25-year-old Alice Gopp, for example, was described as “very boyish and 
untidy” with short hair.251 The rejection of proscribed gender roles also made these women 
seem sexually dubious: in many cases, the act of hair cutting or plucking was explicitly linked 
to sexuality. The young Annie Brinckes “cut her hair short and shortened her dress,”252 an act 
of both childish rebellion and provocative sexuality. Beginning to wear long dresses was a 
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sign of womanhood for the Victorian bourgeois girl, yet short dresses were also associated 
with the lower classes – Annie had expressed a desire to look like a servant. Judging by 
Annie’s determination, the prospect of service might hold a tantalising prospect of 
independence (whatever the reality) for young middle-class women, some of whom 
welcomed admission to Bethlem as an escape from overbearing parents. Ada Smith was 
reported as describing her home life as “very quiet and irksome” because “her parents allow 
her to have very little company”. Bethlem, however, offered Ada the opportunity to 
socialise, and “she greatly enjoys the music and the tennis she gets here.” 253 
Judith Walkowitz has indicated that prostitutes were seen as “unsexed” through 
their claimed exhibition of “male lust”.254 Walkowitz’s analysis of the way in which late 
Victorian women identified with the prostitute victims of the Ripper murders is particularly 
interesting here.255 From September 1888, many patients admitted to Bethlem held 
delusions concerning the Whitechapel murders, yet there was a clear gender divide in these 
concerns. Male patients feared that they were suspected of being the murderer, while 
women openly identified with the victims. In some cases this promoted a link between self-
mutilation and “deviant” sexuality. Annie Geake, a 25-year-old teacher, was admitted to 
Bethlem in early 1889. Geake’s delusions centred on the idea, in the words of her brother-in-
law, “that she was to be cut-up – unsexed – like the Whitechapel victims.” Geake heard 
"gentlemen's voices", particularly those “of a person "lost" to her”: hinted to be a former 
lover. Bethlem’s medical officers thus made a direct link between Annie Geake and the 
prostitutes murdered by Jack the Ripper, suggesting that “with ideas of this nature there is a 
considerable admixture of the sexual element.” Later, in the hospital, when the “erotic and 
troublesome” Geake attempted to injure herself, this was simply regarded as further 
evidence of her sexual state, with her “erotic” ideas thought to have predisposed her 
towards self-mutilation.256 
The large number of excellent feminist histories of psychiatry in the late nineteenth 
century has tended to lead to the impression, by omission, that proscribed gender roles 
were only problematic for Victorian women.257 Yet the connection between the “unsexed” 
prostitute and self-mutilation reminds us that “sexual self-mutilation” was generally viewed 
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as a peculiarly male behaviour. The associations of self-mutilation with male sexuality will be 
discussed in greater depth in chapter four, but it is interesting to return here to the 
tendency in male patients to pluck facial, rather than head hair. Christopher Oldstone-
Moore has suggested that, between 1850 and 1890, the beard was adopted by Englishmen 
“as a signifier of masculine identity,” affirming authority politically and within the family to 
provide personal reassurance at a time in which both employment and family relations were 
markedly changing.258 In 1893, Bethlem patient Frederick Renwick explicitly related his facial 
hair to his sense of masculinity. Before admission to Bethlem, Renwick imagined that 
someone broke into his house, “took away his sense, cut off his beard & moustache & 
applied some lotion to prevent it growing again.” He later imagined that the same individual 
cut his penis, and angrily told the doctors that he was “a man and not a man-woman.”259 For 
Renwick, his beard and moustache were the visible indicators of his masculinity and hence 
his authority. Although in Renwick’s case no actual mutilation occurred, for other patients 
the threat of injury might lead to it. In 1895, Francis Sheridan Chamberlain, unemployed and 
living with his sister, complained of ill-treatment when he thought his hair and moustache 
had been cut too short in the Hospital. Three months later he was regularly plucking out his 
beard, something which continued until his discharge at the end of 1896, by which time he 
“need[ed] a lot of looking after.”260 The apparently impulsive nature of hair-plucking in both 
men and woman, then, could be viewed by contemporaries as related to external as well as 
internal (biological and psychological) factors: an understandable, but nonetheless 
problematic, reaction to the self-control increasingly demanded by society. 
We can see this most clearly by exploring the way in which self-injurious behaviours 
could be “sternly repressed” in the asylum, an approach George Fielding Blandford 
recommended to educate children away from “nervous habits”.261 From this, one might 
anticipate that the adoption of an anthropological model, which placed certain behaviours 
at particular stages of individual and social development, would lead to increasing use of 
physical methods of treatment, including mechanical restraint, within asylums (as, indeed, 
appears to have been the case in schools at this time).262 Indeed, restraint did begin to make 
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a reappearance in many asylums, most publicly at Bethlem (as described in chapter one), in 
the later decades of the nineteenth century. These restraints differed from those used in 
asylums prior to the non-restraint movement of the mid-century, and were closely 
monitored by the Commissioners in Lunacy, who required every use to be recorded and 
justified. Nonetheless, in practice, justifications were extremely vague: for example, “for 
medical reasons” might include stopping a patient removing a dressing after an operation or 
the prevention of self-mutilation, suicidal impulses or masturbation, while the methods used 
also carried vague and euphemistic names, such as “soft gloves” and “strong dresses”.263 
At the centre of the debate over mechanical restraint, however, was the question as 
to whether restraint was used as a matter of convenience, or constituted a form of 
treatment. In the 1890 Lunacy Act, mechanical restraint was explicitly “legalised” for the first 
time, through an attempt to define which items could (as well as could not) be used. 
Although the Commissioners declared that they did not want this “to be construed as 
implying greater countenance by them of this mode of treatment,” they also commented 
that, at times, “mechanical restraint is beneficial to the patient.”264 This implied that certain 
patients might be incapable of controlling themselves, and thus need mechanical assistance. 
This had, of course, long been a legal argument for the incarceration of the mad. Indeed, the 
beneficial nature of mechanical coercion was frequently emphasised in medical arguments 
against the introduction of non-restraint in the 1830s and ‘40s.265 What was new in the late 
nineteenth century was the notion that a patient could somehow be trained by the process 
of restraint so that, when restraint was removed, he or she would no longer engage in 
destructive practices. The same was occasionally claimed for medication, such as the regular 
use of sedatives, although pharmaceutical measures received far less attention.266 This view 
required the acceptance of a developmental understanding of behaviour, as described 
above, and also found in contemporary descriptions of the formation of “habits”. 
The importance of habit in physiology had been emphasised by W.B. Carpenter, who 
laid increasing importance on the notion in his textbooks, beginning with the role of habit in 
reflex action in Principles of Human Physiology (first published 1842), and later incorporating 
                                                 
263
 “Soft gloves” were padded to the thickness of about an inch, while “strong dresses” restrained 
patients by placing the hands in padded extremities. George Savage, "The Mechanical Restraint of the 
Insane," The Lancet, 132, no. 3398 (1888): 738-739, p. 738. 
264
 Editorial, "Mechanical Restraint (Occasional Notes of the Quarter)," Journal of Mental Science, 36, 
no. 154 (1890): 381-382, p. 382. This article complained that the “legalization” of restraint was 
retrogressive. 
265
 For example, Metropolitan Commissioners in Lunacy. Report of the Metropolitan Commissioners in 
Lunacy to the Lord Chancellor (London: Bradbury and Evans, 1844), pp. 140-1 
266
 George Savage, “Hyoscyamine and its Uses,” Journal of Mental Science, 25 (1879): 177-84, p. 183. 
87 
 
an entire chapter on the topic in Principles of Mental Physiology (first published 1874).267 For 
Carpenter and, later, Darwin, habits differed from instincts in that they were learned, rather 
than innate.268 These habits were strengthened by regular use and, eventually, might 
become almost as strong as instincts, thus allowing for their inheritance: something in which 
Carpenter strongly believed.269 Although, as Robert Richards has noted, Darwin increasingly 
relied on the mechanism of natural selection, rather than habit, to explain animal behaviour, 
he nonetheless retained the idea of habit even in his later works, in particular to the 
development of social and moral traits in mankind, an emphasis he gained from 
Carpenter.270 From this approach, impulse could explain the development of “higher” 
powers of mind, rather than being solely a force that the civilised individual needed to 
overcome.271 This positive notion of habit was certainly accepted by some alienists,272 
although the evolutionary context also meant that self-mutilation could come to be 
regarded as directly hereditary, something that was also argued in the case of suicide.273 The 
mental state perceived to be connected with such behaviour could be construed in somatic 
terms, and thus viewed as presenting evidence of direct (biological) heredity. Thus, “nervous 
habits” in a parent might be felt to cause the development of self-mutilation in a child: as in 
one case reported to show a “singular family tendency to excessive constipation and self-
mutilation”!274 Here, the physical symptom of constipation was connected with a variety of 
other attributes seen in the same family, including, as we shall see, the physical change of 
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organs after death, and acts of self-inflicted injury, as if all came from the same cause, which 
had been directly inherited. 
This case was published by James Howden, of the Montrose Royal Asylum: another 
Scottish alienist, educated at the University of Edinburgh. Howden had previously read his 
report at the Edinburgh Quarterly Meeting of the MPA in November 1881, where he may 
have come into contact with James Adam (at that time based in Dumfries, from whence he 
made regular journeys to Edinburgh), whose first article on self-mutilation was published not 
long afterwards. Howden described three members of the same family: 26-year-old mason’s 
wife, J.C., admitted in 1855, her brother A.C, admitted at the age of 22 in 1854, and a sister, 
M.C., 24 years old when she was admitted in September 1874. Two factors appear to have 
encouraged Howden to speak, and then publish, on the case. One was J.C.’s death, in 
February 1877, following which a post-mortem examination uncovered significant 
degeneration of her bones and fatty tissue, but little or no cerebral change. This suggested 
to Howden that the mental symptoms from which she had suffered (including mania and 
self-mutilation) might have been connected to osteomalacia, rather than structural lesions 
of the brain. The second point emphasised was the repetition of an act of self-mutilation: in 
1868, J.C. had attempted to gouge out her eyes, much injuring them in the process. 
Fourteen years earlier, younger brother A.C. had also gouged out one of his eyes, although 
Howden gave little detail. Presumably, it was the second enucleation (which, as indicated in 
chapter one, appears to have been a fairly uncommon act) that sparked his interest in the 
family. The post mortem on J.C. led him to relate all her mental and physical symptoms to 
structural change, suggesting that this might also be apparent in her siblings, who had 
suffered similar digestive problems. 
The tendency to constipation was always marked during the maniacal attacks. The 
same condition existed in the brother’s case, and he died from ulceration of the 
stomach. A younger sister [M.C.]... had it to a still more marked degree.275 
 
Rather than seeing the self-mutilation as a response to a physical condition, the similar acts 
in two members of the same family meant that Howden considered this, too, as an inherited 
behaviour. This was despite the existence of a wide variety of different self-injurious acts on 
the part of J.C., who, over a period of thirteen years, had also bitten off part of her tongue, 
made various wounds and bruises on her arms, and severely lacerated her vagina. It was the 
enucleation, however, that most impressed Howden, who anticipated the appearance of this 
trait in the younger sister as well. 
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The tendency to self-mutilation has not yet shown itself in M.C., but it is remarkable 
that when J.C. gouged out her eyes in 1868 she was not aware that her brother A.C. 
did the same thing in 1854.276 
 
The use of the qualifying “yet” in the first sentence indicates that Howden thought that, as 
she already suffered from the constipation he assumed was inherited, M.C. might well 
exhibit a tendency to self-mutilation at some point. He does not, however, make clear why 
this should be an inherited trait rather than imitative behaviour. Why should J.C. have been 
unaware of her brother’s act, which occurred when she was herself an adult and not 
certified as insane? Was the enucleation concealed from the entire family, given that the 
brother died less than a year afterwards? Did the brother, about whom we are told little, 
have similar delusions to J.C., who “imagined that God had ordered her to mutilate 
herself”?277 It seems that Howden’s prior assumptions as to the hereditary nature of insanity 
caused him to view self-mutilation as inherited in this case: others might just as easily have 
attributed the acts of the C. family to habit or imitation. 
Indeed, it is in relation to the concept of habit that we should view the discussion of 
restraint in self-mutilation: a belief in the beneficial nature of habit formation, associated 
with the idea that impulses might be difficult or impossible to control (due to their 
physiological nature). George Savage, for example, declared that restraint was indispensible 
for patients “given to determined attempts at self-mutilation ... and some have even 
expressed a hope that similar treatment should be followed in case of a relapse.”278 Such an 
attitude was articulated still more clearly in an article presented by Peter Maury Deas, 
superintendant of Wonford House (a private asylum in Exeter), to the South Western 
Division of the MPA in October 1895. Deas described a variety of cases “classed under the 
head of self-mutilation” in which, after mechanical restraint had been used for a period of 
days, weeks, or even months, patients no longer attempted to injure themselves. While, no 
doubt, a variety of explanations for this apparent “cure” could be suggested, Deas 
specifically alluded to the topic in one case of face-picking where, after two weeks of 
wearing gloves, Deas declared that “the habit was completely broken.”279 This statement 
presents a more negative portrayal of Darwin’s model of the acquisition of traits by a 
process of use-inheritance (in that habits required to be overcome, not developed), but 
nonetheless  suggests an evolutionary approach to impulse, in which self-control might be 
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acquired. In the discussion following the paper, most other alienists were in agreement with 
Deas that “gradual improvement” would take place until the restraints could be safely 
removed: in effect, the aim was to restore the self-control that had apparently been lost by 
altering the physiological response of the body. Restraints prevented “primitive reflex 
action,” forcibly ensuring the patient exhibited (and then, apparently, acquired) the civilised 
state of self-control. Photographs in asylum case books seemingly reflect this view. The 
photograph below shows a young male patient at Bethlem in the early 1880s, whose padded 
gloves were intended to prevent him rubbing away hair from the top of his head. 
 
Figure 13: Robert Haussmann wearing padded gloves at Bethlem, 1884 (Bethlem Art & 
History Collections Trust) 
Robert Haussmann, a 34-year-old Clerk, was admitted to Bethlem in April 1884, and 
frequently described as “vacant” and “wet and dirty” (i.e. incontinent). He did, it seems, 
have periods of lucidity, in which he “talked rationally in English to the attendants, played a 
game of cards & smoked a cigarette.” However, following such periods, he was soon back in 
restraints. The photograph, however, does not seem to reflect descriptions of Robert’s 
vacant attitude. He is pictured staring directly at the camera, seated in what appears to be a 
relaxed pose, despite his clothing. Here, Robert appears engaged and alert, rather than 
vacant and speechless: the intention may have been to indicate that the restraints 
themselves have made the patient calm and tractable. Despite this “therapeutic” use of 
retraint, Robert did not recover from his illness, and died at Hanwell Asylum in May 1889, 
apparently from General Paralysis of the Insane. 
91 
 
Restraint was certainly a recurrent issue at Bethlem, particularly in relation to the 
common behaviours of hair-plucking and face-picking. The impulsive nature of these 
behaviours was frequently highlighted by emphasising the cases of patients who, we are 
told, requested mechanical restraint, being unable to otherwise control themselves. In 
March 1891, Annie Bourne, who had “always [been] excitable and hysterical” began picking 
the skin on her head and “at her own request wore gloves to prevent it”280 while, in 1898, 
Reginald Gleadow, who “became wild at Cambridge ... wears gloves voluntarily to prevent 
picking of fingers.”281 Both of these patients had been considered neurotic before their 
admission, and their self-mutilation was regarded as indicating a breakdown of self-control 
that was already defective. What is more interesting, however, is that this rather simplistic 
explanation of self-mutilation as an external representation of physiological impulse is not 
indicated by the majority of case records: of the 174 patients who began or continued to 
pluck their hair or pick their skin while in hospital, only 48 were put into any form of 
restraint, usually in the form of padded gloves. Thus, around three quarters of the patients 
who picked their skin or pulled out their hair were not restrained in any way, as seen in 
figure 14, below. 
 
Figure 14: Graph showing restraint by psychiatric diagnosis in skin-picking and hair-
plucking patients at Bethlem 
Surprisingly, in the above graph, the diagnosis that was regarded as having the most severe 
neurological consequences (for it was the only one with which lesions of the brain could be 
correlated post-mortem), General Paralysis of the Insane, led to the lowest level of 
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mechanical restraint. Even in the case of Mania and Dementia, also regarded to have poor 
prognoses, only around a quarter of patients were restrained. 
But what other conclusions can we draw concerning the relative levels of restraint? 
Did they differ for male and female patients? Figure 15 indicates the levels of restraint at 
Bethlem by gender. 
 
Figure 15: Graph showing restraint by gender in skin-picking and hair-plucking patients 
Two main points of difference are indicated. First, it appears that the “strong dress” was 
used far more frequently on female patients who injured themselves than men, for whom 
padded gloves were thought to suffice. In addition, we can see that the level of restraint for 
hair-plucking was considerably higher in female patients than in male patients – a total of 
48% of the former, but only 8% of the latter were restrained. Such might well reflect the 
associations between hair and femininity indicated previously: hair-plucking was considered 
a much more injurious practice in women than in men. Of course, there is no reason for 
considering hair-plucking more physically dangerous in women: the increased concern thus 
seems to reflect social fears. Overall, however, the level of restraint for both male and 
female patients was low: just over 20% wore padded gloves, while use of the strong dress in 
female patients means that a higher number (30%) of women were restrained. 
 However, the fact that nearly 70% of women engaging in these behaviours were not 
restrained contradicts the view put forward by many evolutionists that women were much 
more impulsive than men, and thus required a greater level of behaviour-regulating 
intervention.282 In some cases, specific reasons were given for the absence of mechanical 
restraint. At times, this allows us to reflect on doctor-patient relations, as in the case of 35-
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year-old teacher Jessie FitzGerald, admitted in 1898 suffering from Recurrent Mania. 
According to her brother, Jessie had recently set fire to herself. The patient herself was said 
to have insisted that, rather than being self-inflicted, her burns were proof of the 
annoyances to which she had been subjected in Paris. In January 1899, Jessie began to re-
open some of her wounds by rubbing, stating that her Parisian persecutors still troubled her. 
She also exhibited frequent outbursts of violence, usually attributed to impulse within the 
asylum. Yet, when Jessie began “biting pieces out of her arms” in June 1899 and gloves were 
ordered, it was subsequently noted that “[a]s she has promised not to do it again, the gloves 
have not been used.”283 Despite her seemingly deluded state, Jessie FitzGerald was not 
treated as if she had no rational control over her actions, as it was assumed that her promise 
would be kept (as, indeed, seems to have been the case). Like Jessie, other patients were 
encouraged to keep their word, and thus presumably deemed to have some measure of self-
control.284 The emphasis doctors laid on verbal contracts with their patients seems surprising 
if, as many historians have argued, late nineteenth-century psychiatry was guided 
predominantly by somatic principles. Here, it reminds us that the concept of moral 
treatment remained, alongside more explicitly physiological theorisations of insanity.  
Directly medical reasons were, however, also given to explain the absence of 
restraint. Physiologically speaking, picking could be regarded as potentially curative. Five 
months after Eveline Burton was admitted to Bethlem in November 1894, Assistant 
Physician Theo Hyslop reported that: “The patient has taken to picking her forehead and left 
temple. She is allowed to do so in the hope that the counter irritation may act 
beneficially.”285 Counter-irritation, a phrase employed by physicians to describe the 
supposed medical benefits of blistering and similar corrosive remedies applied to the skin for 
the treatment of internal conditions, had proved a controversial topic in nineteenth-century 
medicine. Yet it doesn’t seem surprising, given the obvious physical barrier to accessing the 
brains of their patients, and their interest in finding a connection between insanity and 
physical change,  that alienists would retain interest in such theories. Bethlem physicians 
frequently remarked on the strange lucidity of certain patients during an attack of fever or 
other bodily disease: George Savage claimed that this sometimes resulted in complete cure 
if the experience raised the body temperature or caused the patient pain, going on to 
declare that “[w]e have seen the like result follow severe inflammation of the hand due to 
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self-inflicted injury.”286 Indeed, “fever cure” was a growing area of research in the late 
nineteenth century, particularly in the work of German experimental physicians like Julius 
Wagner-Jaurreg.287 While a cure was not realised for Eveline, who was still picking her arms 
and neck in June 1895 and was subsequently discharged uncured, it nonetheless indicates 
that the potentially curative – and thus beneficial – nature of self-inflicted injuries remained 
a matter of consideration for alienists, as well as their patients. However, explicit reasons for 
the lack of mechanical restraint were not given at all for many patients who picked their skin 
or pulled out their hair, even though some of these were reported as having requested it. 
The “hypochondriacal” Samuel Starky,  who had “a habit of picking the fundament”, asked in 
1889 “to be allowed to restrain the hands by means of a chain which he formerly used for 
the purpose and which his brother brought for him.” Starky’s requests were repeatedly 
refused.288 The contemporary psychiatric characterisation of mechanical restraint as curative 
does not, therefore, explain why the vast majority of self-mutilating patients were not 
restrained, indicating that a developmental model of self-mutilation, incorporating notions 
of impulse and habit, was only one of a number of explanatory frameworks employed by 
alienists. By further investigating this topic, we can also explore the broader context of 
attention paid to “minor” mutilations, regularly suggested to be “disfiguring” or “marring 
appearance.”289 
 
2.4 Moral Insanity: Self-Mutilation and Selfishness 
 In 1874, The Lancet reported a relation between religious fervour and self-
mutilation, claiming that stigmatisation (in other words, the artificial creation of the wounds 
attributed to Jesus ) had become a “trade” among the “Ultramonte girls of the Continent”. 
Such self-wounding was described as a taking of “hideous liberties … with their persons.”290 
The description of wounds as “hideous” indicates both the importance placed on what was 
considered attractive or aesthetically pleasing, as well as the censure which might greet a 
departure from what was conventionally deemed to be appropriate appearance. In addition, 
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the suggestion that the girls were taking liberties indicates a complicated connection 
between self-mutilation and social and political freedom. If these girls were not free to 
injure their bodies, to whom did their bodies belong? Moreover, in what might this taking of 
hideous liberties result? The writer pointed to the potential threat of the Catholic Church, 
concluding that “this latest development of Ultramonte fanaticism” provided the best 
possible justification for “the policy by which Prince Bismarck is attempting to complete the 
reformation in Germany.” This, it should be recognised, was not a rejection of religion per 
se, but rather the suggestion that a particular form of religion might be the reverse of 
national solidarity and political progress. In an article addressing the new concept of altruism 
in the second half of the nineteenth century, Thomas Dixon has suggested that, although 
debates often focused on the apparent divide between science and religion, at the root of 
such issues were, instead, “fundamentally political questions about what constituted the 
ideal society, about who was a member of one’s moral community, and about how that 
community should be organised.”291 Within the cultural concerns made apparent by 
discussions over skin-picking, hair-plucking and appearance lie similar political issues. 
Many of these concerns were associated with the belief that evolution might not be 
a straightforward, linear process, but something that could be halted or even reversed. Such 
a doctrine appeared likely to many alienists. As many of their charges had previously fulfilled 
an active role in society, the onset of mental illness seemed to suggest regression to an 
earlier stage of development. Such debates were often closely related to efforts to explain 
the acquisition of moral traits through a process of natural selection. Particularly influential 
was Greg’s pessimistic article referred to in chapter one, in which the author suggested that, 
in “our complicated modern communities ... artificial and conventional have taken the place 
of natural advantages as the ruling and deciding force.”292 Greg pitted “natural” against 
“artificial”, suggesting that modern civilization was an unnatural environment, in which 
survival would not necessarily be of the fittest. Alienists, who, as the previous chapter has 
indicated, recognised the effects of social and environmental pressures on their patients, 
seem to have been particularly inclined to accept such ideas. Greg listed three problems that 
he viewed as running counter to natural selection in western civilization: individual freedom; 
lack of self-control and the results of charitable aid. 293 Although Greg’s negative and 
conservative approach was not shared by Darwin and other evolutionary anthropologists, 
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many of the concerns he raised were acknowledged by them. Darwin, for example, built on 
the texts of Alfred Russel Wallace and evolutionary anthropologists such as Sir John Lubbock 
and Edward Burnett Tylor to address Greg’s concerns, focusing on the beneficial elements of 
the moral and intellectual faculties, which he saw as vital to the development of civilization. 
In particular, Darwin described the evolution of the “social instincts,” contrasting these with 
“selfishness” in an image of linear, purposeful progress.294 
 For Darwin, the sentiment of “sympathy” became the most important element of 
the development of civilization.295 Such an idea built on the Enlightenment concern with 
sympathy as a physical force, acting between organs and individual bodies to produce 
organic change, implying a biological context for what was now cast as an emotional 
connection.296 Many of Darwin’s contemporaries were in agreement with such a conclusion. 
Tylor, for example, asserted that: 
A general survey of the lower races shows that their selfish and malevolent 
tendencies are  stronger in proportion to their unselfish and benevolent tendencies, 
than in higher grades of culture. It would be a wonder were it not so, and our talk of 
progress and civilization would be indeed a mockery.297 
 
Of course, there were many late nineteenth-century commentators who very much feared 
that progress might be a “mockery”. Few, however, questioned the attribution of selfishness 
to savages. This required a particular construction of the concept of selfishness, that did not 
suggest merely that the individual pursued personal gain, or even that he attended his own 
needs in opposition to the requirements of those around him, but that he (and his family or 
group) did not engage in the concerns of humanity at large. The broadly humanistic 
arguments given by writers like Tylor were designed to uphold contemporary western 
political and social virtues: a liberal utilitarianism, in which individual ownership of property 
could be represented as beneficial, for “every millionaire enriches the community.”298 Such a 
theory could ignore any individual acts of kindness between “savage” and westerner, instead 
insisting on this broader view, almost impossible to attain outside a western context that 
provided commercial, press and political links between cultures. 
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Social theories of “instinct” complemented physiological explanations of impulse by 
adding to the former the “’connective tissue’ of civilization”, enabling the “evolution” of 
political and legal systems to be represented from a perspective which required the 
development of intellect, volition and, additionally, the social emotions, in every 
individual.299 The term most commonly associated with this philosophical idealism was that 
of altruism, coined by French positivist philosopher Auguste Comte in 1851 and introduced 
into English by his translators in 1852.300 The new term was rapidly diffused, and included in 
the first edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, compiled in the early 1880s. For Comte, all 
human actions were divided into egoistic and altruistic instincts, with the latter being higher 
in quality but inferior in force. As George Henry Lewes explained in 1853: “dispositions 
influenced by the purely egotistic [sic] impulses we call popularly ‘bad,’ and apply the term 
‘good’ to those in which altruism predominates”.301 The positivist hope for evolution, then, 
was that the altruistic instincts would steadily gain in dominance, with social organization 
becoming the most important principle of mankind.302 Central to the dissemination of 
Comte’s theories in England was evolutionary philosopher Herbert Spencer, who adopted 
the idea in the second edition of Principles of Psychology (1870-2).303 Although Spencer 
included an intermediary – the “ego-altruistic sentiments” – a stark divide between selfish 
and altruistic behaviour began to dominate later nineteenth century thinking. It was 
Spencer’s work in particular that was picked up by alienists, who quickly adopted the phrase 
“altruistic sentiments”.304 Yet Spencer also fostered a confusion between action and 
intention that remained an issue in debates over altruism well into the twentieth century.305  
Such uncertainty between behaviour and motivation formed a large part of the psychiatric 
discussion over self-mutilation: did the term describe a wound, an act, or the idea behind 
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the act? It was also closely associated with another psychiatric notion often applied to cases 
of self-mutilation: the diagnosis of moral insanity. 
Moral insanity was introduced by James Cowles Prichard in 1833, and incorporated 
into his 1835 Treatise on Insanity. The diagnosis referred to a defect in moral or emotional 
capacity in an individual who otherwise showed no sign of intellectual impairment. Hannah 
Augstein has provided a detailed analysis of Prichard’s adoption of the term, indicating that 
the diagnosis reflected his dismay at what he saw as the increasing materialism of the age, 
related to a decline in religious observation.306 Prichard wished to retain the doctrine of 
man’s soul as an essence distinct from his physical form: thus, moral insanity was indicated 
by the individual’s behaviour, rather than a physical lesion of the brain. Nonetheless, 
Prichard applied these ideas within a natural framework, suggesting that moral insanity was 
evidenced by a perversion of natural faculties, including affection for the family and self-
preservation. The very existence of the diagnosis was much contested: John Charles Bucknill 
recalled that the topic was one of the few on which he and Daniel Hack Tuke disagreed 
when compiling their Manual (Bucknill, presumably, refuted the diagnosis, for Tuke certainly 
did not).307 It is particularly interesting here, however, to examine the religious background 
of moral insanity, which is important in two respects. First, while Augstein suggests that the 
diagnosis lost its metaphysical content in subsequent generations (who instead interpreted 
moral insanity from a physicalist perspective), all of the alienists writing on self-mutilation 
tended towards a theistic outlook on life (while rejecting religious – and, indeed, scientific – 
dogmatism).308 They also held to the importance of judging insanity by conduct from a 
moral, as well as practical, perspective. In addition, Prichard’s adoption of the concept of 
self-centredness as a feature of insanity appears, to some extent, to be reflected (albeit 
from a secular perspective) in the very idea of altruism as a key element of human progress, 
for the notion was created by Comte as part of a new humanist religion.309 Later nineteenth-
century scientists and philosophers shared great concern for the future of humanity, 
equating morality with physical and mental evolution.310 By claiming the self-sacrifice of 
religious teaching to be the biological trait of altruism, these writers re-packaged ideals of 
social order within a natural scientific ethos to become the “great fundamental law alike of 
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Nature and Christian morals”.311 The attention to the “social instincts” in the late nineteenth 
century thus represented a re-evaluation of the qualities considered necessary for the 
civilised self. 
Such a re-evaluation is evident in the psychiatric approach to moral insanity, which 
acquired an evolutionary bent through the assumption that it resulted from the loss of the 
highest emotions, as defined by Spencer.  In his paper on the comparative psychology of 
man, Spencer discussed the various degrees of mental evolution, claiming that the altruistic 
sentiments, “coming last ... are also the highest” (i.e. above intellect).312 Such an 
evolutionary ethos was incorporated into neurology, in the work of John Hughlings 
Jackson.313 For Daniel Hack Tuke, used to the rationalist idea that intellect formed the 
highest development of mind, this caused some conceptual confusion. In attempting to 
incorporate moral insanity into the new doctrine, he queried: 
If intellect or thought is of later growth than feeling, and if, as evolutionists suppose, 
the most recently evolved – the least organised therefore – is the first to go, how is 
it possible that Feeling can be disordered without the Intellect being involved? In 
other words, how can the deeper down Feeling go before the higher up Intellect?314 
 
Tuke’s solution was to combine the evolutionary psychology of Spencer with Jackson’s 
concept of the higher faculties, concluding, like Darwin and Spencer, that “the highest 
feelings of all – the altruistic – are of later growth” than either simple feeling or intellect.315 
Thus, in his Dictionary a decade later, Tuke included a definition of altruism (attributed to 
Comte): 
It is exemplified in the sentiments of friendship, veneration, and goodness. It is the 
source also of domesticity and sociability; sentiments recognisable in animals as well 
as in man. A departure from altruism and a leaning towards egoism, mark some of 
the early phases of mental affections.316 
 
From such a standpoint it was selfishness – a trait already identified by Prichard – that was 
central to moral insanity: the attribution of the evolutionary context additionally suggested 
that such a condition might be dangerous for more than just the individual. This view was 
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also offered by other writers, including Henry Maudsley, who associated a development 
from egoistic to altruistic sentiments with a shift in the individual’s attitude from “self-
consciousness” to “world-consciousness”.317 Similarly, George Savage saw moral insanity as 
the form of mental disorder that was “most dangerous socially” for such patients had “no 
sense of truth or honesty, and no altruism”.318 
 The topic of moral insanity was an important theme in alienist discussions of self-
mutilation. Despite its contested status, all of the alienists writing on self-mutilation 
recognised and discussed moral insanity as a diagnosis, and frequently attributed it in cases 
of self-mutilation, within and outside the asylum.319 The concept of impulsive ideas was 
central to this doctrine. If impulse was activated by both intellect and emotion, which 
directed the outcome of voluntary activity, then, according to Blandford “volitional insanity 
must imply an insane reason and judgment, and an insane emotional condition, not only an 
insane will .... We cannot consider intellect as having a separate existence apart from 
emotions.”320 For Blandford, intellect, volition and emotion were intrinsically linked and, 
moreover, these aspects of the individual also associated body and mind, as evidenced by 
particular actions, including self-inflicted injury. Thus impulsive actions were “plainly the 
outcome of some idea present for the moment in the mind, but present, possibly, only for 
the moment, and then so obliterated that the individual afterwards has lost all trace of it.”321 
This explanation also supported Blandford’s conviction that intellectual defect always 
existed in moral or impulsive insanity, despite the absence of clear delusions: from this 
model, delusory thinking could be evidenced by an act, even if the patient could not 
remember his or her motivation. Like his understanding of self-mutilation, Blandford’s 
concepts of impulse fitted into a developmental model: despite his rejection of the will as 
the major civilizing force, his notions of the development of emotion and intellect were 
distinctly Spencerian. The child thus exhibited “lower” forms of intellect and emotion, 
responding directly to feelings, both mental and physical.  
For Blandford, physical structure could alter only very slowly through generations as a 
result of evolutionary progress, and thus the individual savage could never be educated to 
the level of a European. From this idea of slow progress – but sudden regression – within 
evolution, came the anxiety of alienists over impulsive acts like self-mutilation, for moral 
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insanity could represent a “reversion to an old savage type”.322  This model incorporated the 
concept of congenital heredity, but also the creation (and potential transmission) of 
acquired “habits”. For Blandford, impulsive acts of violence against self or others were: 
[A]kin to the imperative ideas or obsessions which beset some people. Such tricks in the 
neurotic may develop till the obsession becomes a possession and rules the whole life. 
Thus may these persons advance to insanity, their higher centres losing control more 
and more...323 
 
For this reason, all such “tricks” (as Blandford called also habits like nail-biting and hair-
pulling) should be “sternly repressed” in children, “and no pains should be spared to repair 
their degenerated constitution”,324 a task also associated with the suppression of the 
nervous child’s “selfishness and egoism”.325 George Savage shared this notion, indicating 
that it was necessary to rein in eccentricity otherwise “a habit is in process of development 
which may influence for evil the whole life of the individual.”326 From this, the fall from grace 
could be rapid: the child born to such a “retrograded” individual would inherit an “imperfect 
brain” and, “[l]ike the savage child ... will be incapable of attaining the perfection of 
intellectual and emotional life ... destitute of the sense of duty and of right possessed by 
others of his country and social status.”327 From such a perspective, the behaviour of the 
individual was explicitly connected with his or her moral feeling and social position. 
 This forms an important background to instances in which moral insanity was 
directly attributed to acts of self-mutilation in the psychiatric literature. In a paper on 
“Insanity of Conduct”, published in the late 1890s, George Savage and Charles Mercier 
confirmed their continued belief in the existence of moral insanity, aiming to show “that 
breaches of the conventional as well as the moral laws of society may be but symptoms of 
disorder or disease of the higher nervous system.”328 Savage’s examples in this paper 
concentrated on the “malingering and mischief-making” he connected with hysteria and 
hypochondriasis. In particular, he remarked that: “it is not at all uncommon to meet with 
hysterical young women who put themselves to great personal torture without any 
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apparent object.”329 Yet, in the cases cited, Savage had already hinted at possible 
explanation for this “torture” by explicitly linking self-mutilation (including burning and skin-
picking or rubbing) to the otherwise deceitful nature of the patient. Miss M, for example, a 
“bright, pretty and accomplished” girl, had been sending threatening anonymous letters to 
relatives, “saying many things which were not true. … Beside all this, some time before, she 
had had a peculiar skin affection, which was proved to have been produced by herself by 
burning with hair-curlers.” Thus, Miss M’s self-mutilation was connected, via the diagnosis of 
moral insanity, to a presumed deceitful nature and “most supreme self-confidence”: the 
inference being that her selfish instincts had won out.330  
 A tendency to describe particular behaviours as selfish, and the relation made 
between what, on the surface, might appear to be un-connected traits, such as an act of 
self-mutilation and an unwillingness to socialise, formed a platform from which the alienist 
could, by extension from an individual, comment on society. Indeed, the analogy from the 
human body to the social body was a commonplace for many writers.331 While such 
references are vague and sporadic within case books, in published texts we often see them 
more clearly. George Savage was one of a number of alienists who frequently insisted that 
the majority of cases of insanity depended on the influence of surroundings more than 
heredity and biology.332 Simultaneously, although insisting that sanity and insanity were 
“relative terms” and “varying with the individual,” Savage, nonetheless, pointed out that 
alienists (as well as patients’ families), often judged their charges by conduct, rather than 
any clear evidence of cerebral disease.333 Thus, although insanity might be a disorder of self, 
it was closely related to social concerns, which simultaneously caused and were threatened 
by it. In what way, however, could an act of injury to the patient’s own body be regarded as 
socially dangerous? One explanation was to view behaviour in evolutionary terms. The 
Lamarckian perspective that acquired characteristics might be hereditary continued to hold 
much weight in the later nineteenth century (even for other evolutionists, including Darwin), 
suggesting that parents might pass an acquired tendency to self-mutilation on to their 
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offspring.334  In psychological terms, this was usually described in relation to “self-
adjustment” (the ability of the individual to adapt psychologically to the environment).335 
Thus, while Savage had a fairly optimistic view of the potential outcome of mental disease 
overall (he maintained that the only patients who were definitely incurable were those 
suffering from general paralysis),336 he had a less positive view of civilization, regarding 
much insanity as produced by “the artificial relationships of society”.337 George Fielding 
Blandford addressed these concerns still more explicitly in an entry on “Prevention of 
Insanity” in Tuke’s Dictionary, in which he blamed contemporary systems of education 
(especially competition for scholarships) and individualist religious groupings for a “self-
culture”, which might lead to failure in adjustment or integration.338 
 Outside the strictly medical arena, the extrapolation from individual character to 
social and political commentary was often still more explicit. We can see this clearly in 
accounts of the life and death of farmer Isaac Brooks, whose attempts at self-castration will 
be discussed in detail in chapter four. The young farmer had apparently injured his own 
genitals twice, before accusing others of having done so. Alienists quickly diagnosed Brooks 
(who had never been in an asylum or, according to his friends, exhibited any unsoundness of 
mind during his life), for the combination of self-mutilation and false accusation appeared to 
be “a definite plan of lying and mischief-making [which] seems to be the symptom of moral 
insanity.”339 The anonymous author of a commentary on Brooks in the Journal of Mental 
Science (perhaps one of the editors, George Savage or Daniel Hack Tuke, both of whom, as 
we have seen, were interested in the topic) cited a number of examples from his own 
asylum experience, where patients had injured themselves, apparently in order to accuse 
others. He went on to describe other instances of self-inflicted injury, implying a similar 
background of moral insanity and manipulation in all instances. The Brooks case thus drew 
together evolutionary thoughts about moral insanity. As Blandford, Savage and Tuke had all 
suggested in other instances, Brooks’ insanity was judged solely by his actions – in this 
instance an attempt at self-castration and the false accusation of others. Indeed, given that 
the farmer had already died, there were no other criteria available on which his state of 
mind might be judged! It was his acts that led to a diagnosis of moral insanity, the new 
evolutionary interpretation of which indicated that the very first trait lost by Brooks must 
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have been altruistic sentiments. If, as many writers held, individual development reached its 
peak in social feeling, then those, like Brooks, who were thought to have failed to develop 
such characteristics posed a national threat. As Henry Maudsley put it: 
 A child ... begins with feeling, like the animal, entirely for itself; but, rightly 
 developing, it goes on to feel for two or three persons, then for the family, then for 
 the country, and perhaps in time for the whole human race.340 
 
If an act was characterised as “selfish”, it was thus implied that it must be antagonistic, not 
only to a person’s immediate contacts, but to national and social feeling as well. 
  
2.5 Conclusion 
 As this chapter has indicated, nineteenth-century naturalist concepts of mind were 
developed within an evolutionary context. Within such concerns, self-mutilation could be 
regarded as a bodily phenomenon by placing either somatic or metaphysical approaches to 
mind within evolutionary accounts of development. Such a model equated impulsive, 
emotional and reflexive behaviours with the lower or animal instincts and thus emphasised a 
view of self-mutilation as a primitive behaviour. These ideas were supported by analogy to 
other mutilations deemed primitive: for example, bodily modification in savage societies or, 
on occasion, self-inflicted injury in animals.341 Within such a model, self-mutilation could 
easily be incorporated into a pessimistic, hereditarian view of insanity, as seen in George 
Fielding Blandford’s description of moral insanity. The motivation behind self-mutilation was 
similarly perceived to be related to lower levels of mental development. The assumption 
was that, just as volitionary control of nervous impulses would develop through a process of 
evolution, so too would the moral and intellectual state of mankind. From such a 
perspective, it was easy to draw the conclusion that selfishness was the “natural and 
unfortunate birthright” of man, which could be transcended by the development of 
civilization and humanitarian influences.342 Thus, whether approached from a physiological 
or a sociological perspective, self-mutilation became cast as a reversion to this “natural” 
state of primitive selfishness, made analogous to body modification for the process of “self-
adornment” in other cultures. As the first section of this chapter has shown, this meant that 
vanity (in some instances loosely related to Darwin’s concept of sexual selection) became 
frequently viewed as a prime motive behind certain forms of self-inflicted injury. 
 An alternative explanation was, however, also offered, through attention to the 
development of impulse, particularly in relation to the notion of “habits”. From such a 
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perspective, self-mutilation might be held to indicate a response to the unnatural state of 
civilization: perhaps part of a morbid attention to self. Reflecting this, I have indicated the 
way in which mechanical restraint was re-interpreted in later nineteenth-century asylums as 
directly curative, by its perceived role in encouraging the development of individual self-
control. From an investigation of skin-picking and hair-plucking in the asylum, however, I 
have shown that while it was claimed that such acts could develop as unconscious habits, 
and should thus be sternly repressed, this approach was not always put into practice. The 
large proportion of patients who were not restrained, despite injuring themselves, reminds 
us that, while attempting to uncover universal explanations for self-mutilation and other 
symptoms, alienists did not necessarily apply these in practice. In some cases, self-mutilation 
was even suggested to be beneficial to the individual, through the relief of mental disorder 
by physical harm: George Savage went so far as to claim that he was “inclined to think that 
the scourging of the lunatic in times past might have occasionally been a help to 
recovery”.343 What’s more, many alienists rejected a hereditarian model, which assumed 
that self-mutilation was evidence of degeneration of both individual and race, and instead 
sought other meanings, psychological and sociological, in their patients’ acts. 
 Nonetheless, even those who promoted the exploration of meaning within self-
injurious acts rarely rejected the evolutionary model outright and, particularly within the 
context of the diagnosis of moral insanity, viewed an act of self-mutilation as evidence of a 
failure to develop the higher sentiments, like altruism. Self-mutilation was thus – directly 
and indirectly – associated with selfishness, despite the fact that many behaviours could 
equally easily have been regarded as the reverse. Patients, for example, often attributed 
altruistic motivation to their acts through reference to religion, suggesting that they had 
injured themselves in order to “save” others. Self-injury could, then, easily have been 
viewed as a sympathetic, social, or even self-sacrificing act. It is only within the particular 
context of contemporary anthropological and evolutionary thought that we can understand 
how late nineteenth-century alienists associated self-mutilation unequivocally with 
selfishness. Self-mutilation, within this context, becomes part of a much broader 
contemporary debate over the self: the relation of body to behaviour and body to mind, the 
external representation of mental phenomena and, most importantly, an indicator of the 
relation of the individual towards society. The tendency to view selfishness as an early 
symptom of insanity gave rise to the converse view: that the insane were necessarily selfish, 
and their acts therefore motivated by egoism. From such a perspective, in which conclusions 
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about an individual’s character might be made simply by their residence in an asylum, self-
mutilation had to be viewed as selfish for notions of progress in evolutionary development 
to remain valid. This explains why acts of “minor” self-mutilation, which were seen as little 
different from “nervous habits”, might be considered selfish, for if these acts were 
considered to be the first indication of insanity in an individual, it implied that they must be 
selfishly motivated.344 Indeed, this even meant that minor self-inflicted injuries could be 
regarded as more problematic than major injuries, for the proximity to nervous habits 
suggested that the individual was closer to health, presumably possessed some degree of 
self-control, and thus had a responsibility to refrain from self-inflicted injury. 
 But why was “selfishness” regarded as such a threat by late Victorians, and thus 
became the dominant explanation for self-injurious acts? As has been indicated, the debate 
around altruism and the higher sentiments in mankind had both religious and political 
implications. Many authors worried that a perceived secularisation of society might lead to a 
decline in moral values: Comte’s humanitarian religion thus became part of a new tradition 
of what Thomas Dixon calls “moralistic unbelief”.345 Concerns over the importance of 
altruism in modern society were prominent, and evolutionists stressed the need for the 
cultivation of humanitarian ideals in the name of progress. Rejecting Enlightenment 
philosophies, which were increasingly regarded as selfish and individualist, authors in a wide 
variety of fields insisted on the necessity of the “social instincts” for the functioning of late 
nineteenth-century society.  Darwin, for example, made the political implications of his 
account of natural selection in mankind clear by stressing the inspiration of Walter Bagehot’s 
“Physics and Politics”, which, he stated, had shown that “[s]elfish and contentious people 
will not cohere, and without coherence nothing can be effected”.346 Finally, if altruism was 
the source of “domesticity and sociability”, then it fell that the reverse threatened the 
stability of home and society.347 Thus, the concept of self-mutilation as a selfish behaviour 
must be set within the context of debate over the proper relation between self-knowledge – 
held by Enlightenment thinkers as the highest aim of the individual – and social progress.  
 
 
  
                                                 
344
 Blandford, Insanity and its Treatment, pp. 194–5. 
345
 Dixon, The Invention of Altruism, p. 95. 
346
 Darwin, The Descent of Man (1998), p. 134. 
347
 Tuke “Altruism”, p. 83. 
107 
 
Chapter Three 
The Normal Self: Psychology and ‘Motive Power’ in Self and Society (1880 – 1910) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 As indicated in the previous chapter, viewing self-inflicted injuries on an 
evolutionary scale did not offer the only perspective on self-mutilation. Alongside the 
progressive and pessimistic models equating the development of the individual to the 
development of mankind, there was also another means of approaching psychiatry within 
the late Victorian period, focused on the individual. Despite the widespread nature of 
theoretical texts adopting evolutionary and degenerationist perspectives, an individualist 
basis remained the foundation for much late nineteenth-century asylum practice, as 
indicated in hospital archives. This approach had its roots in moral treatment – incorporating 
humanitarian paternalism and the re-enforcement of social values – but was also related to 
new ideas within experimental psychology that aimed to understand and interpret the 
human mind. The vast majority of alienists who wrote on the topic of self-mutilation 
explicitly claimed that mental and physical processes could not be regarded as identical (as 
materialists claimed), and that attention to motive as something separate from physical 
process was an essential element of understanding self-inflicted injury. 
 This chapter will outline the ways in which late nineteenth-century alienists 
suggested that the subjective ideas of their patients could aid in the exploration of abnormal 
and normal psychology. In the 1890s, James Adam indicated that analysis of the motives for 
self-mutilation throughout history was the most important factor in understanding the 
behaviour.348 Other alienists also emphasised such an approach.349 The concerns of these 
writers reflects a growing interest in late nineteenth-century asylum psychiatry in the 
suggestion that impulse might be prompted by an idea, and so emphasising introspection as 
an important approach to mind.350 While investigation of brain biology continued to be 
regarded important, a number of alienists insisted that psychiatric questions could not be 
answered through a purely somatic approach that correlated mind and brain. As George 
Savage put it, “neurologists and physiologists are only the engineers who are studying the 
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machinery, while we in asylums have the much more difficult problem of studying the 
motive power.”351 Later in life, Savage conceptualised this “motive power” as a universal 
force which, he admitted, was closely related to other metaphysical and theological beliefs 
and could only be revealed through its relation to action, making the behaviour of asylum 
patients, including self-mutilation, a worthy topic of study. Modern studies suggest that self-
harm “cannot be discussed without consideration of intent”.352 That such is not necessarily 
the case has been made evident in many aspects of the previous two chapters. However, an 
association between injury and motive was increasingly assumed in the later nineteenth 
century. Here, I focus on the way in which self-mutilation was thought to aid the alienist to 
conceptualise hidden mental processes within the individual. Could exploring self-mutilation 
help the physician to “look within” the individual? Was such a means of examination 
beneficial for treatment or theoretical knowledge? How could self-mutilation reveal the 
“self”, and its seeming breakdown or dissolution? Such questions were often rooted in 
religious, as well as secular, thought, for psychological considerations left space for 
addressing not only body and mind, but also an immaterial soul.  
 I will begin this chapter by providing a context for these concerns in the shifting 
language of selfhood in the middle and later nineteenth century. Looking particularly at the 
philosophies of John Stuart Mill, I examine the changing meaning of “self-consciousness”, 
whereby acts of self-mutilation were interpreted psychologically. In the mid-nineteenth 
century the term “self-conscious” first acquired negative connotations. While Enlightenment 
philosophers had regarded self-knowledge as intrinsically positive, introspection in the later 
nineteenth century seemed increasingly suspect, not least due to the potential links with the 
egoistic motivation discussed in the previous chapter. This furthered a tendency to see self-
mutilation as one of the dangers of introspection, and thus indicative of an unhealthy focus 
on the self, as exemplified in the psychiatric diagnosis of hypochondriasis, which a number 
of physicians specifically associated with self-inflicted injury. In a seemingly paradoxical 
manner, such introspection could nonetheless be deemed to result in a loss, or 
disintegration of self. Through such interpretations, we can see an increasing tendency 
among asylum practitioners to view their patients in a psychological, as well as a 
physiological, context, searching for and interpreting the “motive” behind self-injurious acts. 
Sometimes this search for motivation began with the subjective descriptions of the patient; 
sometimes physicians used their own inductive reasoning to supplement these. On still 
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other occasions, the lack of explanation invited broader conclusions over the nature of 
selfhood; a seeming disconnect between act and idea could be used to explore new models 
of consciousness, in particular that of dissociation, related to the fields of psychical research 
and French experimental psychology. It is important to note, however, that these 
psychological concerns did not prevent alienists from drawing broader conclusions about the 
individual’s character and the social implications of his or her acts. Indeed, if anything, the 
symbolic nature of many psychological approaches encouraged this, while the notion of 
“inwardness”, like that of biological determinism, served to locate social problems within the 
individual, despite admitting the relevance of external social and political circumstances. I 
conclude by reiterating the impossibility of seeing late nineteenth-century approaches to 
self-mutilation in either explicitly psychological or somatic terms, while recognising that 
these approaches tended towards certain similar conclusions. The psychological approach, 
just like the somatic, hereditarian attitude discussed in the previous chapter, located the 
impetus towards self-mutilation within the individual, and therefore supported the notion 
that self-injurious acts were indicative of selfishness, leading to disintegration of personality 
or selfhood and, by analogy, the breakdown of social order. 
 
3.2 Self-Consciousness and Introspection: The Shifting Philosophical Language of Selfhood 
 In recent years, the history of selfhood has become something of a preoccupation 
for historians, philosophers, sociologists and anthropologists alike. Accounts have tended to 
emphasise the way in which concepts of self vary across culture and history. The human self 
thus becomes, as the titles of many of these volumes stress, an idea, an invention, a cultural 
construct.353 Of course, issues of human identity have long been a theme of various 
discourses, and many contemporary accounts draw on such sources: Stoic philosophy, 
religious texts on the soul, the much-debated Cartesian divide between mind and body and 
Romantic self-expression, as well as modern psychology. For many modern writers, 
psychology in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is presented as especially 
prominent due to its promise to connect the “inwardness” of the individual with the needs 
and values of society. Sociologists David Armstrong and Nikolas Rose have represented such 
efforts through a Foucauldian perspective, viewing them as negative, restrictive and related 
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to the imposition of power.354 Conversely, the historical approach of Mathew Thomson, 
Rhodri Hayward and Roger Smith provides a perspective that attempts to incorporate the 
desire of many individuals to attain a promised cohesion, and the fear, individual and 
collective, that this might not be achieved.355  
 How, then, do these histories of selfhood relate to the belief that the self that has 
been created might be subsequently mutilated? Figurative language around self-mutilation 
remains prominent in modern texts. Philosopher Charles Taylor, for example, suggested that 
a “stripped-down secular outlook” on the self emerged through a process of “mutilation”, 
and paralleled such an attitude with “self-inflicted wounds.”356 Here, Taylor rejects the late 
twentieth-century tendency to deny human personality a spiritual side. Like nineteenth-
century alienists, however, he paints a direct relation between a potentially self-damaging 
attitude and self-inflicted bodily injury. Indeed, a look at the Oxford English Dictionary 
indicates that it is this figurative (rather than the medico-psychiatric) use of the term “self-
mutilation” that has been predominantly upheld linguistically. The most recent (1980) of the 
two quotations for self-mutilation included today reads “[i]t represents self-mutilation, it 
can only lead to genocide and biocide.”357 Such a quote does not refer to an act of bodily 
injury, but instead uses self-mutilation figuratively to describe the effects of an unspecified 
(presumably political) act. Illustrative quotations relating to individual acts of bodily harm 
were even removed from later editions, such as a reference from Haldane and Huxley’s 
Animal Biology, on the lizard’s “power of self-mutilation (or autonomy as it is often 
called).”358 This use of the term appears to have more in common with psychiatric 
definitions of self-mutilation: not least in the suggestion through “autonomy” that the 
lizard’s behaviour is not simply biological, but also related to metaphysical concepts of will 
and self-government. The relation between self and self-mutilation, then, requires us to look 
in more detail at late nineteenth-century notions of selfhood. 
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 The definitions of self prominent in this period emerged from the Enlightenment 
quest for self-knowledge, which itself followed on the rationalist discourse of seventeenth-
century New Science (the so-called “Scientific Revolution”).359 Yet, in the mid nineteenth 
century, belief in the relative merits of self-knowledge and introspection appear to have 
shifted, giving rise to psychiatric concepts like “morbid introspection” and related concerns 
over the dangers of “self-consciousness” and the “self-culture” of civilization.360 By the late 
nineteenth century, patients (as well as practitioners) were blaming introspection and self-
consciousness for the onset of illness, often suggesting that such traits were inherited.361 
Young Arthur Browne, for example, was reported to have told the Bethlem medical officers 
that his delusions were “probably due to self-consciousness & that he inherits that” while 
Nesta Luke was claimed to have attributed her illness directly to “morbid introspection”.362 
While the term self-conscious (as descriptive of an act of cognition and inward sense of 
reflection) dates from at least the seventeenth century, it is unsurprising that the earliest 
quotation given in the OED for the “morbid” sense of the term is from 1834, in the letters of 
John Stuart Mill. Indeed, it would be difficult to outline nineteenth-century psychological 
approaches to selfhood without paying attention to Mill’s writings; his work on liberty, in 
particular, will be identified as offering a strong connection between self-injurious and 
socially dangerous acts.  
 Born in 1806, Mill was a child of the Enlightenment (son of political writer James 
Mill, himself part of a close circle of Benthamite radicals). He was, nonetheless, a product of 
the nineteenth century, establishing himself as a well-known outspoken political thinker. 
Mill’s ideological works can be situated at the centre of mid-century debate over the relation 
of the individual to society, forming a bridge between individualist Benthamite 
utilitarianism, and late nineteenth-century interest in collectivist ideals, epitomised in the 
socialist and feminist movements.363 Moreover, his work was of much significance to 
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psychological medicine. In On the Logic of the Moral Sciences (the sixth book of the weighty 
series, A System of Logic, 1843), Mill followed up on the ideas of his father to outline a 
Psychology based on “scientific principles.” Although his division between psychology 
(science of the mind) and ethology (science of the formation of character) was not widely 
taken up, both features were certainly embraced in much psychological writing in the later 
nineteenth century, especially in concepts of “the neuroses”. Until 1884, in the admission 
interview at Bethlem, relatives were questioned on the “habits” and “temperament” of each 
patient. When these two categories were removed from the pre-printed record in 1884, the 
same information continued to be recorded, but now in the field for “Neuroses” (which, 
previously, had included only information on physical conditions, such as neuralgia and 
headaches). José Piñero has similarly noted that the term neurosis disappeared from British 
literature in the mid-nineteenth century, reappearing as a psychological concept in the 
1880s and 1890s.364 Such a connection makes it unsurprising that alienists often made 
associations between psychological motive and character in cases of so-called hysterical self-
mutilation, for the notion of neurosis conflated the two. Indeed, with “moral treatment” 
remaining prevalent, one might argue that the very functioning of the asylum was bound up 
in the perceived relation between motive and character.365  
 One of the important ways in which Mill differed from his predecessors was in his 
rejection of Bentham’s theory of motivation through the pleasure/pain principle.366 As 
indicated in chapter one, Bentham had claimed that pleasure and pain were over-riding 
principles of motivation in man. Self-mutilation in such a context appeared to be in 
opposition to “natural laws”. Thus, the motive behind such an act would not require 
attention (being similarly irrational). In order for the motives behind self-mutilation to 
become of interest, a new model of mental functioning in mankind was required and Mill, in 
conjunction with the evolutionary thinkers described in the previous chapter, provided the 
foundation for the belief that sane and insane motives were both more complex and in 
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closer proximity than Bentham’s model allowed. Such a re-evaluation required each action 
to be examined in the context of character and environment. This understanding of the 
individual as part of his wider social relations led to a shift in the meaning of self-
consciousness to the morbid sense of the term most often used today. Inwardness in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had been regarded as an attribute setting man apart 
from animals, making self-consciousness part of a positive quest for self-knowledge. 
Although such connotations did continue to be associated with the term in the nineteenth 
century, the boundaries of this self-knowledge, and the extent to which reflexivity was 
viewed as beneficial, became regarded as increasingly complex. Indeed, in certain situations, 
it was suggested that self-consciousness might discourage the individual from performing 
particular social functions. 
 A close relation between self-mutilation and morbid attention to oneself is found in 
the diagnosis of hypochondriasis. Hysteria (or “Fits of the Mother”) and “Hypochondriack 
distempers” had both been reclaimed by medical writers in the early 1600s (from the 
concept of demonic possession), and soon became explicitly linked to melancholy and 
madness.367 A flurry of works relating these “passions” (the “Spleen and Vapours” as they 
popularly became known) to irregularities of the nervous system followed in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.368 By the late nineteenth century, 
hypochondriasis (like hysteria), was generally regarded as a functional disorder (rather than 
resulting from a structural lesion of the nerves, as the previous century’s writers had 
suggested), on the borderline between sanity and outright madness.369 Despite this shift in 
characterisation from nervous lesion to functional illness, many writers still regarded 
hypochondriasis as the male equivalent of hysteria, as had been the case since at least the 
seventeenth century.370 The exact location of the illness on the spectrum of mental health 
continued to be much debated. In Albutt’s System of Medicine, Henry Rayner (former 
superintendent of Hanwell Asylum and co-editor of the Journal of Mental Science from 1895 
to 1911) saw hypochondriasis as “but a sub-variety of melancholia”, and thus treated both 
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as depressed emotional states of varying intensity.371 George Savage, meanwhile, treated 
hypochondriasis and hysteria together (as “functional disorders”), differentiating both from 
the severe mental diseases of melancholia and mania. An increasing tendency to associate 
“the neuroses” with psychological concerns rather than structural changes in the brain or 
nerves, led physicians to separate them from other categories of mental illness, moving 
away from the eighteenth century view that hypochondriasis, melancholia and mania were 
“but the several steps or stages of the same Distemper”.372  Thus, Savage claimed that not 
every neurotic individual became insane, for “hypochondriasis … rarely pass[es] beyond the 
border line of sanity.”373 The characterisation of mental illness as a series of stages did not 
entirely disappear – after all, some physicians, like Rayner, still regarded hypochondriasis 
and melancholia as different severities of the same illness. However, the growing divide 
between the neuroses and outright insanity caused increased attention to the meaning of 
the neurotic’s actions. 
 Indeed, Rayner and Savage agreed on two important points. Both connected 
hypochondriasis with a morbid focus on the self, and both claimed this might result in self-
inflicted injury. One of three causes of illness listed by Rayner was “the mere habit of self-
attention” while, even where the cause was rooted in “actual bodily disease”, illness was 
perpetuated by the fixing of attention on local sensations.374 Such definitions were rooted in 
judgments concerning the moral character of the patient. The active terms in which illness 
was described suggests a level of intent on the part of the patient in both the onset and 
continuation of illness: the “fixing” of attention appeared to require active volition. Savage’s 
definition, while stemming from different principles, ultimately reached the same 
conclusion. His description of the onset of disease was cast in both physiological and 
evolutionary terms. Thus, hypochondriasis was either a “form of imperfect evolution” 
(reversion to a primitive state, or atavism) or “nervous dissolution” (degeneration). In such 
cases, for Savage, the individual had either never learned to perform bodily functions 
without thinking, or had reverted to a lower level of consciousness as a result of illness. 
Thus, “[t]he constant conscious repetition of sensations, which in the individual or in the 
race ought to be unconscious, leads to morbid introspection and hypochondriasis; such is 
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our contention.”375 This is an interesting reversal of the Spencerian idea outlined in the 
previous chapter, in which reflex actions were regarded to be primitive, with consciousness 
leading to self-control. It also indicates something that was, for later nineteenth-century 
alienists, a concern of primary importance: the integration of self, which might be 
threatened by excessive attention to individual elements of consciousness. Such 
complications can explain why, despite his seemingly biological explanation, Savage had 
more to say about the character of the hypochondriac than Rayner had. While the onset of 
illness might be unavoidable, it was “increased and aggravated by attention,” bringing the 
patient’s supposedly morbid focus on himself to the fore once again. Indeed, Savage felt 
that, in most cases, nervous dissolution was itself caused by “an unhealthy solitude or want 
of object in life, so that an unhealthy subjective life has been led.” What’s more, he claimed 
that such self-attention could change the patient’s entire disposition, “so that the kindly and 
un-selfish man becomes selfish and egotistical.”376 Rather than losing self-control, then, the 
hypochondriac was instead represented as giving too much attention to his own state. His 
failure to integrate was the fundamental problem: internally and, by extension, externally 
with society. 
 This correlation between the patient’s attention to himself and his supposedly 
selfish character was played out in concerns over self-mutilation which, in hypochondriacal 
patients, was usually thought to be an attempt at self-operation. Rayner declared that 
“[s]elf-homicide may result … from attempts by operation to relieve some imaginary 
condition of the bowels or bladder.”377 Similarly, Savage thought that: “Patients … will cut 
open their abdomens to give vent to the collections which they believe to be there, they will 
suggest the most ingenious operations so that the defects may be repaired.”378 Unlike earlier 
writers, who had characterised such acts as suicidal, both Savage and Rayner differentiated 
“self-homicide” from suicide due to the difference in intent: death might be self-inflicted but 
not through a desire to commit suicide.379 In particular, for Savage, “Hypochondriasis of the 
Digestive Tract” was closely connected with both self-mutilation and emotional disorder, 
due to the “natural association” (according to Savage) between emotions and the pit of the 
stomach. Such a connection reminds us once again of the proximity between emotion and 
sensation in nineteenth century medical descriptions, made most famous in psychology by 
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William James’ suggestion that our subjective evaluation of an emotion follows, rather than 
creates, the physiological elements of feeling.380 Thus, cases of hypochondriacal self-
mutilation were often attributed to the emotional state of the patient. Samuel Starky, for 
example, was admitted to Bethlem in February 1889, and diagnosed with Hypochondriacal 
Melancholia. Although not considered suicidal, it was noted that he had a “tendency to 
injure self.”381 Ill for eight or nine months prior to admission, Starky’s brother declared that 
his sibling had complained of irritation of the rectum which, after his mother died of cancer 
of the uterus, he attributed to cancer. He: “[s]aid that the bowel was choked up, that 
‘someone’ told him to cut out the rectum. Got a razor for purpose. Tore part with fingers. 
Got chain & padlocks to restrain self from this.” On admission to the hospital, Starky was no 
longer allowed to use these restraints. Treatment, instead, followed the pattern 
recommended by Savage. As the self-mutilation in hypochondriacs was regarded as 
representative of an excessive self-attention –evident in Starky’s “irritable” and “morose” 
disposition and his “lack of interest in the ordinary daily pursuits” – “we give tonics, baths, 
and aperients and try to persuade the patient to take up some definite occupation or 
amusement, so that he may be taken out of himself and his narrowing feelings.”382 If self-
mutilation was linked with morbid introspection and excessive attention to self, then it 
followed that it could be combated with social and environmental therapies, encouraging 
the individual to adopt wider interests. Such an ethos continued to be adopted well into the 
twentieth century; one of the main forms of treatment suggested by Horatio Adamson for 
skin-picking in 1915 was “occupation which will help to withdraw attention from the 
patient’s self”.383 
 The diagnosis of hypochondriasis in the later nineteenth century thus indicates the 
close attention paid by alienists to the relation of the individual to society, and the way in 
which this might be articulated through notions of self-mutilation. The understanding that 
hypochondriasis and other nervous disorders were close to sanity meant that the motives 
for the self-inflicted injuries of such patients were seen to require particular attention.  Yet, 
as we have seen, these motives could not be explored outside their social context, and were 
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perceived to relate directly to the individual’s relationship with society. Comte had 
challenged the old psychology as well as religion, claiming that it portrayed all actions as 
motivated by selfishness (i.e. the “pleasure-pain” principle). And, as we saw earlier, 
attention to concepts such as altruism caused alienists to attempt to explore the actions and 
behaviour of their patients in greater depth, and place far more emphasis on motive in 
insanity than they had done previously. 
 
3.3 Unconscious Mutilation: Spiritualism and the Disintegration of the Self 
 In the summer of 1912, while considering his forthcoming presidential address to 
the new Section of Psychiatry of the Royal Society of Medicine, George Savage allowed 
“some wild imaginations” to take possession of him. While “lying on mountain slopes”, 
Savage: 
 contemplated a universal force, call it vital ether, as yet unrecognised and possibly 
 beyond human powers to recognise, which, like the astronomers' ether, is universal 
 and prevalent, this acting on what are called living bodies according to their 
 structure. ... The consideration of this theory caused me much pleasure, but I admit 
 it has no ground of fact, though it represents, perhaps, in a crude way, all we know 
 of life.384 
 
The idea of a vital, universal life force had been of much interest to writers on the human 
condition in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.385 Often dismissed by modern 
writers as pertaining to the retrogressive influence of religious thought in scientific practice, 
such concerns nonetheless experienced a resurgence in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, as part of an increasing interest in spiritualist modes of thought. 
Spiritualist schools of philosophy and psychology (as distinct from, although related to, the 
“religion” of Modern Spiritualism, which emerged in the United States in the late 1840s) 
held that consciousness was an essence apart from, and superior to, matter, and “is the 
cause rather than the effect of certain changes in the brain.”386 While, as Roger Smith has 
noted, the concerns explored by many spiritualist and metaphysical psychologists were 
often complicated by their adoption of terminology from the natural sciences (such as 
“force” or Savage’s “motive power”, a term from thermodynamics), most of their 
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explanations emphasised that thought might precede organic change in the brain (the 
domain of the materialists).387 Most importantly, for those alienists, like Savage, who wished 
to set themselves apart from physiologists and neurologists, motive power was 
characterised as a living force, not confined to “this deadening belief in the all-powerfulness 
of the organ”. 388 In order to explore motive, psychiatrists had to pay close attention to 
individual patients, in order to follow the interplay of “feelings as well as coarser environing 
conditions”.389 
 These alienists tended to reject materialism, and shared an interest in exploring 
consciousness and contemporary theories of unconscious phenomena, from W.B. 
Carpenter’s “unconscious cerebration” to psychological interpretations of multiple 
consciousness in the late nineteenth century, including Janet and Bernheim in France, Myers 
and Gurney in England and Freud and Breuer in Germany.390 While the later influence of 
psychoanalysis persuaded a number of historians to chart such theories in terms of the 
“discovery” of the unconscious (as if this was a fixed, natural entity), far less attention has 
been paid to the discovery (or, rather, the re-framing) of consciousness.391 Like the 
unconscious, consciousness cannot be regarded as a universal given entity, although it 
certainly incorporates seemingly fundamental elements; one can hardly ignore, for example, 
the difference between a dead and living being. However, this difference can be explained in 
a variety of ways, one of which is the concept of consciousness. Consciousness was a 
significant problem for evolutionary psychology, for it was hotly debated at what point in the 
development of individual or species it appeared. This could make it a fundamental problem 
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for evolutionary principles. Alfred Russel Wallace, whose work on natural selection inspired 
and supported Darwin, felt strongly that the origin of consciousness could not be explained 
by evolution through natural selection. Much has been written about Wallace’s connections 
with spiritualism, and the way in which his scientific principles were shaped by a 
humanitarian, socialist ideology that required a teleological approach to the natural 
world.392 Wallace’s corresponding interests in vitalist accounts of biology, and the potential 
existence of unseen and unclassified forces within the natural world (such as telepathy and 
spirit communication), however, indicates that attention to diverse phenomena was by no 
means limited to the fringes of late nineteenth-century science. 
  Discussion of consciousness encouraged interest in associated fields, in particular 
that of motive, as previously indicated. But what was motive? In Jonathan Andrews’ recent 
discussion of pyromania, there is a clear legal context for such concerns, and interest in 
motive within psychiatry should certainly be understood in relation to criminal proceedings: 
understanding the background to a crime had a clear bearing on punishment.393 Yet the 
topic also held broader implications within psychological approaches to madness. In 1884, 
on the publication of the much expanded second edition of his Illustrations of the Influence 
of the Mind Upon the Body in Health and Disease, Daniel Hack Tuke drew attention to the 
“remarkable increase in the amount of intelligent interest felt in the more subtle relations 
existing between Mind and Body” since he had first published on the topic a decade 
earlier.394 This attention marks a departure from the physiological psychiatry of the mid-
century (in which the acts of the insane were often explained through reference to nervous 
impulse), and even from evolutionary explanations of the will. For these alienists, insanity 
was part of “…wider laws or a larger circle of phenomena … [which] may exist, and may still 
be discovered.”395 Writers on self-mutilation viewed the topic as providing a direct link 
between idea or mental process and physical action, and this informed their understanding 
of the self-injurious acts of their patients.  
 We cannot draw a clear and direct link between interest in self-inflicted injury and 
interest in psychological investigation of the mind: the psychologists listed above (with the 
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notable exception of Pierre Janet) apparently had no interest in the topic of self-mutilation. 
Meanwhile, Savage, Tuke and Hyslop at Bethlem were all also influenced by physiological 
explanations of brain function, the belief that mind was situated within the brain (and, at 
times, might be analogous with brain functioning) and evolutionary concepts of 
development. However, this did not preclude a broader approach to mental functioning 
that placed consciousness outside the domain of biological science. 396  All three of these 
alienists derided “scientific snobs” and “self-satisfied science”, referring to those doctors 
who, in the words of William James, identified science with a fixed belief in mechanical 
origins, even though “in its essence science only stands for a method”.397 For Savage, 
science simply meant “organised inquisitiveness”, which allowed for the acceptance of a 
wide variety of methods of investigation within psychiatry, including experimental 
psychology, “psychic analysis”, psychical research and hypnosis.398 Thus, although it may not 
have sparked their interest in the topic, the receptiveness of this particular set of alienists to 
psychological approaches to mind certainly shaped the way in which they understood self-
mutilation. In addition to interpreting some self-inflicted injury as revelatory of brain lesions 
or functional nervous disorder, a background in psychical concepts of mind suggested 
another interpretation, in which self-inflicted injury appeared to be evidence of a 
disordered psychical state, including (but not limited to) altered or secondary 
consciousness. In the 1880s and 1890s, all three Bethlem superintendents (George Savage, 
R. Percy Smith and Theo Hyslop) experimented with hypnotism, apparently influenced by 
Daniel Hack Tuke’s efforts to give the topic serious consideration at meetings of the MPA.399 
Hyslop, to whose interest I shall shortly return, appears to have been the most influenced 
by psychological approaches to mind: in 1895, he was elected an Associate of the Society for 
Psychical Research, and remained as such until at least 1901.400 
 These physicians regarded hypnotism as a potential therapy for mental disorder. In 
what ways was this related to efforts to alter behaviour, including preventing acts of self-
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inflicted injury? In order to explore this, we need to look more closely at some of these 
experiments. Not all were published, and it is often through the asylum records that we 
glean information on the way hypnosis was employed and directed.401 In early 1883, Tuke 
and Savage invited Carl Hansen, a Danish hypnotist, to experiment at Bethlem, and Tuke’s 
paper on the topic was presented to the next meeting of the MPA.402 Tuke concluded that 
the mental condition in hypnotism was strongly related to that in insanity and, moreover, 
that suggestion might be used to cure both physical and mental disease, absorbing the topic 
into his earlier work on the imagination.403 While the introduction of dynamic psycho-
therapy has generally been attributed to French (Janet and Bernheim), German (Freud) and 
Swiss (Jung) thinkers, Tuke may, in fact, have been one of the earliest advocates of “psycho-
therapeutics”.404 This term, for Tuke, incorporated a wide variety of techniques of 
therapeutics, ranging from the use of medication known to be inert to hypnotism and, 
finally, the influence a doctor might have due to the patient’s faith and trust in him. This 
concept, Tuke hoped, would bind psychiatry more closely to general medicine, by indicating 
the close relationship between body and mind.405 Tuke also invoked a universal force – 
Imagination – to explain psycho-therapeutics, complaining that, while other doctors had 
dismissed this concept, it deserved further investigation. 
When a person on swallowing a bread-pill, in the belief that it possesses aperient 
properties, is purged, it is said to be Imagination ... That she is relieved is no 
Imagination. What cured her? Merely to say it was the Imagination is no solution of 
the problem.406 
 
The imagination, Tuke felt, deserved greater credit for its curative powers, as well as 
investigation of its therapeutic role: as Sonu Shamdasani has recognised, this emphasis on 
the imagination meant that Tuke did not seem to connect his own approach with 
continental work on suggestion, despite being aware of the latter.407 For Tuke, the power of 
cure lay in the patient, not the doctor, whose duty was simply to “excite” the patient’s 
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naturally occurring sentiments in order to aid cure: the same sentiments that, in diseases 
such as hypochondriasis, might cause the symptoms in the first place.408 Tuke cited a 
number of cases, predominantly using hypnotism, which claimed to achieve cure by 
changing the patient’s mental state.  Savage, although sceptical at the time, claimed thirty 
years later to have reached a “stage of hope” over the possibilities offered by hypnotism as 
a treatment for nervous and functional disorders, as well as for investigation of the mind.409 
Smith, meanwhile, indicated that hypnotism might be interpreted as a continuation of 
moral treatment, for “[t]he dominance of one human being over another, which is, for the 
moment at least, gained by its [hypnotism’s] influence, seems in some ways more 
appropriate to the guidance and help of the insane by the sane.”410 
 Smith’s experiments in the late 1880s offer the first direct connection between 
therapeutics at Bethlem and the recently founded Society for Psychical Research (SPR), set 
up in 1882 to investigate spiritual, mesmeric and other psychical phenomena using a 
scientific methodology.411 In 1890, Smith published the results of experiments (made with 
A.T. Myers) into therapeutic hypnotism in twenty-one female Bethlem patients. Much of 
this hypnosis was carried out by the SPR’s Mr G. A. Smith, a former stage hypnotist: 
however, Myers, Percy Smith and Dr Goodall (a clinical assistant at Bethlem) also made 
attempts to induce hypnotic states.412 Arthur Myers was the younger brother of Frederic 
W.H. Myers (one of the founders of the SPR) and had a keen interest in hypnotism, having 
visited Charcot in Paris and Bernheim in Nancy in the 1880s.413 A physician by training, 
Arthur provided a link between the medical establishment and psychical research, paying 
more attention than his brother to the use of hypnotism in medical therapeutics.414 He also 
maintained connections with asylum psychiatry, contributing an article to Tuke’s Dictionary 
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on the history of hypnotism, in which he referred to the Bethlem experiments as a rare 
study among “very little done in therapeutics” in England.415 
 What, then, did Smith and Myers attempt with these patients, and how did they 
select the individuals on whom they experimented? All of the patients hypnotised were 
female. Was this because they were deemed easier to hypnotise or because their symptoms 
related to those Smith and Myers wanted to study? The article gives no reason for the 
choice. It is possible that these were milder cases of illness. In one instance, (Case VI) it was 
commented that the patient was chosen for her “considerable intelligence” which, it was 
felt, would make it “easy to gain her attention”.416 Attention was a new focus in late 
nineteenth century psychology, particularly following the work of Théodule Ribot, and 
increasingly formed a chapter heading in textbooks.417 This faculty, alienists often claimed, 
was frequently lacking in the insane, making them harder to hypnotise.418 It is also possible 
that a larger number of female patients exhibited the types of symptom Myers and Smith 
wished to investigate. The hypnotic suggestions concentrated on efforts to remove or 
minimise troubling behaviour or symptoms: wild and destructive acts, “dirty habits” 
(incontinence), hallucinations and delusions and, in particular, refusal of food. Half of the 
patients experimented on (10 out of 21) had refusal of food – a self-injurious (but not 
mutilating) behaviour – listed as one of their most prominent symptoms, and the 
suggestions made to these patients generally focused on encouraging them to eat. While 
there were certainly a high number of patients in Bethlem who refused food for short or 
prolonged spells, this was well under half the female population (in 1889, for example, the 
year in which the experiments were carried out, 51 out of the 160 women admitted refused 
food at some point – with only a third of these refusals occurring during the hospital stay). 
Refusal of food was also associated with other self-injurious acts, with around 25% of male 
patients and 45% of female patients who otherwise injured themselves also refusing food at 
some stage in their treatment. 
Hypnotic suggestion certainly constituted a very different manner of treatment from 
the standard technique of force-feeding, which often occurred as soon as one meal was 
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refused. Indeed, some success in persuading patients to eat seems to have been the result 
that Smith and Myers found most encouraging. Although many attempts at hypnotism 
failed, “[c]ases I, VIII, and XVII. were very similar in symptoms, in all three refusal of food 
being the greatest difficulty to combat, and in all there certainly was some improvement in 
this respect after the attempts at hypnotism.”  All three patients were in their teens and it 
was concluded that “the results gained would appear to have been due much more to the 
large amount of personal attention devoted to each case than to any hypnotic influence.”419 
Smith does not appear to have drawn any conclusions from this as to the general benefit of 
personal attention in psychiatry, although all three patients were discharged cured. At 
Sussex House Asylum, Dr Huggard was far more enthusiastic, suggesting that hypnotism not 
only compelled patients to eat, but that this was achieved by “reaching and exciting to 
action long disused nervous channels”, thus directly aiding relief of illness, as well as 
symptoms like food refusal.420  
Smith, however, was less-than convinced by the results of therapeutic hypnotism, 
noting that “so far the results have been extremely limited.”421 Despite this, he and Myers 
carried out further experiments in 1892 (this time unpublished)422and Smith’s junior 
colleague, Theo Hyslop, investigated therapeutic hypnotism with John Milne Bramwell later 
that decade.423 In 1895, the year he joined the Society for Psychical Research, Hyslop made 
the bold claim that: 
Among the insane, it [hypnotism] has been employed as a sleep producer, as a 
sedative in excitement, to dispel fleeting delusional states and the minor psychoses, 
to overcome morbid resistance of patients, and as a substitute for mechanical 
restraint.424 
 
Attempting to dispel then-prevalent concerns around the potential use of hypnotism for 
criminal purposes, Bramwell claimed that his experiments with Hyslop revealed “the fact 
that there has been neither loss of consciousness nor of volition”. He also suggested that the 
effect of hypnotism in the insane proved that it worked by increasing the individual’s ability 
to exercise his or her natural volition over apparently morbid (often self-injurious) 
tendencies.425 Refusal of food remained a dominant issue in therapeutic hypnotism within 
psychiatry, and George Savage later connected the method with the cure of “nervous 
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anorexia”.426 This was similarly explained by the ability of hypnotism to restore “natural 
instincts”, including that of self-preservation. Hence we can understand Hyslop’s claim that 
hypnotism might replace mechanical restraint by, in his view, restoring the instinct of self-
preservation in individuals exhibiting self-injurious or suicidal tendencies. 
 In recent years, historians have become interested in the connections between 
psychical research and psychology in the late nineteenth century, and the overlap between 
the two fields is certainly indicated by the interest in hypnotism and altered states at 
Bethlem.427 It was not only in order to prevent troublesome behaviour that alienists 
explored hypnotism, but also as part of efforts to understand and explore the human mind. 
Indeed, Tuke, who had witness Charcot’s experiments in 1878, came to believe that the 
procedure was most useful for this purpose.428 This approach drew on the representation of 
insanity, and associated acts such as self-mutilation, as characterised by a loss of “self-
feeling”, encouraging parallels with investigation into other “abnormal” states of 
consciousness.429 Cases of purportedly psychical phenomena, such as the state of 
mediumship, furthered the view that insanity and mental health were proximate, such “that 
it is possible to interpolate an innumerable series of gradations between them [abnormal 
cases] and health.”430 In exploring these concerns, alienists increasingly drew on mental, 
rather than somatic, philosophies, focusing on identity through such concepts as “double 
consciousness”, which they saw as particularly relevant to insanity.431 In the case of hysteria 
in particular, and the “dermatitis artefacta” that will be discussed in chapter five, self-
mutilation was directly related to these altered states. As Myers put it: 
Both in hypnosis and hysteria there is a disaggregation of the personality. Instead of 
the continuous personality of commonlife, with its one familiar alternation of sleep 
and waking, there are minor changes of phase, interruptions of memory, 
irregularities of will, inhibitions of faculty, something capricious and mutilated in the 
manifestation of the self.432 
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There was thus more crossover between British asylum psychiatry and psychical research 
than has been recognised. Hyslop approvingly mentioned the “large number of keen 
investigators” in England and America exploring mediumship “scientifically.”433 In turn, 
psychical researchers took psychological medicine seriously. The Society for Psychical 
Research added Tuke’s Illustrations of the Influence of the Mind upon the Body to their 
Library as soon as it was published (1884), while his Sleep Walking and Hypnotism (1884) 
was added the following year.434 When Frederic Myers included a helpful glossary of terms 
used in psychical research in the Society’s Proceedings of 1896, he took the definitions for 
most words “in common philosophical or medical use” from Tuke’s Dictionary (another 
volume in the Society’s Library), deeming it “the most authoritative – almost the only – 
English work of its kind.”435 The Glossary included “Psycho-therapeutics”, as defined by Tuke, 
with Myers confident that “all suggestion of course comes under this head.”436 While many 
writers dismissed psychical phenomena as evidence of fraud or disease others, who, like 
Tuke and Hyslop, stressed the importance of imagination and sympathy to human life, 
regarded them as revelatory of positive truths about humanity and selfhood. 
 Other than refusal of food, however, what forms of self-injury were most often 
related to altered consciousness? The wild movements and spasms of mediums and other 
hypnotised persons meant that the most frequent parallel drawn with so-called insane self-
mutilation was that of knocking the head or other part of the body. Alongside skin-picking 
and hair-plucking, such knocking was one of the most frequently recorded acts of self-
mutilation in Bethlem during this period (see figure 7). Associating such acts with an altered 
form of consciousness was not, however, the only or obvious explanation. Several decades 
earlier, in February 1850, 29-year-old nailmaker Samuel Day was admitted to Bethlem as a 
potentially “dangerous” (but not suicidal) patient. Due to his violent behaviour, Day was 
often secluded in a padded room (although mechanical restraint was not abolished at 
Bethlem until 1851, it was a rare occurrence in preceding years).437 On 4th July, all the 
padded rooms being full, Day was locked in an ordinary bedroom but soon after found 
“kneeling in the corner of the room, himself and the floor covered with blood which had 
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flowed very profusely from a severely lacerated wound of the scalp”. The patient later 
claimed that he had “intentionally beaten his head against the projecting edge of the brick 
wall.” Nonetheless, his death (a short period later) was not listed as suicide.438 Suicide could 
thus be categorised in particular ways in order to avoid negative publicity for the asylum. 
The classification also, however, brings to mind the association of certain forms of self-injury 
with wild, but essentially unintentional, acts, made by George Fielding Blandford and in the 
Ipswich asylum reports discussed in chapter one.439 In French neurology, head-banging 
continued to be associated with uncontrollable behaviour, such as the “Maladie des Tics” 
described by Gilles de la Tourette in 1885.440 By providing psychological explanations for 
certain cases of head-banging, however, Theo Hyslop offered an entirely different view of 
self-inflicted injury. 
 In 1899, the year in which Milne Bramwell rather boldly claimed that “the principle 
upon which the subliminal consciousness theory depends is now largely admitted by 
science”, Hyslop expanded his own work into this field by presenting a paper on “Double 
Consciousness” at the Annual Meeting of the British Medical Association Section of 
Psychology.441 While Bramwell’s claim is arguable, it does indeed seem that many writers in 
medical and popular literature had become impressed with the idea that the “self” was 
formed from a combination of elements (some conscious and some not), rather than being 
one unitary personality.442 In his short paper, Hyslop sought to expand the field of research 
on consciousness through a discussion of cases he felt might “help to bridge the apparently 
impassable gap between double consciousness and more ordinary experiences”,443 thus 
showing his belief in the proximity of sane and insane states. Hyslop’s interest in the field 
may well have increased following correspondence with Pierre Janet, who has widely been 
perceived as influential in the field of psychodynamic psychiatry in the later nineteenth 
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century.444 The two presumably met, for Janet’s calling card is pasted into Hyslop’s copy of 
Mental Physiology along with later correspondence.445 In “Double Consciousness”, Hyslop 
related Janet’s work on the “anaesthetic hysterical types” of multiple personality as one 
example of altered states of consciousness, citing particularly his well-known work with the 
subject Léonie.446 Here, however, I wish to focus particularly on a case in Hyslop’s paper 
featuring self-mutilation: that of “A.M.” 
 Twenty-five-year-old teacher Alice Rose Morison was admitted to Bethlem as a 
Voluntary Boarder in March 1895. Alice only remained in the Hospital for sixteen days 
before “her friends took her away as they thought that the other people in the gallery would 
be bad for her”, yet there are more case notes recorded about her than for many patients 
who remained a full year or more at the Hospital, indicating the high level of interest in her 
case.447 Alice, “an intellectual and highly cultivated lady” of “restless, nervous disposition”, 
had begun sleepwalking in 1891.448 “She used to make a great deal of noise at night, banging 
at the door, hitting her head on the floor & such like.” Two years later, mesmerism (carried 
out by “a friend”) apparently eased her condition, stopping Alice from “bang[ing] herself 
about so much”, but in the summer of that year (1893) “she again started sleeplessness & 
sleepwalking only she threw herself about more.” Knocking the head or body, as already 
indicated, came under contemporary definitions of self-mutilation, and it is interesting to 
note the way in which changes in Alice’s condition seem to have been measured by those 
around her through her level of self-injurious behaviour. In Christmas 1893, Miss Morison 
began “clairvoyance” and writing letters in her sleep, although for a long time she reportedly 
refused to believe anything she was told she had done in a trance. Having been advised the 
rather un-somatic (but not unusual) treatment of “rest and marriage” by neurologist Victor 
Horsley, Alice (who refused to follow this advice) had subsequently developed three 
separate personalities:  
Her second person she calls “Nocturna” & herself she calls “Morison” … a little later 
on she seems to have acquired a “3rd state” who used to do all manner of mischief… 
Perhaps one of the most important things to be grasped is that Nocturna knows 
what Morison is doing but Morison does not know what Nocturna is doing and 
neither of them know what the 3rd state is doing. This has been picked out of 2 hours 
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conversation [with Alice and her friend Miss Kennedy] so that necessarily there are 
many details wanting.449 
 
Despite the absence of detail, and the short duration of Alice’s stay at Bethlem, Hyslop 
nonetheless concluded in his publication that the case was: 
In favour of the hypothesis that dual consciousness is only complete somnambulism. 
The successive awakening of the senses constitutes a gradation from ordinary sleep 
to complete somnambulism, which gives to the person studied the appearance of 
leading a dual life. 
 
From this, he indicated that insanity might be comparable to “some dream states”, with acts 
like self-mutilation thus committed “unconsciously”.450 Such a notion also suggested that 
there might be a motive behind the self-inflicted injury that was beneath the level of 
consciousness, even if this were as confused or irrational as in a dream. 
 Another explanation was that the patient’s “second self” (or underlying 
consciousness) was, in fact, more rational than the primary self (which was subject to 
insanity or other nervous disorder) in that it protected him or her against injury: Alice 
Morison, as Hyslop remarked, “never really hurt herself”.451 The ability of hysterics to 
protect themselves from injury despite loss of sensation was similarly remarked upon by 
many writers, who noted that such was not the case in other conditions of anaesthesia, such 
as damage to the spinal cord.452 Thus, Frederic Myers declared that “[t]here is normally, in 
fact, a supervision – a subliminal supervision – exercised over the hysteric’s limbs. Part of 
her personality is still alive to the danger, and modifies her movements, unknown to her 
supraliminal self.”453 Indeed, even when the patient’s conscious self was insane, the “second 
self might protect against self-mutilation, which appeared as a “remarkable feature” in the 
case of Anna Winsor, sent to the American Society for Psychical Research. Here, the 
patient’s right arm “became, as it were, the primary possession of the secondary 
personality” with “beneficent control” over the subject’s attempts to tear out her hair.454 
Myers’ conclusions about human personality in this case resulted from the prior assumption 
that the act of tearing the hair was a perversion of the natural instinct of self-preservation: a 
similar perspective to that of the asylum psychiatrists discussed in chapter one. Nonetheless, 
for Myers, this instinct could be maintained by the subliminal self. 
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 In keeping with his usual method of working, Hyslop divided his conclusions on 
double consciousness into what he referred to as psychological and physiological 
considerations (depending on the authorities to whom he referred: in the latter instance, 
physicians, and in the former experimental psychologists). In physiological terms, he found it 
difficult to make any generalisations for, as he stated, within physiology there was no clear 
conception of what constituted the physical basis of consciousness, let alone any multiplicity 
of this phenomenon.455 While noting Hughlings Jackson’s suggestion that the left 
hemisphere of the brain, being more “highly evolved” might be able to inhibit the right 
hemisphere, this could not, he felt, explain cases of multiple personality. Indeed, the very 
existence of such cases suggested “the diffusion of the elements of consciousness 
everywhere throughout the brain substratum” with “no supreme centre anywhere.”456 
Psychologically, however, Hyslop felt able to draw four conclusions, primarily based on 
Wundt’s suggestion that ego (or selfhood) was founded in bodily sensations and images. 
Thus, for Hyslop, abnormal states of consciousness were characterised by “the disjoining of 
these bodily feelings and images which … removes the background of the awareness of 
self.”457 Hyslop’s descriptions remained associated with the physiological psychology of 
Carpenter and Laycock, through his characterisation of such states as entailing a loss of 
volition. However, these concepts were modified by new interpretations of self, in which, as 
Myers described it, the “old-fashioned view of a single unitary personality” (as in 
associationist psychology), was replaced by the “modern view that the self is a co-
ordination.”458 Hyslop’s article thus reflected the work of Théodule Ribot, whose Diseases of 
the Personality (1885) suggested that the self was a complex of memories and bodily 
sensations: indeed, Hyslop referenced the French writer in the article and his psychiatric 
textbook.459 The “disjoining” of these would, then, appear to make the self disappear, or 
otherwise disintegrate. Such concepts of self were attractive to many alienists, whose 
asylum experiences (in particular the continuing environmental and educational approach of 
moral treatment) persuaded them to claim a model of insanity based on heredity, 
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physiology, environment and sociology, in which selfhood “cannot be treated as if it were a 
constant quantity.” 460 
 In addition, however, the regular parallels made between the integration of the 
individual into his surroundings, and the integration of the personality (or self) in the 
individual, meant that acts (like self-mutilation) which were seen as indicative of such a 
disintegration of self - “the old and oft-repeated statement that insanity is a perversion of 
the ego”461- might be deemed similarly representative of a loss of social function. Indeed, 
despite their divergences, psychological and physiological approaches stemmed from, and 
resulted in, similar judgments about the individual. Whether self-mutilation was seen to 
represent a psychological alteration of identity (revealing the hidden recesses of mind) or a 
biological reversion to a “primitive” state, it was nonetheless regarded as the opposite of the 
“instinct” of healthy self-preservation and, as such, antagonistic to the “social instincts” 
required for the future of civilization. Psychological approaches to character, like 
physiological ones, incorporated philosophical and economic concerns for national well-
being: in particular, the increasing discussion of “malingering.” 
 
3.4 Liberty, Malingering and Responsibility: Self-Help or Self-Sacrifice 
 In order to set malingering in a wider context, I will first explore the seeming 
opposites of “self-help” and “self-sacrifice”, concerns which formed the focus of much 
political and intellectual discussion in the later nineteenth century. The former notion is 
most commonly associated with the popular book by Samuel Smiles, published in the same 
year as John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty and Darwin’s On the Origin of Species.462 Like Darwin, 
with whom he corresponded, Smiles saw the values he promoted in Self-Help as “natural” 
and, like Mill, he was deeply concerned with the relationship of the individual to society.463 
Self-Help effectively begins where On Liberty ends: with the notion that the “worth of a 
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State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it.”464 Mill himself had 
attempted to discern the proper balance between individualism and state control (in 
general, he felt the former under-valued). Influenced in his early writings by the approach of 
Auguste Comte, some of whose texts were explored in the previous chapter, Mill’s concerns 
over Comte’s development of a “humanitarian religion” in the Catèchisme Positiviste caused 
him to distance himself from Positivist thought.465 Yet the distinction made in On Liberty 
between acts considered self-regarding and those felt to be other-regarding appears 
remarkably similar to Comte’s division of motivation into egoistic and altruistic. Traditional 
criticisms of On Liberty have portrayed Mill as championing individualism and diversity over 
state control, suggesting that the only limits – legal or social – which might be legitimately 
enforced on an individual were in order to prevent his or her behaviour being harmful to 
others.466 In the last ten years, however, Mill scholarship has been subject to much 
revisionism. Joseph Hamburger, for example, has indicated that Mill does not explicitly 
denounce all social constraints over the individual, and any analysis of his ideas must take 
into account the shifting meaning of what might be deemed “harmful”.467 Every individual 
who receives the protection of society, according to Mill, owes a return. This responsibility is 
not merely defined by active harm to others, but also “in each person’s bearing his share ... 
These conditions society is justified in enforcing at all costs to those who endeavour to 
withhold fulfilment.”468 From such a perspective, self-mutilation (an intentional damaging of 
the body’s function) might be considered economically “selfish”, preventing an individual 
from working or fulfilling other social responsibilities.  
 Self-mutilation certainly did become bound up in contemporary debate around the 
concept of malingering, or feigning illness, which, by the turn of the twentieth-century, it 
was claimed, had “reached a high level of perfection”.469 Medical commentators often 
emphasised the importance of the medical “detective” to uncover those individuals deemed 
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to constitute a social evil.470 While this was certainly not a new approach for doctors, the 
late nineteenth century saw a rapidly increasing interest in both the concept of malingering, 
and use of the term itself, as indicated by figure 16, below. This graph shows the results of 
my search for the terms “malinger” and “feigned disease” between 1851 and 1910. 
“Medical” incorporates my data from the Journal of Mental Science, British Medical Journal 
and The Lancet. “Press” includes a search of the British Library Victorian Newspapers 
database and The Times Digital Archive, while “Books” was a search of British texts on 
Google books. While the limitations of the databases used means that this graph cannot be 
regarded as definitive, it nonetheless illustrates a general trend: increasing discussion of 
malingering in the later decades of the nineteenth century, particularly after 1870. 
 
Figure 16: Graph showing the increase in discussion of malingering, 1850 – 1910 
But where did the term come from? One medical correspondent to the Oxford 
English Dictionary – William Sykes M.D. – claimed to have “traced this word down to almost 
the case of the Great French War.” 471 Like other writers, Sykes was certain that malingering 
had entered the English language from the French verb malingre (to be sickly or weak), and 
that it had gained its association with military conduct during the Napoleonic Wars.472 This 
connection was made despite the fact that neither he, nor anyone else, could find any 
French quotation using “malingre” in such a sense and, indeed, the term “malingeror” in 
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British texts pre-dates this period.473 The idea thus rested on prior assumptions that military 
self-mutilation had a French history, based on the fact that France was the first country to 
legally threaten punishment for it in a law of 1832.474 This ruling subsequently became 
incorporated into military law in other nations.475 Indeed, some of the earliest references to 
self-mutilation in journals and newspapers tended to be in the context of malingering. When 
Forbes Winslow’s Psychological Journal reported on “Moral and Criminal Epidemics” in 1856, 
the article included self-mutilation among a list of social problems, giving as example a 
claimed epidemic of “voluntary mutilations” in the French Foreign Legion in 1844.476 
Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, commentators in French and 
English regularly referred to the origins of the concept of “malingering” (however phrased) 
and self-mutilation in the Napoleonic Wars.477  
Yet military parlance alone does not explain the surge in interest in malingering, as 
shown in figure 16. Indeed, it was the increasing application of the concept to civilian 
populations that accounted for a large proportion of this use. While the description of 
civilians as malingering had certainly occurred prior to the Napoleonic Wars, the 
retrospective attempt to locate the origins of all malingering in wartime experiences 
suggested that civilians must be trying to gain something – as, it was claimed, soldiers were 
– by inflicting injuries on themselves or otherwise feigning disease. The relation to self-
mutilation was further emphasised by claims that the term malingering indicated the 
physical nature of a deceit: as one correspondent in Notes and Queries explained, the British 
War Office distinguished between feigning (pretending to be ill) and malingering (the 
production of the physical appearance of disease by drugs or mechanical means).478 The 
increasing interest in civilian “malingering” has been convincingly associated by historians 
with the rise of health insurance systems across Europe: the introduction of accident 
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insurance in Germany in 1871 and the Employer’s Liability Act of 1880 and subsequent 
Workmen’s Compensation Acts in England.479 Many of those discussing self-mutilation in the 
later nineteenth century also assumed such a context. The collections of physician Frederick 
Parkes Weber on the topic of self-mutilation, for example, were closely associated with his 
files on Workmen’s Insurance and Life Assurance Claims: Weber also claimed to have been 
the first person in England to publish on the German system.480 Historical accounts of the 
emergence of these worker insurance schemes have portrayed them as indicating a broad 
shift from a model of obligation (in which responsibility for accident and compensation lay 
with the employer, unless employee negligence could be proved) to one of collective 
responsibility, in which accidents would be assessed by the seemingly neutral measure of 
statistical probability. Yet the costs of such a system, and the means of assessing the 
worker’s right to a claim, made debates around malingering class-oriented from the outset. 
The malingerer was invariably the worker, not the employer, and he (and not his employer) 
would be the person accused of attempting to cheat the system. Thus physicians like Weber 
often became involved in such a system by policing it, whatever their personal political 
ideals.481  
 These concerns seemed to legitimate a distinction between deserving and 
undeserving recipients of relief, and can be (and have been) used to attack the concept of a 
welfare state as well as to support it.482 The apparent simplicity of the insurance model of 
healthcare was complicated at an early stage by the difficulty of judging whether or not a 
person was entitled to compensation. A number of writers have indicated the importance of 
the traumatic neuroses in such concerns, which led to a re-definition of “accident” in 
insurance circles. So-called traumatic neurosis emerged from medical interest in “railway 
spine” in the mid-nineteenth century (early manifestations appeared in the context of new 
rail networks spreading across Europe). It was characterised as an illness that might emerge 
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long after an accident, which itself had caused little or no physical damage.483 The physical 
and emotional shock of the accident, it was suggested, caused damage to the nervous 
system, which later resulted in a wide variety of symptoms, including aches, pains, 
exhaustion, trembling, and mental depression. Such cases often became the subject of legal 
battles between insurance companies – who refused to recognise the diagnosis – and 
claimants, who asserted the veracity of their illness.484 The neuroses – including hysteria, 
hypochondriasis and the popular turn-of-the-century diagnosis neurasthenia – thus held an 
uneasy relationship with malingering, a proximity which continued into the First World War 
via the concept of “shell-shock”.485 
 Indeed, the label of malingering appears to have been more frequently applied to 
cases of neurosis than to acts of self-mutilation. This can be seen within the records of two 
hospitals: the National Hospital for Nervous Diseases in London’s Queen Square and the 
Royal London Hospital. The former was founded in 1860 as a private philanthropical 
enterprise with just ten beds, the hospital had expanded to hold 100 in-patients by 1871 and 
200 by 1900. Between 1878 and 1905, a total of seventeen patients were suspected of 
malingering, with the term forming either all or part of their diagnosis (with or without a 
question mark). The low number of “malingerers” in the Hospital, quite in contrast to 
articles stressing the prevalence of this type of act, is also evident in patients admitted to the 
Royal London. Founded in 1740, the Royal London Hospital was a charitable institution in 
East London, which had rapidly expanded in size following the opening of a purpose-built 
hospital in Whitechapel in 1757. Most of the patients were drawn from the surrounding 
communities and, by the late 1800s, some paid a small fee for their treatment, while others 
were cared for free of charge. By the 1880s, the Hospital housed around 800 in-patients at 
any one time: enormous in comparison to Queen Square. Yet, between 1893 and 1910, 171 
male and 76 female patients were categorised as “Nil or Malingering” (just 0.002% of over 
120,000 admissions in this period). The amalgamation of “Nil” and “Malingering” into one 
category meant that many of these patients were not considered to be feigning disease at 
all: the total included babies admitted with their mothers and administrative errors, in 
addition to individuals viewed as deceptive. Unlike several Royal London cases, which will be 
discussed shortly, not one of the Queen Square “malingerers” was suggested to have self-
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inflicted injuries: instead, reflecting the neurological focus of the Hospital, these were 
patients who complained of pain, numbness, paralyses and fits, which appeared to have no 
organic foundation and, for one or other reason, did not result in the “functional” diagnosis 
of neurasthenia, hysteria or hypochondriasis. 
 Although we might imagine a diagnosis of malingering would bring into question 
whether any medical treatment should be given, only two of the patients at Queen Square 
classed as malingerers were treated for less than ten days (the average length of stay was 31 
days), while many were discharged with ongoing medication. Indeed, the reason for any 
suspicion of malingering is often hard to pinpoint, and rarely seems to have been confirmed. 
Only in one case did a patient confess to feigning illness, 17-year-old apprentice James 
Carter. Admitted in April 1878 suffering from hyperaesthesia and paralysis of the right leg, 
the suspicions of doctors appear to have been raised early for, rather than referring to the 
general conditions of the patient’s life, James’ previous history stated simply: “Apprentice to 
Brush maker. Doesn't like his work.” This, it was implied, might explain the patient’s efforts 
to gain admission to Hospital, where he was pejoratively described as a “stupid-looking 
boy”. Punishment, it seems, was felt to be the most apt form of treatment after James was 
suspected of copying the symptoms of other patients and, two days after admission, 
“Faradization [was] this morning painfully applied to buttocks, dropped his stick & literally 
ran away from it.” The following day, when James would not sit “properly”, he was given the 
cold douche and sit bath, after which he was described as “very much better. Sits now.” A 
week after admission, having been Faradized on two more occasions, “[n]ow he walks as 
well as anyone. Jumps well & sits down. In fact has nothing whatever the matter with him 
according to his own account.” Responsibility was passed on to James’ mother, who was 
“advised as to treatment in case of relapse.” In spite of the boy’s confession that he had “put 
it on because his mother wanted him to go to sea”, it is interesting to note the retention of 
medical language here, via the terms “treatment” and “relapse”. James’ malingering, 
although seemingly intentional, nonetheless remained within a medical remit.486 The 
proximity of medical treatment and investigation into malingering was further complicated 
by the use of the same techniques as both treatment and punishment. Such is evident in the 
above case, where Faradization and the cold douche were used to shock the patient into 
confessing or otherwise abandoning his feigned symptoms. The wire brush, used in cases of 
numbness or paralysis to re-invigorate the nerves, could also be applied in such a way. 
William Symonds, whose paraplegia appeared to the doctors to be “voluntary”, “[r]ecovered 
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completely after a few applications of wire brush very strongly”, implying that he had 
dropped feigned symptoms following intentionally painful treatment.487 
 Although Queen Square was a charitable hospital, a number of the malingering 
patients were educated and from formerly wealthy backgrounds. Such patients complicated 
a situation which, in other instances, was read through class and economic concerns, with 
the decision as to whether a patient was hysterical or malingering often made on such 
grounds.488 From an insurance perspective, malingerers were working class, while their 
middle class counterparts (who did not benefit financially) were hysterical, and thus sought 
emotional, rather than financial, gratification. In some circumstances, doctors were 
forthright in dismissing working class patients as deceptive. In 1889, George Thorpe, a 
general practitioner in Walthamstow, commented indignantly on the case of a seventeen-
year-old servant he had treated. This “healthy-looking country girl” had visited Thorpe on 
several occasions with an inflamed hand. The surgeon seems to have been suspicious from 
the outset, for “[h]er mistress informed me that the girl was not at all fond of work, and that 
she had a deal of trouble to get her to do it.” When Thorpe examined the hand he 
discovered a needle, which he removed – a procedure which recurred several times over the 
next week. Eventually, Thorpe “felt so disgusted with her that I advised her mistress to get 
rid of her at once, which was done, and the girl returned to the country.” He concluded that 
“[i]t seems hardly credible that a person of her age could be so cunning, and would inflict so 
much pain upon herself to avoid work.”489 Yet this explanation nonetheless appeared to 
Thorpe to be the only possible one, given the girl’s station in life, although his decision to 
remove a number of needles before coming to this conclusion indicates that even doctors 
who were outspoken on this subject were wary of accusing their patients directly. 
Nonetheless, class-oriented definitions of malingering continued to appear in physician’s 
reports on working class women who injured themselves in the early twentieth century.490 
Accusations of deception were not necessarily the only interpretations of working class 
injury made by doctors: a liberal political bent might suggest a socio-environmental 
explanation. Scottish laryngologist, Sir James Dundas-Grant, for example, referred 
sympathetically (if patronisingly) to a “poor lodging-house drudge” who had continued to 
return for hospital treatment following an operation, as scraps of bone were regularly found 
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in the wound. Later, it was discovered that she was inserting the bone herself, an act 
Dundas-Grant judged a “pitiful endeavour to obtain respite from the drudgery of her 
everyday existence [which] made her an object for commiseration rather than for blame.”491 
 Nonetheless, the hypothesis of fraud remained commonly judged by class, sex (with 
men deemed more likely to be fraudulent than women), and personality. The connection of 
self-inflicted injury with malpractice was supported by newspaper articles. In 1906, Weekly 
Dispatches published a case of “self-torture as fraud”, citing one Mary Brown, a 35-year-old 
woman who had been convicted of impersonating nurses in order to make fraudulent 
financial transactions. Mary, it was claimed “gained her knowledge of the nurses’ names by 
obtaining admission to the various hospitals as a patient, one of the means to that end being 
the sticking of hairpins in her body.”492 Anthropological examples also appeared to support 
such contentions. When the case of a Chinese beggar who had amputated his own feet “in 
order to make “himself as attractive as possible to the charitably disposed” was reported in 
the BMJ in 1882, it was suggested that such acts were frequent in China. This, the author 
concluded, enabled Western readers to “throw a light on that singular mixture of courage, 
deceit, and sacrifice of almost anything to advance low enterprise, which characterise the 
lower orders in that country.”493 The assumption that a rational motive lay behind self-
inflicted injury promoted a tendency to rule self-injurious acts as suspicious: whether for 
financial, moral or other reasons. By the mid twentieth century, these concerns were so 
fixed in common opinion that doctors claimed “malingering is best classified by motives 
rather than by techniques”.494 This increasingly coloured attitudes to psychiatric patients in 
the later years of the nineteenth century. A physiological explanation of self-injurious acts, 
as caused by a nervous impulse difficult or impossible to resist, had prompted a view of 
injuries as beyond a patient’s control. The later nineteenth-century attention to individual 
psychology and patient responsibility encouraged self-mutilation to be viewed in the context 
of malingering and associated diagnoses, such as hysteria (which will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter five). That such a perspective is not necessarily self-evident, but rooted in 
many other judgments concerning the relation of the individual to society, is made clear by 
the association with another contemporary concern used by patients (but not, generally, 
psychiatrists) to explain acts of injury: self-sacrifice. 
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 Although often associated with altruism in the later nineteenth century, the concept 
of self-sacrifice had a longer history, directly tied to Roman Catholicism and High Church 
Anglicanism. Despite the long-running existence of such a notion, the topic appears to have 
received little scholarly attention.495 Victorian texts, however, are littered with references to 
self-sacrificing women, seen to epitomise the domestic ideal.496 For alienists, this trait was 
particularly important, for it was evidence of the way in which the “position and ... 
profession of the individual will colour the nature of the insanity: ... a man is more 
egotistical, a woman more altruistic in her bent.”497 In late-nineteenth-century Christian 
texts, the notion that self-sacrifice was a female trait meant that it was embodied by female 
characters, such as the heroine of the Reverend William Des Brisay’s epic poem Ethelena or 
Self-Sacrifice, who learnt devotion and self-sacrifice from reading texts on the holy 
martyrs.498 Such tracts often reinforced traditional gender roles. In 1882, the London Society 
for Promoting Christian Knowledge published a pamphlet entitled Lizzie Blake, or Self-
Sacrifice.499 The short story was presumably aimed at girls around Lizzie’s age (twelve at the 
start of the story); in a period of increasing feminist agitation, and reforms to women’s 
education, the text reminds children on the verge of puberty to attend to daughterly (and, 
later, wifely) duties before pursuing personal goals, concluding that: 
I hope the girls who read this will try and be like Lizzie, who in all she did was so 
unselfish and kind. There is no doubt, if all tried to give up their own will, and to 
think of other’s before their own pleasure, the homes of a great many would be the 
happier for it.500 
 
It is clear from the text that the “all” supposed to give up their will were, specifically, 
women, represented by the only two characters in the story given actual names: Lizzie and 
her elder sister Martha, who “selfishly” abandons her family to gain “independence” as a 
servant. When alienists described the women around them as self-sacrificing, they 
perpetuated such myths of femininity.501 
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 Yet these notions were accompanied in the late nineteenth century by the idea of a 
more secular, heroic, masculine self-sacrifice, epitomised in artist G. F. Watts’ “Memorial to 
Heroic Self-Sacrifice”, unveiled in London’s Postman’s Park in 1900, as seen in figure 17, 
below. 
 
Figure 87: Photograph of the Watts Memorial, Postman's Park, London. This plaque was 
added to explain the display by the Watts Gallery in June 2009 
The Watts Memorial was designed to commemorate ordinary people who had died saving 
the lives of others, and would otherwise have been forgotten. Its very existence indicates 
the extent to which notions of “self-sacrifice” were idealised in this period: in many of the 
tablets, both attempted rescuer and helpless victim are revealed to have perished, making 
the sacrifice futile to modern eyes. Yet the memorial itself is revelatory of the extreme late 
nineteenth-century perspective, steeped in notions of altruism, in which multiple deaths are 
portrayed as having become socially beneficial through the sacrifice of selfhood, such as the 
aptly-named David Selves, a twelve year old boy who died in 1886, while supporting “his 
drowning playfellow and sank with him clasped in his arms.”502 Selves’ “heroic” self-sacrifice 
appears to consist of simply sharing the death of his companion. The medical profession 
might also be characterised as self-sacrificing, as indicated in reactions to the “heroic” death 
of Middlesex Hospital medical officer, William Freer Lucas, who died of diphtheria caught 
while administering medicine to a child.  
We cannot afford to let such deeds drop into silence. Here in the Jabez Balfour end 
of the nineteenth century is a great white fact! A man lays down his life for another! 
... Deeds like that of William Freer Lucas help to make belief in God and humanity a 
possibility and a fact.503  
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Jabez Balfour was a businessman who, in 1892, fled the country after swindling investors in 
his Building Society by using funds to purchase his own properties at inflated prices: the 
contrast here sets the potential for selfish individualism within self-help squarely against 
self-sacrifice as a humanitarian goal. Watts esteemed Lucas similarly highly, and a 
commemorative plaque to his death was incorporated into the Memorial. Yet Samuel 
Smiles’ concern with progress meant that he cast self-help as opposed to selfishness for, “it 
will also be found ... that the duty of helping one’s self in the highest sense involves the 
helping of one’s neighbours.”504 Thus, Smiles boldly declared: “National progress is the sum 
of individual industry, energy, and uprightness, as national decay is of individual idleness, 
selfishness, and vice.”505 
 However, the notion of heroic self-sacrifice could just as easily be appropriated as 
justification for capitalist gain. Smiles himself declared that “some of the finest qualities of 
human nature are intimately related to the right use of money; such as generosity, honesty, 
justice, and self-sacrifice”,506 implying that these virtues could only be achieved by the 
wealthy or prudent. Other writers took this train of thought still further. Anthropologist 
William Winwood Reade declared the “love of money ... the root of all industry, and ... 
therefore ... the root of all good.”507 Reade, like Smiles and some of the evolutionists 
discussed in the previous chapter, saw capitalist, industrial society as natural: free trade 
promoted individuality, and individual gain led to social progress. Reade declared that: 
“Wealth, like health, is in the air; if a man makes a fortune he draws money from Nature and 
gives it to the general stock.”508 Such an economic perspective on self-help and self-sacrifice 
supports the hypothesis that self-mutilation might be considered damaging to the 
community by making the individual economically worthless, and thus unable to repay those 
debts to society outlined by Mill. Such concerns were not, however, explicitly addressed in 
relation to self-inflicted injury beyond the concept of malingering, which, although part of 
medical debate around hysteria, did not become directly connected to medico-political 
concerns until the 1910s, following the introduction of national insurance.509 That this was 
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the case becomes more understandable when one recognises the way in which the practical 
and spiritual ideals outlined above were intertwined in notions of both self-help and self-
sacrifice. 
 In 1894, Francis Herbert Bradley (a leading member of the idealist movement in 
philosophy) published a paper in the International Journal of Ethics on “The Limits of 
Individual and National Self-Sacrifice.”510 Bradley began from the assumption “that self-
sacrifice can exist and also may be right,” before covering various approaches to it in an 
attempt to determine on what principle self-sacrifice might be right, and whether there was 
a limit beyond which it became wrong.511 He concluded that “self-sacrifice is right if the loss 
is sustained with a view to a greater gain, and otherwise it is wrong.”512 It should be noted, 
once more, that Bradley does not suggest that the gain must be achieved, it must only be 
expected. This is an important distinction, which is not necessarily in accordance with the 
sense in which the term might be used today. This may well relate to the religious history: 
from a Christian perspective, the gain will be achieved in the after-life. It also provides an 
important background from which to view the Watts memorial, in which many of those who 
sacrificed themselves failed in their efforts to save others. Evolutionary writers in the same 
period equated this sacrifice with the notion of progress. Winwood Reade titled his history 
of Africa The Martyrdom of Man in order to describe, as he saw it, “universal history.” 
In each generation the human race has been tortured that their children might profit 
by their woes. Our own prosperity is founded on the agonies of the past. Is it 
therefore unjust that we also should suffer for the benefit of those who are to 
come?513 
 
Such a belief could be pitted against social reformers, by casting poverty and inequality as an 
important element of the overall improvement of the race. Reade himself, who had 
originally planned to call his book The Origin of Mind, claimed that the sacrifice for western 
Victorian society was predominantly “a season of mental anguish”, suggesting that mental 
disorder itself was an essential aspect of progress.514 Thus, the acts of those, inside or 
outside asylums, who castrated themselves, plucked out an eye or amputated a hand in 
order to, as they saw it, benefit society could in theory be viewed as self-sacrificing, whether 
any actual benefit accrued or not. What is most surprising, then, is that such motivations 
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were not generally acknowledged by alienists. At Bethlem, Annie Hockley claimed that she 
wanted to become a martyr in order to save the world, while Ada Rider thought burning 
herself would save everyone from ruin.515 Such patients were simply considered delusional, 
without any recognition of the way their ideas fitted into contemporary concerns. For those 
who saw altruism as solely associated with progress, it was impossible to see self-injurious 
behaviour as stemming from similar impulses. Indeed, only those writers who appear to 
have been quite negative about both biological progress and religious faith appear to have 
made this connection, such as Charles Mercier, who darkly claimed that the “spirit of self-
sacrifice ... is but self-injury on a higher level than that of actual physical mutilation. The 
principle on which it depends is precisely the same, although the manifestation takes a 
different form.”516 Mercier’s words form part of a broader criticism of the concept of 
altruism, which, some writers argued, could not be portrayed as the “motive power” 
necessary for life.517 However, these dissenting voices were few and far between, at least in 
the field of asylum psychiatry, where the impact of evolutionary and anthropological 
concerns furthered the depiction of self-mutilation as selfish, rather than self-sacrificing. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 As previous chapters have indicated, there continued to be much debate around the 
role of impulse and volition in late nineteenth-century discourses on insanity, in particular a 
tendency to regard many acts of self-mutilation in asylums as indicative of loss of self-
control. Nonetheless, in the 1880s and 1890s, this debate was part of a much broader 
picture. Many late nineteenth-century alienists no longer regarded the will as a pure 
element of mind, as had previously been claimed. Daniel Hack Tuke, for example, came to 
view will as constituted by intellect and emotion, a circumstance which emphasised the 
ideational, rather than the neurological-inhibitory, elements of the concept.518 Thus, 
although sane and insane acts might still be viewed from a physiological perspective (in that 
they were perceived to result from neurological impulse), many suggested that emotion or 
idea preceded such an impulse, with the “inward” experiences of intellect and emotion 
increasingly forming the province of the late nineteenth-century alienist. These new 
explorations of motive depended not just on the influence of contemporary psychological 
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theories of consciousness, but also on the social and political implications of new concepts 
of self, by which the individual was regarded as a combination of elements, conscious and 
unconscious, rather than one unitary personality.  The integration of these factors in the 
individual, often represented in evolutionary terms as adaptation to environment, was seen 
to be vital to mental health. Paradoxically, such self-knowledge could also be potentially 
dangerous, and needed to be viewed in the context of the individual’s integration in society. 
We can see these concerns clearly in the ways alienists paid increasing attention to the 
subjective motives of their patients and the part these played in prompting self-injurious 
acts. While by no means all alienists adopted this approach, it is interesting that those who 
considered self-mutilation to be a definite topic were often those – like the physicians at 
Bethlem – who also tended towards an anti-materialist stance, their concepts of selfhood 
incorporating physiological, psychological, sociological, metaphysical and even theological 
concerns. 
 The re-evaluation of the seemingly disparate concepts of self-help and self-sacrifice 
should thus be viewed as illustrative of a shift in concepts of selfhood in the later nineteenth 
century, which provided the impetus for interest in self-mutilation, as well as shaping a 
number of features of the psychiatric debate. From being characterised as either rational or 
irrational (based on the old psychology), the psychological model of motivation in mankind 
in the second half of the nineteenth century began to follow a Comtian model, separating 
acts into egoistic and altruistic: those for and against society. This shift has been highlighted 
by an exploration of morbid self-consciousness in hypochondriasis, which provides an 
important backdrop for the characterisation of self-injurious acts as selfish, indicating that 
debate over self-mutilation formed part of a much wider discussion over the nature of the 
individual, and his or her relationship to society. Thus, although self-mutilation continued to 
be characterised by a perceived absence of will, new approches to volition caused alienists 
to see some self-inflicted injuries as the opposite, the result of “those active operations of 
the mind which involve movements and active concentration of the attention upon an 
object or idea, with the addition of a resolve.”519 The topic thus sat uncomfortably at both 
ends of the spectrum of ideas: regarded as both internal and external, evidence of self-
knowledge or morbid self-consciousness, self-help or self-sacrifice, atavism or degeneration. 
 Late nineteenth-century concerns about the self can be regarded as rooted in the 
political visions offered by two seemingly opposing views. In defining purpose in purely 
individual terms, rationalism appeared to undermine the cohesion of society, while 
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Romantic expression offered a means of maintaining a free, participatory society, supported 
by an ethos of nationalism.520 In this chapter I have argued for the existence of a still more 
complex political and social background to late nineteenth-century concepts of self-
mutilation, in which there was no clear divide between physical and spiritualist or 
evolutionary and degenerationist concepts of motivation. Self-mutilation was sometimes, as 
in the case of Isaac Brooks, held up as indicative of excessive individualism: an act performed 
against society, as much as an act of inwardness, and thus representative of the effects of 
the self-culture of modern civilisation.521 Yet, as we have seen in the previous chapter, self-
mutilation might equally be regarded as irrational, an improper (and un-civilised) means of 
intellectual or emotional expression, which required regulation and control. The efforts of 
alienists to deal with this disjuncture, which appeared to simultaneously require the 
engagement and detachment of the doctor, also led them to comment on the issues they 
considered to be facing society. If self-mutilation might be caused by factors both internal 
and external to the individual, then both of these fields became the psychiatrist’s concern. 
That these concerns could be supported, as in the case of self-mutilation, by biological, 
psychological, metaphysical, moral and spiritual arguments indicates the importance of 
recognising that we can see none of these fields as essentially any more or less restrictive or 
liberating than any other: indeed, that we often cannot regard them as separate fields at all. 
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Chapter 4 
Sexual Self-Mutilation: Masturbation, Masculinity and Self-Control (c. 1880 – 1900) 
 
4. 1 Introduction 
 On the rare occasion medical histories have discussed self-mutilation, many have 
noted the interest in castration during the late nineteenth century. Armando Favazza has 
suggested that such reports played an important role in the development of psychiatric 
theories, as well as positing a link between case studies of self-castration and the “castration 
complex” of psychoanalysis.522 Yet a focus on the role of Freud is misleading, for psychiatric 
attention to the meaning of castration (biologically, psychologically and symbolically) 
certainly pre-dates his work. By the 1890s castration seemed, for some, to be the paradigm 
for self-mutilation. In his Dictionary entry, James Adam specifically isolated “sexual self-
mutilation” as a particular category, setting such acts in the context of contemporary work 
by French and German authors, in particular the new field of sexual pathology. In American 
texts, the prominence of case studies of castration in European publications led to bold 
claims in the same decade that “self-mutilation in man is almost invariably the result of 
meditation over the generative function.”523 Thus, by the time the issues for “S” in the 
Surgeon-General’s Index-Catalogue were published in 1910, the entry for “self-mutilation” 
pointed readers to the entries for “Sexual instinct (perversion of)” and “Skoptzy”, suggesting 
a link between the three.524 The articles listed included a large number focusing on other 
forms of self-inflicted injury, including amputation and enucleation, which might be 
regarded equally dramatic. So why was there such medical interest in genital self-injury in 
the later nineteenth century? And in what ways did alienists explain and interpret self-
castration?  
 It might seem obvious to us today, following psychoanalytic tradition and the 
introduction of gender reassignment surgery, that the removal of the male sex organs 
should be regarded as a process of gender inversion. However, we cannot assume that 
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masculinity has always been perceived as directly related to sexual identity (and organs).525 
Nonetheless, examining the ways in which psychiatrists related self-mutilation to male 
sexuality does illuminate certain aspects of masculinity in late nineteenth-century culture, a 
period which has been regarded by many writers as one of intense male self-doubt.526 This 
chapter thus explores the ways in which male identity in the late nineteenth century was 
associated with sexual function. The widespread assumption within this period that 
masculinity was synonymous with self-control (and sexual restraint) offers a far more 
complex picture than the assumption that castration is intrinsically emasculating. I argue 
that attention to castration may well be seen to reflect contemporary masculine ideals, but 
not necessarily in the ways that twenty-first century readers would expect. I begin by 
describing the psychiatric category, and the way in which this was shaped by two particular 
cases. Outside the asylum, the widely-reported mutilation of farmer Isaac Brooks 
encouraged growing psychiatric interest in the topic: in particular, a tendency to relate 
castration to changes in character, as well as physical form. This case was certainly one of 
the factors that led James Adam to the topic, and medical and lay ideas from the Brooks 
case permeate his work. Adam chose to apply certain of these to one of his own patients, 
formulating sexual self-mutilation as a psychological category. 
 In order to understand why Adam and others drew certain conclusions about 
individual character and mental state from the act of castration, we need to understand the 
context within which they were working. I thus explore the relation of self-castration to 
what might be considered as surgical genital mutilation, in particular the remedies adopted 
to counter the supposedly harmful effects of masturbation. Both within and outside 
asylums, practitioners experimented with potentially harmful genital therapies for the 
dreaded disease of spermatorrhoea, including cauterisation and “wiring”. While it is 
arguable as to whether castration ever formed part of the medical arsenal for this disease, 
late nineteenth-century writers certainly believed that it had done, and often viewed 
castration in such a light. In the context of intense concern with sexual health, from venereal 
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disease to masturbation, castration could thus easily be regarded as a very masculine act: 
the ultimate form of self-control. Indeed, religious sects – most prominently in this period 
the Skoptsy (“the castrated”) – presented castration as part of a controlled, civilised lifestyle, 
in which they also abstained from meat, tobacco and alcohol. 
 Yet declarations of castration as self-cure were complicated by changing views of 
sexuality, with a general shift from sexual anatomy to a psychological understanding of 
sexual desire.527 For alienists, an increasing emphasis on a developmental view of individual 
psychology encouraged the view that the acquisition of sexual desire was part of a more 
general psychological change in puberty. Certain writers even claimed the sexual impulse to 
be the basis for social advancement, a view promoted by writers on sexual pathology, who 
had an interest in viewing their chosen field as fundamental to human progress. These 
discourses shifted models of masculinity away from a focus on control or restraint, as well as 
revealing “new” pathologies which seemed to deviate from a two gender model, such as the 
invert (homosexual) or eonist (transvestite). Both of these practices, particularly the former, 
were explicitly linked by some writers to self-castration.528  By viewing a (heterosexual) 
interest in sex as the basis for individual growth and social cohesion sexologists and 
psychiatrists began to depict castration as a social threat. Genital mutilation was considered 
most worrying in men, not only because the sex organs were external, and thus easier to 
damage, but also because men were assumed to be “naturally” selfish, and thus required a 
stronger physiological impetus (associated with the development of sexual characteristics 
during puberty) to acquire altruistic traits than did women. This view of castration as anti-
social is emphasised by exploring British attitudes toward the Skoptsy, and the way in which 
their supposed bad character (considered to result from castration) was regarded by many 
as a social and political threat. Thus, we can see a shift (though by no means universal or 
straightforward) from a mid-century focus on a biological and neurological understanding of 
castration to the later nineteenth-century view whereby sexual self-mutilation was viewed 
through a psychological and sociological lens. Through such a shift, self-castration came to 
be viewed as a highly symbolic act; later, the symbolism would come to receive more 
attention, especially in psychoanalysis, than the act itself. 
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4.2 Sexual Self-Mutilation: A Psychological Category 
 Before exploring early psychiatric attempts to explain self-castration, we might 
wonder what the term actually means. The Oxford English Dictionary gives the primary 
meaning of castration as “the removing of the testicles”. Such an explanation seems so 
obvious that other historians have assumed this is what castration always means.529 Yet, in 
nineteenth-century texts, the term castration was applied to operations carried out on 
women (in particular, ovariotomy)530 and was also used interchangeably to mean removal of 
the testicles and amputation of the penis. Literary scholar Gary Taylor has claimed that this 
was part of a general shift in the meaning of castration during the nineteenth century, which 
laid increasing emphasis on the penis. However, both he and urologist Mels Van Driel place a 
mistaken emphasis on the instrumental role played by Freud in redefining castration, 
biologically and culturally.531 In late nineteenth-century psychiatric texts on self-mutilation, 
both removal of the testicles and of the penis are referred to as castration, and there is 
rarely any interest in differentiating between these two acts. While this might seem 
surprising today, following a century of endocrinological research into “sex hormones”, 
there was no obvious reason to distinguish between acts that impaired sexual function in 
the late nineteenth century. The sex organs were generally believed to exert an influence on 
the body through the central nervous system, not by means of chemical secretion.532 If this 
was so, then damage to any part of the genitals might affect this process. 
 Another element of Victorian writing on castration that seems surprising to modern 
readers is that there is often little interest in whether or not the operation has been 
“successful” in preventing sexual function, suggesting that this may not have been the 
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fundamental importance of castration to contemporaries. Today, we often assume that 
castration causes impotence and a related loss of secondary sex characteristics. Histories of 
other periods, however, show that the procedure does not have to be interpreted in this 
way. Peter Brown’s work on early Christianity, for example, offers a variety of very different 
models for castration. For some, the practice was considered to enhance masculinity, for the 
tying of the testicles ensured that a man would not waste the “vital force” essential to his 
male status.533 By the time of Origen’s probable castration in the third century AD, Brown 
suggests that it was a routine operation. Origen viewed the sexual aspect of human life as a 
mere passing phase. As humans were only sexually active during a certain period of life, 
sexual impulse could not be considered essential to the human spirit and was, therefore, 
dispensable. This view differs even from the previous, in that it depicts castration as having 
no effect on masculinity (or femininity), for it cannot alter the essence of the individual.534 In 
later periods, Gary Taylor has questioned the work of modern scholars looking at castration 
in early modern drama, in particular Thomas Middleton’s A Game at Chess (1624). Taylor 
suggests that Freud’s later definition of castration as symbolising loss and impotence has 
caused modern historians to find such meanings where they are not, in fact, evident.535 
 Castration, then, does not necessarily mean what we think it means. This is 
particularly evident in a case that I describe here as the paradigm for sexual self-mutilation 
(the term used by James Adam to refer specifically to male genital self-injury): the story of 
Staffordshire farmer Isaac Brooks, briefly outlined in chapter two. Brooks was by no means a 
“typical” case (if, indeed, there can be any such thing): the medico-legal context of his story 
and its wide publication made it distinctly unusual. Nonetheless, medical writers adopted 
many conclusions drawn from the Brooks case as a model for other acts of self-mutilation, in 
particular male genital injury. The case assumes particular significance when we note that a 
third of the articles on self-castration published in medical journals in the later nineteenth 
century referred to it. The story was followed by all three medical journals examined in this 
thesis (as well as large numbers of local and national newspapers), and in all three writers 
used the term “self-mutilation” to refer to Brooks’ actions (although it was nowhere 
definitively proved that Brooks’ wounds had been self-inflicted, and his doctor certainly 
claimed they were not). Favazza, meanwhile, referred to the Brooks case as “the first case of 
male genital self-mutilation in the medical literature” and, although this is not strictly the 
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case, this claim recognises the contemporary prominence given to the incident across 
medical specialities, as well as in the wider public arena; something that did not occur in 
other reported case studies of self-mutilation.536 
 Isaac Brooks was a stonemason and small farmer from Leek, Staffordshire. Single, he 
lived with other family members, including his own illegitimate son. In 1879, then aged 
twenty-nine, Brooks called the local doctor to attend to a cut wound to his scrotum, from 
which one of his testicles protruded. When pushed for an explanation, the young man 
claimed he had been attacked and wounded by three others, whom he later named as local 
farmers. Two of these men were subsequently arrested, and sentenced to ten years 
imprisonment for the crime. The whole story (including treatment for a second, identical, 
injury eighteen months later) only appeared after Brooks’ death in December 1881. On his 
deathbed, the farmer signed a full confession stating that the two men were innocent and, 
according to initial (mistaken) reports, that his injuries were self-inflicted (this, it later 
transpired, Brooks had never explicitly stated). The newly-formed Press Association ensured 
the wide distribution of the story and, from 5th January 1882, it appeared in, among others, 
newspapers in London, Birmingham, Glasgow, Leeds, Sheffield and Liverpool. Many 
newspapers quickly followed up with further details as they became available, so that it was 
small wonder that, by the time The Lancet came to publish on Brooks, their reporter called it 
“the case of mutilation which is now exciting so much public interest.” 537 From an initial 
focus on an alleged miscarriage of justice, most reports quickly moved to speculation over 
the life, character and habits of Isaac Brooks himself, and how these related to what was 
widely agreed to be an act of self-mutilation, suggesting that it was not only within 
psychiatry that self-inflicted injury became connected to wider social and political issues. 
 On 14th January (the same day that the Home Secretary ordered the release of 
Brooks’ supposed attackers from prison), the account of Brooks’ doctor, Francis Warrington, 
was published in both the British Medical Journal and The Lancet.538 Both letters, although 
slightly different, described the nature of the wound and treatment and confirmed that a 
second injury had taken place in February 1881. Warrington paid most attention, however, 
to providing detail on Brooks’ character: supposedly a defence against certain reports which 
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attempted to explain the incident through the suggestion that “Brooks was a man of bad 
character with a malignant disposition.”539 Warrington’s statement, however, was frequently 
contradictory, not least in his continued insistence that the injuries could not have been self-
inflicted, which conflicted with his efforts to protect both his own and Brooks’ reputation 
against the possibility that they had been. Defending his medical reputation from 
accusations of aiding the miscarriage of justice, he stated: “Neither before the magistrates 
nor at the assizes were any questions asked me, as to whether it was possible the injury 
could have been self-inflicted” (at no point suggesting what his verdict would have been had 
he been consulted), while he played down any suspicion of malice on Brooks’ part by 
suggesting the man was pressured by the police into naming his attackers.540 Local papers 
were sceptical of Warrington’s statement, “his evidence at the trial that Brooks could not 
have injured himself being well remembered”.541 The doctor’s evaluation of Brooks’ mental 
state was similarly ambiguous: despite attributing him with many qualities (“exceptional” 
among the “rough unmannered hill-country farmers”),542 he nonetheless described the 
young man as “of eccentric habits, close, and reserved”.543 This encouraged medical 
reporters to cast just as much doubt on Warrington’s conclusions as the lay audience had 
done, although Warrington had attributed the lay belief that the injuries were self-inflicted 
to a lack of medical knowledge.544 Both medical journals immediately declared that it was 
entirely possible that such wounds could have been self-inflicted, with The Lancet asserting 
most stridently that “there cannot be the slightest doubt in the mind of any one reading Dr. 
Warrington’s statement that the case was throughout one of self-mutilation from 
insanity.”545 After all, as both journals were quick to note, Warrington’s description of 
Brooks’ temperament implied unsoundness of mind, something that can hardly have 
escaped the doctor’s own notice. 
 The Brooks case became a focal point for medical thought on self-castration, which 
fed into Adam’s later description of this topic as a distinct field of self-injury. First, it sparked 
widespread interest in the frequency of such acts. A writer in The Lancet declared that the 
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Brooks case was “no isolated one. There are many well-authenticated cases of youths and 
men of all ages who have sometimes successfully, at others unsuccessfully, performed this 
painful operation upon themselves.”546 None of these cases were detailed: instead, the 
belief that Brooks’ injuries had been attempts at self-castration was seen as confirmation 
that such acts occurred. The writer in the Journal of Mental Science similarly used the Brooks 
case to support the statement that “it is not very uncommon to meet insane persons who 
have injured themselves, and in these the injuries are often of the sexual organs.”547 Again, 
no other evidence was given for this claim which, while supported by some published cases 
of the period, is certainly not indicated by a close examination of asylum records. Indeed, on 
examining the prevalence of such acts at Bethlem between 1880 and 1900, castration hardly 
even registers – just four male patients (out of a total of over 2,000 admitted in this period) 
attempted self-castration, and two more threatened it. In contrast, twenty patients 
attempted (and sometimes managed) to pluck out their eyes, while every year more than six 
patients picked their faces, pulled out their hair or knocked themselves against the wall or 
floor. Thus, while the Brooks case was used by medical writers to draw together and 
evaluate medical cases to create a category of self-mutilation, its prominence also helped to 
create a focus on self-castration as the major form of this behaviour. 
 What, then, made the Brooks case appear so important to contemporaries? Apart 
from the mysterious nature of the story, the medico-legal implications were drawn out for 
professional reasons. The Lancet felt that the wound itself should have been medically 
investigated, asserting that the case formed “a typical and striking example of a class of 
cases which must always be liable to misconception, to the lasting discredit of justice, so 
long as lawyers think they can appraise the real value of medical evidence.”548 However, it 
was the proposed connection between self-mutilation and insanity that formed the topic of 
most discussion and the “psychological interest” of the case was stressed by many.549 The 
British Medical Journal, for example, suggested that psychological examination was 
important in evaluating character as well as state of mind. 
The case is one of considerable psychological complication, for no doubt Dr. 
Warrington is justified in assuming that it is highly improbable that the man would 
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inflict the first injury on himself; but, on the other hand, anyone accustomed to deal 
with peculiarities of erratic and temporary forms of mental disease, will probably say 
that it is just possible that, a man of such eccentric, solitary, and reserved habits, 
under a morbid impulse, may have inflicted such injuries on himself.550  
 
The claim here suggests that both mental disease and the character of an individual were 
relevant in forming a judgment about self-mutilation. Indeed, Warrington had attempted to 
use the latter as the most important means of defending the farmer against accusations of 
self-injury: “The possibility of the injuries being self-inflicted has been made a strong point in 
the case, therefore I have been the more particular in describing the man himself.”551 
Warrington thus suggested that Brooks’ “pleasing manners”, fondness for music and reading 
and “pride in using long words” were evidence against the possibility of his having injured 
himself.552 
 An anonymous commentator – presumably an alienist – in the Journal of Mental 
Science unsurprisingly stressed the value of psychiatric evidence in the courtroom. As with 
debate over the insanity defence, the Brooks case was explicitly connected here with what 
many alienists saw as the strongest point of “forensic contest”: the diagnosis of moral 
insanity.553  The Brooks case was valuable to psychiatrists in that, rather than being an 
instance in which they were required to prove to sceptical lawyers the existence of such an 
illness, the widespread publicity given to the concept of “insane self-mutilation” meant that 
Brooks’ alleged acts were seen as proof of the existence of this slippery diagnosis, for no one 
had regarded the farmer insane in life. Thus, it was claimed, the author’s asylum experience 
suggested that many patients who injured themselves “to a slight extent, and have accused 
others” were either weak-minded or morally insane.554 Despite the fact that Brooks was 
dead, and had never actually admitted attempting to castrate himself anyway, the location 
of his wound became viewed as evidence of his motivation. Perhaps surprisingly, no one 
suggested that Brooks had been unmanned by twice injuring his testicles. Instead, the injury 
was related to masculinity through the assumption that certain traits perceived to be 
masculine had led to it. This included sexual indiscretion: masturbation was suggested, as 
                                                 
550
 Editorial, "The Staffordshire Mutilation Case and Confession," British Medical Journal, 1, no. 1098 
(1882): 60. 
551
 Warrington, "The "Strange Confession" in Staffordshire", p. 82. 
552
 Warrington, "The "Strange Confession" in Staffordshire", p. 81. 
553
 G. Fielding Blandford, "Insanity Without Delusions," Journal of Mental Science, 15, no. 69 (1869): 
23-48. See also Joel Peter Eigen, Witnessing Insanity: Madness and Mad-doctors in the English Court, 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Roger Smith, Trial by Medicine: Insanity and Responsibility 
in Victorian Trials (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981). 
554
 Warrington and Anon, "The Case of Isaac Brooks", p. 72. 
156 
 
was other sexual activity, represented by the illegitimate son (which even led one 
newspaper to call the farmer “a rustic Don Juan”!).555 
 The sexual, individual, and social elements of the Brooks case are evident in many 
later descriptions of self-castration and, by the end of the nineteenth century, it was widely 
assumed that, in cases of self-mutilation, “not uncommonly the organs of generation, one or 
all, are removed because they have ‘offended,’ and incited the patient to lust or 
masturbation”. 556 Before the Brooks case came to light, however, this conclusion was by no 
means obvious, indicating that “sexual self-mutilation” had to be created, rather than simply 
discovered. James Adam referred to the Brooks story as one of the influences informing his 
first article on self-mutilation.557 In his later texts, he referred to sexual self-mutilation as a 
specific type of male self-injury. But how did the alienist move from this one case to a 
category of “sexual self-mutilation”? What did the idea mean? And how were his theories 
informed by his own practice? Adam referred specifically to two cases he had himself 
treated.558 Both had resulted in asylum admission immediately after self-castration, which in 
one case had been removal of the testicles and in the other the penis. The latter case, a 
young farm servant Adam had encountered many years before, will be discussed in the 
following section. The former, however, provides some interesting background to the way in 
which “sexual self-mutilation” was understood by Adam and others in the late nineteenth 
century, as the alienist would have met this patient around the time he began writing on the 
subject.  
 The case has been bookmarked by Adam in the patient case book for West Malling 
Place: “Captain H.H. self-mutilation.” Captain Henry Puge Halhed had been admitted to West 
Malling Place in April 1871, over a decade before Adam arrived there. At this time he was 65 
years old, but had first been regarded as showing signs of mania thirty years previously, 
when he was sent to Brook House in Clapton. Prior to his asylum admission, Halhed had 
been a Captain in the Bengal Army: perhaps their shared military background in India 
contributed to Adam’s interest in both patient and topic. About five years before his 
admission to West Malling Place, Halhed had “removed the testes & part of the scrotum ... 
having the impression he must become a Eunuch to preach to a tribe in the North of 
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India.”559 Halhed’s explanations were interpreted as religious and sexual delusions by both 
Adam and his predecessor, Thomas Lowry. The case notes state that Halhed claimed that: 
Although a Eunuch in this country he would not be thought so in India for they 
would say “he might have connection with their Wifes & Daughters to amuse them.” 
Such scandal as this would be ignominious to a Missionary. This appears one 
objection to his returning to India and he thinks now he might meet with a Lady who 
would live with him without being desirous of cohabitation – “A kind of Spiritual 
Wife.” There he thinks he could live happily.560 
 
When Adam classified Halhed as a case of “sexual self-mutilation,” he implied that his sexual 
drive somehow accompanied or inspired the “fit of religious enthusiasm and excitement” 
which the doctor regarded as prompting the act itself. In mutilating himself, Halhed had 
prevented proper reproductive function and his desire for a “Spiritual Wife” was judged a 
related delusion. This term may well refer to historian and traveller William Hepworth 
Dixon’s 1868 book, Spiritual Wives, which compared “celibate love” to polygamy, both being 
regarded as misguided and low on the evolutionary scale.561 Yet the investigation of motive, 
which Adam regarded as fundamental to understanding self-mutilation, was further 
complicated by Halhed’s connections with India. In the Dictionary, Adam began by noting 
that the Captain “had been many years resident in the East, and had come to acquire many 
Eastern languages and ways,” suggesting that exposure to Eastern culture had influenced 
the patient’s act.562 Indeed, Halhed’s own apparent recognition of the cultural specificity of 
concepts of eunuchism, as indicated in the above quote, is interesting in this relation. As 
histories of castration describe, many cultures removed the testicles from certain males in 
order to create reliable guardians for harems, for the eunuch would not be able to 
impregnate the inhabitants. Gary Taylor’s analysis of Elizabethan drama finds that 
references to eunuchs in such a light were common in England at this time. Eunuchs, in 
these dramas, were invariably portrayed in Eastern, rather than Western, contexts, and 
tended to be associated with absolutist governments and slavery.563 Yet, as Halhed notes, 
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the eunuch is still able to “have connection”: he is generally capable of erection, but not of 
procreation.564  
 In the same year that Halhed was admitted to West Malling Place, the British 
Governor-General enforced the Criminal Tribes Act in Northern India, which effectively 
criminalised certain individuals purely due to their membership of particular groups. Among 
those included in the act were the hijda, often translated as the “third gender”, a tribe of 
“natural eunuchs” (perhaps one of those Halhed was “so anxious” to convert),565 who 
dressed in women’s clothing.566 Such activity blurred the distinction between the physical 
creation of a eunuch by castration and his social creation through the adoption of a female 
role: the hijda were not necessarily castrated, or congenitally deformed. It is possible that 
both Adam and Halhed had come across this tribe, and Adam certainly created a role for 
“Eastern” religions and culture in the origins of the impulse toward self-mutilation in 
mankind.567 Thus, he used Halhed’s case to suggest the dangerous nature of savage 
tendencies to those exposed to them: the Christian missionary could be altered by the very 
culture he wished to convert. Yet this association with Eastern influences is striking in its 
absence from the notes on Henry Halhed’s behaviour in the privileged West Malling Place 
environment (where he apparently believed he was the proprietor). He was permitted to 
walk off the premises unattended, and slept alone in a single room – suggesting that his 
status over-ruled any possible risk of further self-inflicted injury. Instead, the notes indicate 
the relative freedom a wealthy, elderly gentleman in a country asylum might have: despite 
suggesting that the Captain’s health would be affected by his insistence on taking daily 
walks, even in cold weather, the asylum officers seemed unable to enforce any control, for 
“he is so perverse you cannot get him to remain indoors or take anything except what he 
feels inclined.”568 Rather than implying the Eastern ways Halhed had supposedly acquired, or 
even his status as a certified lunatic, Halhed instead appears as certain of his domain as any 
wealthy imperial officer. Thus, although he may have assumed that he was uncovering a 
hidden truth behind Halhed’s case, it was Adam’s own belief in the relevance of Eastern 
religion, within a context of evolutionary anthropology, which led him to relate Halhed’s 
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self-mutilation to Eastern influences. In actual fact, the castration had not been carried out 
until the age of sixty – some twenty-five years after Halhed had been invalided out of the 
army (and India) due to his mental state! 
 From the examination of published cases and asylum patient records, it has 
emerged that acts of self-castration were not as numerous as alienists and other medical 
writers made out. We cannot find the explanation for the prevalence of this belief within 
psychiatric practice. Instead, we must look at other concerns, both within and outside 
contemporary medicine, in order to understand how alienists understood sexual self-
mutilation. In the case of Halhed, certain religious, sexual and social concerns highlighted by 
alienists do make an appearance, in particular the connection with “the East”, which Adam 
claimed to be the basis of all human impulse toward self-mutilation.569  Yet Halhed’s life and 
behaviour in the asylum complicates this story, as did his continued insistence that his 
actions had been perfectly justified. Indeed, it is just as easy to find examples in asylum 
records in which the expectations of alienists are not confirmed as those in which they are. 
In 1875, for example, the previous superintendent of West Malling Place appeared quite 
mystified by the “very gay and joyous” manner of Clayton Barnett, who “has been married 
five years and has never been capable of cohabitation”. Barnett’s manner was deemed 
“unusual in a person who is impotent for generally they are low and depressed and 
humiliated when in this condition.”570 This association of impotence with depression and 
humiliation bears a strong similarity to the connections Taylor regards Freud as having 
created around the concept of castration and, indeed, sexual self-mutilation appears to be 
an important aspect of this story. Why, though, did sexual self-mutilation strike a particular 
chord at this time? And what can such interest suggest to us about the way in which 
contemporaries related sexual function to masculinity? 
 
4.4 “He has tried to kill himself with masturbation”: Castration and Self-Cure 
 In his popular study of the correspondence between two men involved in the writing 
of what was later the Oxford English Dictionary – Editor James Murray and American army 
surgeon William Chester Minor – Simon Winchester describes the latter’s castration in a 
straightforward manner. Minor had been confined to Broadmoor Asylum for the Criminally 
Insane in April 1872, after shooting a man he wrongly believed to have been in his bedroom: 
all his contributions to the Dictionary were made from his rooms at Broadmoor, and he was 
one of the most prolific contributors. In December 1902, after thirty years in the asylum, 
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Minor cut off his penis with a penknife he had been given to cut the pages of first edition 
books. Winchester begins this chapter, as he does every other, with a definition from the 
completed Dictionary: in this instance, the entry for “masturbate”. Minor’s act is presented 
as a “bizarre” accompaniment to his re-conversion to Christianity, and a belief that God 
would not forgive him for his prior sexual misdemeanours and persistent masturbation. But 
would his contemporaries have perceived his act as equally bizarre?571 Victorian attitudes to 
sex and sexuality have long been a prominent field of historical debate. In the early 
historiography, the “Victorian period” was often regarded as an era of sexual repression, 
contrasted with the supposed licentiousness of the eighteenth century. In such histories, the 
study of sex and sexuality at the turn of the twentieth century appeared to show a 
progressive advance to modern “enlightened” notions of sex.572 These assumptions were 
questioned by Steven Marcus, in an influential study of nineteenth-century pornography and 
other sexual literature.573 Michel Foucault further suggested that the existence of this 
literature refuted the “repression” hypothesis, although this has been questioned by more 
recent scholars.574 However, many historians continue to apply several elements of 
Foucault’s work: the idea that the decades around 1900 were a “turning point” in the history 
of sexuality, and that the concept of sexuality itself cannot be considered a natural given 
from which our analyses depart, but rather is created and shaped by the discourse itself.575 
Until the publication of Lesley Hall’s Hidden Anxieties, much historiography concentrated on 
the categorisation of “sexual deviance” within this period, with particular focus on 
homosexuality and the subjection of women.576 As Hall notes, this focus misleads us into 
perceiving the “normal” male as “monolithic, unchanging [and] unproblematic”, masking the 
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existence of numerous concerns about male sexuality – and, indeed, male health in general 
– in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.577 Fear over widespread venereal 
disease, concerns about the effects of masturbation and need for sex education, and 
political agitation (both male and female) around the sexual “double standard” (in particular 
the Contagious Diseases Acts of 1864 and 1866) indicate that “normal” sexuality could be a 
fraught and contentious topic.578 Of particular relevance to sexual self-mutilation, as we 
have already seen in the Brooks case, was masturbation. 
 Many histories of sexuality have commented on the intense concern around 
masturbation during the nineteenth century. As Michael Mason notes, modern readers tend 
to assume anyone doubting the ill effects of masturbation must be “progressive”, ignoring 
the complexity of Victorian attitudes to sex, whereby doctors might doubt certain elements 
of the doctrine, but unquestioningly accept others.579 What’s more, masturbation pathology 
faded in the twentieth century without any direct medical recantation of the theory.580 
Historian Thomas Laqueur has suggested that ways of thinking about masturbation changed 
dramatically during the eighteenth century. Previously regarded as a vice (albeit an 
unhealthy one), “solitary sex” subsequently became conceptualised as a disease following 
the anonymous publication of John Marten’s Onania: or, the Heinous Sin of Self Pollution in 
1712,581 which went through numerous editions. Masturbation, it suggested, resulted in 
physical wasting, lethargy, impotence, and even death. The term “spermatorrhoea” 
emerged to refer to a physical illness largely regarded as caused by masturbation, a 
condition characterised by exhaustion, wasting, mental depression, nocturnal emissions and 
impotence.582 Prior to this period, Laqueur suggests, although masturbation had been of 
physical and moral concern to many, it had not been singled out as the sexual vice, rather it 
had been regarded as one of a number of ways, including excessive sexual intercourse, in 
which essential fluids (and thus energy) might be lost.583 Treating the topic within the 
context of other contemporary concerns – political, social and cultural – Laqueur regards the 
increased emphasis on masturbation as part of a new philosophical understanding of the 
relation between individual and society, which encouraged greater attention to self-imposed 
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restraint. Masturbation, in this context, became viewed as evidence of the individual who 
had lost self-control, and was thus also unable to contribute to society.584 
 Despite a strong argument, Laqueur pays little attention to the relation of 
masturbation to mental pathology in the later nineteenth century, although he does note 
that the term “masturbatory insanity” was coined by Henry Maudsley in 1868. For Laqueur, 
this forms a confusing sidestep in what he sees as a shift within psychiatry from interest in 
behaviour to a focus on neurology and organic lesions.585 Yet, as this thesis has argued 
throughout, an interest in neurological approaches to the mind was certainly not 
incompatible with attention to behaviour and individual psychology. Indeed, even the most 
materialist of psychiatrists continued to look for moral, as well as physical, causes for 
insanity.586 However, there was much confusion over the exact role that masturbation 
played in mental illness: was it a cause or a symptom? Many physicians in the later 
nineteenth century tended towards the latter suggestion although this certainly did not stop 
them considering masturbation to be dangerous: something to be safeguarded against by a 
variety of physical means including the use of restraining garments.587 However, it seems 
that the strongest concerns around masturbation were related to a mid-nineteenth-century 
neurological and materialist perspective (focused on the conservation of “nervous force”). In 
the late nineteenth century, an increasing interest in psychological approaches to mind 
caused a simultaneous shift in understandings of the effects of masturbation from physical 
to psychological, making self-castration appear far less acceptable as a solution. 
 In one of the first articles to reference self-mutilation in The Lancet in 1861, alienist 
Robert Ritchie, superintendent of Bethnal House Asylum, carried out “An Inquiry into a 
Frequent Cause of Insanity in Young Men.”588 Ritchie offered a link between masturbation 
and self-inflicted injury (presumably genital), drawing attention to this connection three 
times in a short four-part article. He declared, in a similar decided manner to the medical 
commentators in the Brooks case twenty years later, that “[s]elf-mutilation is also not an 
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infrequent accompaniment; but correct statistics on this point I am unable to obtain.”589 
Despite his lack of supporting evidence, he later reiterated “the tendency frequently 
exhibited to self-mutilation” in acute cases, which, “as reports show, … are not unfrequently 
successful.” Ritchie further hinted at the form such injury might take by concluding that it 
indicates “an unsound reasoning power, the visiting on the supposed offending organs the 
faults of the ill-regulated mind.” 590 Presumably, then, the alienist referred to castration, of 
either the penis or testicles. But where did these many cases he failed to describe come 
from? While it is entirely possible that a larger number of cases occurred than were 
published in medical journals, any form of self-inflicted injury is invariably described in 
asylum case books, for the purpose of protecting medical officers and attendants from 
accusations of abuse. Bethnal House during this period was roughly twice the size of 
Bethlem: nonetheless, it seems unlikely that Ritchie encountered a considerably higher 
number of castrations (and, if he had, he would presumably have had some statistics to refer 
to). Of the four attempts at Bethlem in the twenty year period previously alluded to, only 
two actually resulted in injury, neither of which caused permanent damage. So, where did 
Ritchie’s idea that self-mutilation was so common come from? And did the link he made 
between masturbation and self-mutilation influence the description of sexual self-mutilation 
in the later nineteenth century? 
 The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw a proliferation of medicines and other 
devices aimed at preventing masturbation and curing its supposedly deleterious effects. 591 
While some historians, most notably Laqueur, have downplayed the role of sexual surgery 
within this context, others have claimed it was more common.592 Robert Darby, in particular, 
has fiercely argued that fear of masturbation advanced the practice of routine circumcision 
well into the twentieth century.593 Timothy O’Neill, while more cautious about these claims, 
notes that the procedure was performed with increasing frequency from the 1860s to the 
1880s.594 While we cannot assume that all circumcisions were designed to combat 
masturbation, sexual surgery was certainly regarded as one of the weapons with which the 
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late nineteenth-century practitioner might combat the solitary vice: physical remedies 
included cauterisation, circumcision and, in some asylums, so-called “wiring”. In 1876, David 
Yellowlees, superintendent of the Glasgow Royal Asylum, described the insertion of a wire 
or safety pin through the foreskin of masturbating male patients, with the intention of 
preventing erection by causing a “painful dragging on the pins” when the foreskin 
retracted.595 It is unclear whether Yellowlees and his colleagues began this practice due to a 
belief that masturbation exacerbated mental and physical ill-health or repugnance at 
witnessing such acts carried out in open galleries (the latter certainly receives more frequent 
mention). The procedure was trialled at Bethlem in the mid-1880s, although it appears to 
have been quickly abandoned – perhaps because the results were not as striking as those 
claimed by Yellowlees. In the case of one young clerk, for example, judged to be suffering 
from “partial weak-mindedness with impulsiveness” (and thus presumably regarded 
incapable of self-control) the “safety pin fixed in position in hopes of stopping masturbation” 
on 4 August 1887 had been removed a month later – perhaps, it was suggested, by another 
patient.596  
 It seems likely, from the rarity with which this practice is mentioned, that it was only 
employed on occasions where the level of masturbation was considered particularly high or, 
as in the case above, the patient was deemed impulsive, and thus could not be led by moral 
means to control himself. There are no references to “wiring” at Bethlem after 1887, 
although Yellowlees was still recommending the procedure, “[w]hen honest efforts fail”, in 
1893.597 Permanent forms of surgery do not appear to have been considered at Bethlem, 
although they certainly occurred on occasion elsewhere, on men as well as women. Thomas 
Laycock suggested that castration as cure for mental disorder had a long heritage, citing an 
“old Scotch popular work on medicine” from 1775, in which it was suggested to “geld the 
patient, and his madness will cease”.598 While the citation did not apparently make a 
connection with masturbation as the cause of insanity, Laycock himself certainly assumed 
such a context. Yellowlees, meanwhile, felt the need to refer simultaneously to 
clitoridectomy, ovariotomy and castration in his 1893 piece for Tuke’s Dictionary, suggesting 
all three ideas (if not necessarily the procedures) were still in common currency. The alienist 
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dismissed all three, claiming that sexual desires were not destroyed, and “the operation is 
generally deemed ineffectual and unsatisfactory.”599 Such an explanation suggests an 
increasing tendency, for some, to divorce sexual desire from physiological processes: desire 
was no longer deemed to be created by the sex organs themselves, but instead was a mental 
process. This meant that radical cures, like castration, no longer seemed reasonable to many 
writers, although they may have done previously. As Ritchie had suggested, for many it 
became the mind that required regulation, and not the genitals. 
 The on-going concern over the dangers of masturbation, and the advocation of 
radical cures for a disease that it was widely believed could result in death, sets the concerns 
of many asylum patients of this period in a very different context. John Tilston Evans, 
admitted to Bethlem with “Partial Dementia” in October 1886, complained of “frequent 
nocturnal emissions” and thus “[e]xpresses a wish to be castrated as the only means of 
cure.”600 While certainly expressed in melodramatic terms, it was quite possible for young 
Frederick Bethell to interpret his actions as suicidal, and his doctors recorded that he says 
“[h]e has tried to kill himself by masturbation.”601 The physicians did not interpret their 
patient’s behaviour in the same way, for he was not classed as suicidal in the case book. 
Instead, it was claimed that his “[g]eneral mental condition seems to be that of brooding 
over the state of his sexual organs with hypochondriasis.” Such a comment is suggestive of 
the changing psychiatric position on masturbation, which slowly shifted from viewing 
masturbation as a physical to a mental cause of insanity.602 Other physicians also associated 
masturbation with sexual hypochondriasis, offering accounts in which the place of the sex 
organs shifted from being the physical site of disease (which might require castration for 
cure to be affected) to a psychological fixation of the patient (with castration similarly 
indicative of the patient’s state of mind).603 
 In his textbook, Insanity and Allied Neuroses, first published in 1884, George Savage 
listed “self-abuse (sexual)” under the physical causes of insanity, regarding masturbation as 
“a cause of insanity … fully recognised by the profession and the world at large.” In common 
with many other writers of the period, Savage felt that masturbation “produces insanity 
chiefly, if not solely, in those who are highly nervous” and regarded it as more often a 
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symptom of insanity than a cause.604 Nonetheless, he certainly felt that masturbation 
produced “nervous” symptoms, as well as general mental weakness, providing a 
neurological justification for medical interest in the topic. Although Savage did not alter this 
section in later editions of the textbook, his views in Allbutt’s System of Medicine (published 
in 1899) show a definite shift toward viewing masturbation as a mental rather than physical 
cause of insanity: 
Self-abuse is one of the most commonly cited causes of adolescent insanity; it 
certainly is an accompaniment, and occasionally the cause of such disorder. It occurs 
very frequently in both sexes, and the more sensitive the person the greater the 
danger of the practice; not so much from the physical harm of it as from the notion 
of its being debasing and unnatural. The indulgence itself is of less moment, except 
in the very young or very weak; the thoughts about it are more harmful.605 
 
Despite maintaining that masturbation could, for some (the young or weak), be physically 
harmful, here Savage emphasised the effect on the individual’s psychological state, with 
worry about masturbation highlighted as more dangerous than the act itself. The way in 
which sexual self-mutilation was described shifted in a similar manner. In early accounts 
(such as the Journal of Mental Science description of Isaac Brooks), it was perceived as the 
result of a nervous impulse resulting from physical weakness. Later, self-castration was re-
interpreted as a considered response to a problematic situation, itself viewed as delusory or 
otherwise wrongly interpreted by the patient. Adam’s second patient who castrated himself, 
an eighteen-year-old farmer, “admitted that he had masturbated” and thus removed his 
penis to prevent temptation. Adam further noted, laying the blame for the patient’s actions 
in external suggestion rather than the masturbation itself, that “[h]e had been reading some 
quack publications on nervous debility, and also Salvation Army publications, which roused 
within him strong convictions of his wickedness.” This claim received greater emphasis in 
Adam’s second report, in 1893, than it had ten years previously.606 Such re-interpretation 
supported the claim that thoughts about masturbation might be more harmful than the act. 
Similarly, it indicates a shift in understanding of self-castration, from having been viewed as 
caused by masturbation, to being seen as a pathological act in itself. Thus, when Dr Campbell 
Black reported a case of self-ablation of the testicle in the Medical Press of 1889, he 
regarded this as “the act ... of a maniac”, although the young man in question clearly stated 
                                                 
604
 George Savage, Insanity and Allied Neuroses: Practical and Clinical (London, New York: Cassell, 
1884), pp. 63-4. This was part of a wider shift in views on masturbation from cause to symptom. See 
Hall, "’It Was Affecting the Medical Profession’", p. 689. 
605
 George Savage, “Mental Diseases” in A System of Medicine, ed. T. Clifford Albutt. vol. 8, (London, 
1899), pp. 190-1. 
606
 Adam, "Self-Mutilation", p. 1151; Adam, "Cases of Self-Mutilation by the Insane", p. 218. 
167 
 
that he had mutilated himself to prevent the nocturnal emissions he perceived as a result of 
too-frequent masturbation, and seemed mentally sound following his physical recovery.607 
  
4.5 The Basis for Social Advancement: Sexology and Self-Mutilation 
 We should take particular note of the way in which descriptions of sexual and 
mental health relied on a developmental model: Savage stated that masturbation occurred 
“very frequently” during adolescence but, if precocious, could interfere with “normal mental 
growth.”608 Similar ideas were also adopted in psychological circles, and have been 
particularly noted as influencing Freud’s theories of the aetiology of hysteria, after he 
abandoned the seduction theory in 1897.609 Influenced by socio-evolutionary approaches to 
mind, physicians in the later nineteenth-century were paying greater attention to 
adolescence, with sexual and mental change regarded as closely connected. Savage 
frequently reiterated that youth was “a period of nervous instability”, for “the whole of a 
new side to the life is being developed, and the hitherto chiefly egoistic is now growing out 
of itself, and becoming more altruistic.”610 This was one area where he was in support of his 
long-term associate, Henry Maudsley, who similarly connected the emerging “sexual 
feelings” of puberty with “sympathetic ideas”, judging this to be the time of life when “the 
highest feelings of mankind” were developed.611 Herbert Spencer, meanwhile, had 
incorporated propagation of the species into the acts generally regarded as altruistic in 
1879, regardless of the motivation in each individual case, while Charles Mercier claimed 
“the spirit of self-sacrifice” to be “intimately connected with the sexual function”.612 
However, sexual feelings needed to be directed towards the opposite sex in order to be 
viewed as healthy: masturbation, within such a context, became a developmental concern. 
By directing attention toward the self, it was thought that masturbation could prevent the 
development of “higher feelings” for others.  
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 Thus, male-female marital relations might be claimed to be directly related to 
altruism. Savage was particularly concerned with this topic and regularly upheld the 
importance of marriage for maintaining mental health. Marriage in “neurotic subjects” (who 
were not insane) could often, for Savage, be beneficial. Although he stressed that there 
might be an increased risk of insanity in the children of such parents, these same children 
could have a beneficial influence. 
Thus, as one is in the habit of seeing, the sexual function is the function which 
develops altruism, so without children the parents become egotistical, and egotism 
and insanity are not far apart.613 
 
This connection of marriage with healthy social relations relied on pre-existing religious 
models of society (Savage was certainly a practicing Christian), as well as the suggestion of 
evolutionary biologists that man had evolved as a “social” animal, with sexual selection 
forming an important element of progress.614 Michael Mason has emphasised, in contrast to 
other historians who assume that all religions promoted an Augustinian interpretation of sex 
which emphasised celibacy, that for much of the nineteenth century celibacy was regarded 
as more problematic within Protestant religions than sex for purposes other than 
procreation.615  Despite the increasing interest in eugenic concerns around the turn of the 
twentieth century, this continued to be the case. Indeed, the particular focus in England on 
positive rather than negative eugenics (the promotion of reproduction among the “fit”) 
emphasised this equation between celibacy and selfishness, particularly in the middle 
classes, where the postponement of marriage and children was regarded as the pursuit of 
personal gain above social progress.616 In later decades, similar concerns encouraged Freud 
to associate a shift of sexual desire from the self to another as part of childhood 
development with the emergence of altruism.617 
 It is within this context that we should see English psychiatric interest in the 
emerging continental field of sexology. While it has long been assumed that British 
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psychiatrists avoided much of this debate, Ivan Crozier has recently recognised otherwise.618 
Thus, when Adam referred readers on sexual self-mutilation to further examples in the texts 
of Richard von Krafft-Ebing and Albert Moll, he addressed a field that many of his 
contemporaries could be expected to have encountered, even if they were not actively 
writing in it themselves.619 One of the elements of sexological research that has often been 
emphasised by historians is the way in which psychiatrists were able to create new ways of 
“being” in the late nineteenth century, in which the individual was defined by his or her 
sexual preferences, shifting attention “from practices to psyches”, with the emergence of 
“the homosexual”, “the fetishist” and so on.620 Adam’s grouping of cases of sexual self-
mutilation, supported by reference to continental studies in sexual pathology, served a 
similar purpose: in particular, the case study method of description emphasised the notion 
that every element of the narrative was related in some way to the individual’s “perversion” 
(in this case castration). Further, this method of reporting ensured that castration itself, 
rather than being viewed as a reaction to another form of sexual misdemeanour (such as a 
form of self-treatment), was depicted as the primary perversion. 
 To what, then, did Adam refer when he cited sexological literature?  The work of 
Krafft-Ebing in particular fitted neatly within the contemporary British commitment to 
altruism, emotion and social feeling as the primary factors in progress, as discussed in 
chapter two. Using the theories of British alienists to justify his work (he specifically cites 
Maudsley’s view that sexual feeling formed the basis for social advancement),621 Krafft-Ebing 
claimed the relevance of sexual life to more or less every aspect – individual and social – of 
existence. 
Sexual life is no doubt the one mighty factor in the individual and social relations of 
man that discloses his powers of activity, of acquiring property, of establishing a 
home, and of awakening altruistic sentiments toward a person of the opposite sex, 
toward his own issue, as well as toward the whole human race.622 
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When broken down, such a statement can appear mystifying to a twenty-first century reader 
in some areas (what can sex have to do with acquiring property?) and exaggerated in others. 
Yet many of these claims are closely connected to broader contemporary ideals. While most 
of us, today, regard sex as an important aspect of romantic relationships, it seems unlikely 
that many would assume that a person was required to be sexually active in order to 
develop feeling towards humanity. Yet this is just what Krafft-Ebing claimed, a suggestion 
that only makes sense within the anthropological and evolutionary context set out in 
chapter two, by which civilization was regarded as progressing from smaller to larger units. 
In the anthropological model, intimate personal relationships were regarded as progressing 
inexorably towards family relationships, which in turn enabled an individual to appreciate a 
wider human sphere: from village or tribe to humanity as a whole.623 From such a 
perspective, the two major drives in human life described by Krafft-Ebing – the sexual and 
self-preservation – appeared to be intimately connected, suggesting that disorder of the 
latter (evidenced by self-mutilation) might indicate a perversion of the former.624 
 From this starting point, in a shared view of civilization and social progress, we can 
begin to examine in what way Krafft-Ebing’s cases of sexual self-mutilation related to those 
described by Adam. What broader context might Adam assume by referring to the Austrian 
writer? One of Krafft-Ebing’s earliest published cases detailed attempted self-mutilation: he 
re-printed this case in later classificatory studies and, finally, in Psychopathia Sexualis.625 E., a 
thirty-year-old journeyman painter, was reported to suffer “sexual anaesthesia”. Krafft-
Ebing was called as a medical witness after E. was arrested: 
while trying to cut off the scrotum of a boy he had caught in the woods. He gave as a 
motive for this act that he wished to cut into it in order that the world should not 
multiply. Often in his youth, with like purpose, he had cut into his own genitals.626 
  
Voicing the Malthusian belief that population growth would inevitably outstrip natural 
resources, E.’s concerns acted out the fears of many others, for he “declared that it would 
be better to castrate all children than to allow others to come into the world that could only 
be fated to endure poverty and misery.”627 On Krafft-Ebing’s testimony, however, E. was 
judged insane, and sent to an asylum rather than prison. This judgment meant that E.’s 
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concerns about procreation and his own childhood poverty were dismissed as irrational. 
Instead, Krafft-Ebing’s emphasis lay in an association between E.’s violent acts (to himself 
and others), his lack of desire for “normal” sexual intercourse, and his personality. Given the 
writer’s strong belief in the altruistic potential of sexual activity, it is hardly surprising that he 
found E. “selfish and weak-minded” and a lover of solitude. Conclusively, Krafft-Ebing 
declared that “[s]ocial feelings are absolutely foreign to him.”628 E. certainly did possess 
physical feeling: Krafft-Ebing noted that his attempts at “self-emasculation” had not been 
carried out because of pain. Thus, for Krafft-Ebing, absence of sexual feeling was not entirely 
a physical phenomenon: his cases of sexual anaesthesia were not impotent, but “the 
corresponding emotions of sexual life are absolutely wanting.”629 While this is often 
interpreted as indicating a shift towards an internal and subjective reading of sexuality,630 
the heading of anaesthesia (which remained unchanged in later editions of Psychopathia 
Sexualis) suggests a more nuanced reading, whereby these psychological categories 
remained bound up with physiological understanding of sensation. Imposing a modern 
division between somatic and psychological can thus lead to an anachronistic reading of 
nineteenth-century ideas. 
 Krafft-Ebing’s judgement was opposite to that voiced by E. For E., his act of violence 
was socially motivated, aiming to benefit humanity in its entirety. Rather than being 
pathological, his attempts at self-castration were efforts at cure, not necessarily of his own 
condition, but of the human race. A number of Krafft-Ebing’s other cases explicitly focused 
on castration as self-cure. Harry Oosterhuis, following a historical analysis of all Krafft-
Ebing’s writings, states that two homosexuals and one fetishist reported that they had 
considered castration in order to cure what these patients (but not necessarily others) 
thought to be an unhappy condition.631 In 1899, Krafft-Ebing published a case in which such 
a castration was carried out: a seventeen-year-old student decided that his neurasthenia 
was caused by masturbation. When hypnosis failed to help, the student told Krafft-Ebing he 
wished to be castrated. Although the psychiatrist advised against such a procedure, the 
patient had his testicles removed by a willing surgeon. When his symptoms continued, he 
visited Krafft-Ebing again, this time considering amputation of the penis. According to 
Oosterhuis, the psychiatrist successfully persuaded the boy against such a course, although 
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whether this advice was ultimately taken is, of course, impossible to know.632 What these 
cases do indicate, however, is that castration was certainly considered – and even 
sometimes carried out – by men for a variety of perceived medical problems, up until the 
end of the nineteenth century, and quite possibly beyond. The suggestion that sexual 
surgery might be self-performed in seemingly mentally healthy subjects is also apparent in a 
letter received by Marie Stopes in 1923, discussing the possibility of the admittedly less 
drastic option of circumcision to prevent masturbation.  “Would you advise me to be 
circumcised?” Her correspondent enquired. “If you advise circumcision could I do it myself 
as I don’t wish to approach a doctor on the subject as I am thoroughly ashamed of 
myself.”633 In such a light, the “self-mutilations” of psychiatric patients who blamed 
masturbation or sexual activity for their mental condition appears rather differently. Indeed, 
it may well have been the psychological interests of alienists like Krafft-Ebing that led them 
to cast self-mutilation as pathological: by rejecting surgery as a potential cure for sexual 
disorders judged by them to be explicitly mental, the rationale behind self-damaging 
treatments also had to be rejected.634 Certainly, this was the perspective that psychoanalytic 
practitioners in the early twentieth century chose to emphasise, when reporting that 
castration had “even recently” been reported as a cure for “neuroses, perversion, sexual 
crimes, sexual abnormalities, mental diseases, and even tuberculosis”.635 
 In addition to the relation made between self-inflicted genital injury, the sexual 
instinct and the “selfish” personality, did Krafft-Ebing make any specific connection with the 
pathologies he famously outlined? Today, we might expect some reference to sado-
masochism: indeed, certain psychoanalysts later invoked this concept to explain self-
mutilation.636 Yet the connection is strikingly absent in Krafft-Ebing’s work, and was certainly 
not picked up by British alienists, although both masochism and sadism were introduced into 
Psychopathia Sexualis in 1890, several years before Adam’s definition of self-mutilation was 
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published.637 Masochism was thus readily available as a model for self-inflicted injury, but 
was not adopted. Instead, relying on prior understanding of the characteristics of the 
castrated male, castration seems most frequently to have been discussed in relation to cases 
of “antipathic sexuality” (known in England as “sexual inversion”), i.e. homosexuality. It was 
here that Krafft-Ebing adamantly rejected castration as cure, and it was also in such 
circumstances that castration gained a very specific meaning, forming a reflection on the 
physical and mental state, and the “inverted” character of the individual. By association with 
a “third sex”, castration became seen as a very particular form of emasculation. 
 In his introduction to early editions of Psychopathia Sexualis, Krafft-Ebing referred at 
some length to the work of physician Victor von Gyurkovechky on impotence. Gyurkovechky 
compared a loss of virility in men as they aged to castration and, subsequently, to 
“effemination”. 
…the man bereft of his virility is morose and spiteful, egotistic, jealous, contrary, 
listless, has but little self-respect or sense of honor, and is cowardly. Analogies are 
seen in the Skopzens, who, after their castration, change for the worse. The loss of 
virility is still more noticeable in certain weakly constituted individuals, where it 
expresses itself in formal effemination.638 
 
Such a generalisation clearly related castration to both gender inversion and a broader 
change in character, and claimed that anthropological investigation of the Skoptsy proved 
such a connection. The particular role of the Skoptsy will be discussed in the final part of this 
chapter. Here, however, it is important to note the regular use of such correlations in 
psychiatric discussion of homosexuality, through the suggestion that “gender inversion” 
might be evidenced physically (by changes in the genitals) as well as through a perceived 
“feminine” character. Yet we encounter a paradox here. Women, as was shown in the 
previous chapter, were frequently associated with altruistic traits (Darwin, for example, saw 
men as “naturally” more selfish than women), especially in their extreme form, the maternal 
ideal of “self-sacrifice”.639 Krafft-Ebing, too, saw women as “naturally” passive – and, 
therefore, presumably not “egotistic” in the aforementioned sense. 640  In the 
characterisation of eunuchs (and homosexuals) as feminised and aggressive, effeminate and 
egotistic, we have a combination of several theories. The eunuch is regarded as feminised, 
and therefore cannot show a masculine “self-respect” or drive. However, he is unable to 
perform the reproductive sexual functions of the male or the female, and thus cannot 
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acquire the civilising altruism associated with the reproductive sexual act by 
contemporaries. Castration in such a context would appear to result in far more than simply 
a loss of masculine status: perhaps also a complete loss of humanity 
 Assumptions about the connection between castration, passivity and homosexuality 
were supported in medical texts by reference to anthropological literature. These texts were 
often created within a naturalist framework, intended to indicate the universality of 
homosexual behaviour, thus framing it as biologically, as well as culturally, natural. This 
approach emphasised associations between act and character, for this formed the “proof” of 
universality. Thus, while claims for universality supported legal sanction for abnormal sexual 
behaviour, it also served to increase the association of certain character traits with 
homosexuals and eunuchs, as well as suggesting a relation between the two. Krafft-Ebing 
took one such example from the work of American doctor William Alexander Hammond. A 
formerly disgraced army-surgeon, Hammond later became a specialist on mental disease 
and published on a variety of fringe topics, including spiritualism, hypnosis and “fasting 
girls”.641 His several volumes on Sexual Impotence included anthropological material 
gathered during his days in the army, and Krafft-Ebing was particularly interested in reports 
of the creation of mujerados among the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico. The mujerado 
formed a ceremonial function among the Indians, being the “chief passive agent in the 
pederastic ceremonies … which take place in the spring of every year”.642 According well 
with western medical thought, the mujerado’s state of impotence was claimed to be 
achieved by repeated masturbation and continuous horseback riding. Physically, his penis 
and testicles were supposed to atrophy: Hammond had personally examined two such 
mujerados, and confirmed this change. However, both Hammond and Krafft-Ebing 
concentrated on a claimed alteration in the instincts and desires of the subject. In addition 
to losing his social place as a male (his family, if he had one, passing from his control), the 
mujerado apparently became timid and lost his taste “for those sports and occupations in 
which he formerly indulged.”643 In essence, then, both writers presented the mujerado as 
having become physically, socially and sexually passive – and thus female. While Hammond 
was most concerned with the way in which impotence might affect a man in the broadest 
sense, Krafft-Ebing related Hammond’s discussion directly to his own research on antipathic 
sexual instinct. The example of the mujerados followed on from the case of Sch., a thirty-
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year-old physician whose autobiographic account of his physical and sexual development, 
and homosexual experiences, was similarly followed by a description of his character. Sch. 
described himself as “effeminate, sensitive, easily moved, easily injured and nervous.” 
Further, “[m]asculine pursuits do not interest me.” Krafft-Ebing concluded that Sch. had 
acquired his antipathic sexual instinct through early sexual experiences, which in turn, 
having “induced a desire for the passive role”, ensured that “[t]he character became 
feminine.” The example of the mujerados was thus claimed to form an “interesting 
confirmation” of Krafft-Ebing’s own theories.644 
 In using ethnological data to support theories about western sexual practices, both 
Hammond and Krafft-Ebing assumed the universality of behaviour and character, ignoring 
elements specific to any particular instance, such as the religious and ceremonial function of 
castration in New Mexico. Other anthropological studies of the period regarded castration in 
other cultures in a similar manner, including the eunuchs of Imperial China, the hijda and the 
kojahs of India and, of course, the Skoptsy.645 Many of these accounts, despite 
acknowledging the multiple historical purposes of castration, nonetheless equated modern 
day eunuchs with homosexual prostitution, through assumptions about their “passive” 
nature. Thus, in his report to the Anthropological Society of London, Dr Shortt referred to 
the “debauchery and low practices” of the “Higras” (hijdas) who hired themselves out “to a 
dissipated set of Moslems” at night.646 In Western psychiatric texts, analogies were 
frequently made between castration and an assumed feminine character: Gould and Pyle, 
for example, noted that one Italian law student who castrated himself was “of delicate 
complexion”.647 Another army-surgeon pseudonymously published a volume about his 
travels, Untrodden Fields, making a similar link between castration and male prostitution.648 
In this instance, rather than claiming his anthropological examples to be natural (and hence 
not punishable by law), the author suggested the opposite view to Krafft-Ebing, playing on 
contemporary fears of national and racial decline. This indicates that it was perfectly 
possible to use ethnological examples to support whichever argument the author preferred. 
Unlike Krafft-Ebing, the author of Untrodden Fields appeared to support castration for some 
                                                 
644
 Krafft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis (1999), p. 252. 
645
 See also R. A. Jamieson, "Chinese Eunuchs," The Lancet, 110, no. 2813 (1877): 123-124; Melissa S. 
Dale, "Understanding Emasculation: Western Medical Perspectives on Chinese Eunuchs," Social 
History of Medicine, 23, no. 1 (2010): 38-55. 
646
 Shortt, "The Kojahs of Southern India", p. 406. 
647
 Gould and Pyle, Anomalies and Curiosities of Medicine, p. 732. 
648
 Dr Jacobus, Untrodden Fields of Anthropology: Observations on the Esoteric Manners and Customs 
of Semi-Civilized Peoples, trans. Charles Carrington (Paris: Librairie de Medecine, Folklore et 
Anthropologie, 1898), p. 117. 
176 
 
individuals assumed to be deviant, including “sexual perverts”. 649 Such concerns indicate a 
continued interest in castration as a cure for homosexuality. Indeed, Krafft-Ebing’s 
associates apparently recommended this treatment. Moritz Benedikt, his colleague in 
Vienna, saw three possibilities for homosexuals: abstinence, imprisonment or castration.650 
Similarly, some doctors continued to advocate surgical intervention for preventing 
masturbation into the twentieth century.651 
 Further indicating that castration could still be interpreted by some as a cure for 
sexual pathology, Havelock Ellis added a section on the topic to the 1915 edition of Sexual 
Inversion (first published in 1897), noting that “the treatment of homosexuality must be 
approached with discrimination, caution and scepticism.”652 Ellis gave firm reasons for his 
rejection of this “seemingly very radical method” of treatment, which was “sometimes 
believed to have been successful by those who carried it out.” His contention was that 
castration could not be successful, because it acted only on the body and not “the whole 
psychic state.” Since sexual inversion was “firmly imprinted”, “[c]astration of the body in 
adult age cannot be expected to produce castration of the mind.” Such an argument 
supported the now widespread view that sexual inversion did not refer solely to an act, but 
an entire way of being. It avoided, however, the contention of other authors – like 
Hammond and Krafft-Ebing – that castration might alter the entire way of being, and not 
merely the physical state of the genitals. Indeed, the cases Ellis quoted (from other authors) 
did refer to mental as well as physical change. These mental changes, however, were not 
claimed to affect the “inverted” character. Instead, the cases reported the “aggravation” of 
neurasthenic symptoms, in particular the inability to resist impulse, relying on earlier 
correlations between castration and selfishness. Ellis highlighted this dangerous effect of 
castration by referring back to a case history reported earlier in the volume, that of Guy 
Olmstead.653  
 Olmstead was not one of the cases collected by Ellis and his co-writer, John 
Addington Symonds, but had already been reported in American newspapers as a medico-
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legal case when Ellis and Eugene Talbot (Olmstead’s physician), collaborated in a report in 
the Journal of Mental Science in 1896. Talbot, a medical doctor with an interest in 
degeneration, provided the data; Ellis was responsible for the commentary.654 Olmstead had 
shot a fellow letter-carrier in the street, apparently fatally wounding him. Subsequently, 
many details about Olmstead’s history, in particular his homosexual involvement with the 
victim, William Clifford, came to light. Olmstead, it was said, had “never been considered 
perfectly sane”, and had been previously treated in various asylums. Following an affair, 
Clifford had apparently rejected Olmstead, and later gave incriminating letters to their 
employer, resulting in Olmstead’s dismissal. Subsequently, “on the advice of friends”, 
Olmstead had his testicles removed. Both Talbot and Ellis drew their strongest conclusions 
about the case in connection with Olmstead’s castration. Both seemed to regard castration 
as having provoked the onset of hysterical melancholia, and Ellis concluded adamantly that: 
The removal of the testicles, the apparently depressing effect of the operation, and 
the speedy occurrence of the crime after it, should suggest caution to the surgical 
psychiatrists who advocate the castration of inverts and sexual perverts generally. 
Such persons are frequently of unstable mental balance, so that the mutilation 
produces a depressing effect, while it does not remove the perverted tendency.655 
 
Ellis thus emphasised that castration was dangerous, rather than curative: his aim was to 
suggest that it was, in fact, more socially problematic than inversion might be. Given the 
social functions doctors as diverse as Krafft-Ebing and George Savage attributed to the 
sexual instinct, this would certainly seem to have been a persuasive line of argument, and 
fitted amongst other contemporary depictions of castration as leading to violence and 
sudden emotional changes in the individual.656 
 The case of Guy Olmstead highlights the emphasis placed on restraint as a key 
element of masculinity in the later nineteenth century, associated with contemporary 
interest in Stoicism and neo-Spartanism.657 Thus, sexuality, gender and character were all 
bound up in the same ideals, judged important for both individual and race. 658 From the 
several perspectives outlined above, castration thus shifted from a potential cure for a 
sexual or other biological problem (an imposition of control), to a pathological act in itself, 
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regarded as resulting in an impulsive loss of control (and hence loss of masculinity) in the 
patient. For some, such as John Addington Symonds, who had his penis cauterised by 
William Action in 1864, castration had to be represented as pathological to highlight the 
legitimacy of what Symonds saw as an inborn condition (homosexuality).659 Conversely, as in 
the case of the author of Untrodden Fields, castration could be viewed as evidence of 
degeneration and sexual perversion, turning the eunuch into the passive recipient of anal 
intercourse while, as in the examples of Krafft-Ebing and Hammond, simultaneously 
feminising his character. Finally, the association between the physical act of castration, the 
mental state and the individual character became viewed as especially problematic in 
relation to the emphasis put on sexual restraint and self-control in Victorian culture. Sexual 
restraint was perceived as a vital element of masculinity, shaping the individual’s response 
to other social situations. Castration was thought to weaken the will, removing the need for 
the individual to learn control of himself. If he were not making a concerted effort to restrain 
himself sexually, the Victorian male might be expected to fail to restrain himself in other 
ways: thus, it was implied, Guy Olmstead would not have shot his former lover had he not 
been castrated. For some critics, this was associated with much wider concerns about 
respectability and social convention. As James Eli Adams has noted, writers as varied as 
Oscar Wilde, John Stuart Mill and Matthew Arnold represented Victorian moral conventions 
as a type of “mutilation” of the body. 660 Within a medical context, concerns about the 
relation between self-control, sexual restraint, character and social convention can be 
viewed most explicitly in texts on the Skoptsy, the Russian religious cult who practised ritual 
castration. 
 
4.6 “Indifferent to his Environment”: Religion, Self-Restraint and the Eunuch 
 As outlined in chapter one, a number of writers linked self-mutilation specifically to 
religious fervour, and English alienists frequently noted an association with Matthew 5:29 - 
“If thy right hand offend thee, cut it off” - whether or not their patients cited this scriptural 
injunction.661 James Adam regarded Christianity as having caused the spread of self-
mutilation in Europe and, although there were certainly many who disagreed with this 
viewpoint, one particular example was often used to support the connection between 
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religion and castration: the Russian Skoptsy.662 As already indicated, the Skoptsy were one of 
the most oft-cited instances of castration outside the psychiatric realm, receiving a separate 
category in the Surgeon-General’s Index Catalogue, and providing much of the material for 
later medical investigation of the consequences of “Eunuchism”.663 Although castration was 
not literally self-performed, their acts were nonetheless considered under the remit of “self-
mutilation”.664 Thus, an article in the Medical Press of 1888 compared cases of self-
mutilation in western asylums with contemporary “religious fanaticism in Russia”, even 
though the British cases described were of enucleation rather than castration.665 
 The Skoptsy emerged in the late eighteenth century, and their history has been ably 
traced by Laura Engelstein, through religious texts as well as legal and medical documents.666 
One of a number of sects that broke away from the Russian Orthodox Church, the Skoptsy 
appear to have been persecuted particularly severely following the discovery of their 
practice of castration in 1772. As Engelstein notes, the Russian state struggled to pin down 
their problem with the Skoptsy’s practice: was it religious heresy or social harm?667 
Commentators claimed that the Skoptsy’s practice of castration stemmed from a 
“misinterpretation” of the Bible and a “mystical madness”.668 Engelstein suggests that three 
passages of the Bible were emphasised in the sect’s religious teachings: Matthew 19:12 
(“there be eunuchs which have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven’s 
sake”), Matthew 5:29 (as above) and Luke 23:29 (“blessed are the barren”).669 When a paper 
on the topic was read to the Anthropological Society of London in 1870, one member 
complained that “according to the best commentators, the assertion that some eunuchs 
made themselves such referred to the living a life of celibacy and not to mutilating the 
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body.”670 This was, in itself, a deliberate but unnecessary reading of this passage of the Bible 
as allegory: indeed, a footnote in the same journal noted that the Vulgate used the verb 
“castraverunt” in this same passage, suggesting a literal interpretation. As Gary Taylor notes, 
it is perfectly possible to interpret the passage literally, and many of the early Christian 
teachers, such as Augustine and Clement of Alexandria, who did claim this passage to be 
allegorical, attacked similar readings of other parts of the Bible as heretical. Taylor concludes 
that this interpretation was necessary to resolve a conflict in the Bible that might cause 
problems with missionary conversion, as well as to explicitly reject pagan cults in which 
castration had been practised.671 
 Whatever the explanation, it is certainly true that this passage was usually taught as 
allegorical well before the nineteenth century. Explanations as to why the Skoptsy reversed 
this interpretation were many and varied. Anthropologists attributed the existence of the 
sect to “the psychological peculiarity of the race of Moscovites, in which it prevails”.672 
Psychiatrists, and some lay writers, related acts to a “morbid condition”, while general 
newspapers and journals gave particular weight to cultural influences, such as the “want of 
intellectual nourishment” in Russia.673  
 Although the Skoptsy had existed for a hundred years previously, it was not until the 
late nineteenth century that the sect came to the attention of Western Europe, following a 
series of open trials in the late 1860s and early 1870s. These reports indicate the close 
relation made by Western commentators between castration and character. The trial of a 
wealthy gentleman named Plotitzine, reported in The Times, appeared in a number of local 
newspapers. As with the later case of Isaac Brooks (which some newspapers even compared 
to the Skoptsy),674 journalists shaped these stories into a mystery format, based on 
contemporary interest in – and suspicion of – secret societies.675 Thus, three papers titled 
the story “Russian Self-Mutilators and their Treasure”, claiming that the Skoptsy escaped 
persecution due to their great wealth and that it was “common practice to induce 
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conversion by cash.”676 Such views of the Skoptsy were often based on anti-Semitic rhetoric. 
Engelstein notes that: 
the Skoptsy suffered from comparison with the Jews, not the reverse. … Portraying 
the Skoptsy as ferociously money-loving became a cliché of antisectarian writing. 
Having deprived themselves of human love and renounced all family ties, it was said, 
they devoted their energies to acquiring wealth.677  
 
This was not by any means a foregone conclusion: after all, Krafft-Ebing regarded the sexual 
instinct as a requirement for the drive to acquiring wealth.678 It did, however, fit into 
western discourses that associated the sexual instinct with altruism and love for humanity, 
and the reverse with selfishness. In general, the Skoptsy came to be associated – socially, 
financially, and psychologically, as well as sexually – with a selfish way of life. 
 What’s more, it was invariably the physical act of castration itself that was regarded 
to have changed the Skoptsy’s character, as indicated in the above quote from 
Gyurkovechky, that the sect “changed for the worse” following castration.679 This was a 
common assumption about eunuchism in British evolutionary psychology. Darwin thought 
that eunuchs were inferior to other males,680 while Henry Maudsley declared with 
characteristic forthrightness that: 
The physical degeneration of a sexual impotency is surely reflected in a 
corresponding moral degradation ... The perfect moral man must be of perfect 
physical development. Eunuchs are said to be the vilest creatures of the human race, 
cowards, deceitful, envious and vicious.681 
 
Thus, descriptions of the Skoptsy invariably vilified them for their secrecy and love of gain, 
without wondering whether this was true or, even if it was, it might have been created by 
their life of exile, rather than castration itself.682 Moreover, this view also insisted that even 
an allegorical reading of the biblical injunction was “unnatural” in modern society, and that 
“enforced celibacy” was a social problem. Russian writer Evgeny Pelikan was particularly 
influential in such portrayals of the Skoptsy in the West. Pelikan (1824 – 1884) was a 
professor of forensic medicine at St Petersburg, and his use of case studies emerged from 
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this medico-legal context. As many Skoptsy claimed at trial that they had been castrated 
“accidentally”, Pelikan’s writings focused on medical evidence which contradicted this, as 
well as providing details of other ways of physically identifying Skoptsy, whether castrated 
before or after puberty.683 The two forms of castration practised were thus detailed in his 
work. The “minor seal” involved removal of testicles and scrotum, while the major, or 
“royal”, seal included amputation of the penis. Female Skoptsy also underwent a physical 
indoctrination: the breasts were scarred, and sometimes removed, as was the labia and, 
occasionally, the clitoris. 684 Interest in the physical appearance of the Skoptsy was a major 
feature of attention in Western Europe. At the Anthropological Society, Barnard Davis 
showed an anatomical preparation “which exhibits the radical excision of the sexual organs 
of a male Scoptsi” in conjunction with “photographs … of rich individual Scoptsis at 
Bucharest.”685 Photographs were thought to evidence physiognomic change rather than the 
physiological effects of castration: thus showing the way castration altered character. Thus, 
Davis noted the “peculiar mildness and want of force in their countenances”.686 
 
Figure 18: Photograph of three male Skoptsy in the early 1900s. The beards of the seated 
gentlemen indicate that they were castrated after puberty. Western photographs often 
depicted several generations, drawing attention to the differences in time of castration. 
(from Eugéne Pittard, La castration chez l'homme, (Paris: Masson, 1934), fig. 68) 
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The examination of specimens, and the connections between physical, facial and 
behavioural change, tended to concentrate on the male Skoptsy. Although many of the trials 
analysed by Engelstein revealed as many mutilated female as male Skoptsy, and the two 
sexes were treated the same in Russian legal proceedings, it was the castration of the male 
that formed the topic of most discussion in the West.687 This was very similar to accounts of 
sexual self-mutilation in asylums. There were just as many instances of female genital self-
injury as male in Bethlem during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, yet the only 
published article (discussed earlier) which referenced the topic in women was suggested to 
be unusual, and compared directly to the Brooks case to prove this.688 Sexual self-mutilation, 
it seems, spoke particularly to western commentators about the regulation of masculine 
sexual desire, and the role of sexuality in the creation of masculinity. This can be associated 
with the interest in same-sex relations, as outlined above (which also concentrated on men), 
in addition to concerns around masturbation. The male was more closely associated with his 
sex drive (not to be confused with reproductive capacity, which was seen as a greater 
physiological factor in women) than the female, and thus the social consequences of the loss 
of sexual function were deemed far greater in men than in women. Indeed, the element of 
Pelikan’s text which particularly resounded with western commentators was his suggestion 
that the loss of sexual ability in the Skoptsy might be a source of social danger, for the 
regulation of sexual desire also controlled other elements of male behaviour.  
Once he becomes sexually active, the normal man starts to find the opposite sex 
attractive: the first instinctive call of love also inspires him with the urge to noble 
action and great deeds and with devotion to the fatherland. The young man 
castrated before puberty knows none of this: he remains indifferent to his 
environment, lacking the smallest germ of noble aspiration, sense of duty, or civic 
obligation.689 
 
This description certainly resonated in Western Europe, for it was not the religious or 
political context that English commentators reflected on, but rather the threat to society. 
“These fanatics,” James Adam declared of all the “old religions of the East” were most 
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dangerous in having “withdrawn from the society of man”,690 while Charles Mercier claimed 
that the “orphan celibate” could not experience the “social emotions” of ethical and 
patriotic duty.691 Such a description indicates once again why the supposed character of the 
Skoptsy was frequently associated with the physical act of castration. In addition to being 
perceived as evidence of “an intimate and natural bond between the psychological character 
of a race and its religious ideas and propensities”, the assumption that sexual desire was 
connected to altruistic behaviour made the reverse a foregone conclusion.692 Thus, the 
Skoptsy “are in general very greedy, avaricious, but peaceful and sober.”693 Even when 
“eunuchism” had been re-classified as an “endocrine disease”, attention to the psychological 
profile continued to emphasise such traits. Although cast in post-psychoanalytic language, 
the psychological picture described by Cawadias in 1946 was nonetheless rooted in late-
nineteenth-century assumptions about selfishness. Eunuchs, Cawadias claimed, usually 
show: “tendency to introversion with infantilistic traits and abnormalities of behaviour of 
“limelight” nature due to over-compensation of inferiority complex.”694 In nineteenth-
century terms, they had failed to develop the altruism associated with the acquisition of the 
normal sexual function during puberty. In such a context, the castrated man could not fail to 
be selfish, turning castration itself into an egotistical act. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 While this chapter has drawn together a number of examples of self-castration and 
other forms of ritual mutilation, it should in no way be assumed that castration was a 
widespread procedure in late nineteenth-century Britain. Rather, I have sought here to 
account for what appears to be a much higher level of discussion of castration – particularly 
self-performed – than is evident in practice. Many of the writers cited in the fields of 
sexology and anthropology were not discussing castration per se, but using cases as 
examples to build entirely different arguments. Nonetheless, the way in which they framed 
the cases they did discuss provides an important context for understanding the definitions of 
self-mutilation created by alienists. In the first place, I have recognised the importance of 
case studies (in particular those of Isaac Brooks and Henry Halhed), within and outside the 
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asylum, in creating a concept of “sexual self-mutilation”. The existence of such cases does 
not, however, indicate why castration was emphasised over other forms of self-mutilation, 
or why it acquired associations with a selfish, passive and introverted character. Neither can 
this be explained by the assumption that castration is “necessarily” about loss of masculinity. 
Indeed, the Victorian concern over masturbation challenges this notion, for castration – 
even where self-performed – could certainly be regarded as preferable to the slow death or 
decline into insanity often attributed to masturbation. A few physicians do appear to have 
suggested (or carried out at the behest of their patients) this radical cure, along with the 
lesser surgery of circumcision, well into the twentieth century. Within psychiatry, however, I 
have placed more emphasis on the increasing interest in psychological and sociological 
aetiologies of mental illness – particularly among those alienists most interested in self-
mutilation. This perspective meant that physical therapies – such as castration and other 
forms of sexual surgery – no longer seemed therapeutically appropriate. Sexuality began to 
be considered a mental state, and thus more deeply embedded in the individual character 
than could be altered by surgical intervention. From this, it fell that the act of self-castration 
became viewed as pathological in and of itself. 
 Yet, in order to understand how the character of the eunuch could arouse such 
censure, the broader context of socio-evolutionary approaches to civilisation need to be 
taken into account. Like other male disorders, including hypochondriasis, masturbation and 
sexual perversion, castration in the late nineteenth century was claimed to alter the 
character of the individual, encouraging a selfish self-obsession, at times related to insanity. 
These concerns were strongly rooted in contemporary ideals of masculinity, of which self-
control was an essential element. In the later nineteenth century, the acquisition of this 
control became increasingly connected with sexual health. As the individual developed 
sexually so, it was assumed, did he develop socially, so that the natural selfishness of the 
male sex would blossom into altruism. Self-castration, in this context, was presented as the 
ultimate act of selfish preoccupation: a refusal to perform a useful social function. 
Anthropological and sexological examples appeared to support this contention, claiming to 
provide evidence that castration altered the behaviour, leaving the eunuch passive, inert, 
disinterested in society and focused instead on personal gain. Thus, Isaac Brooks was 
claimed to be “just the type of man in whom all the evils of civilization seem to accumulate 
... A solitary man, thinking himself misunderstood and neglected, building castles in the air, 
finding the times out of joint”. 695 Yet can we find it surprising if some individuals did end up 
                                                 
695
 Warrington, "The Case of Isaac Brooks", The Lancet, p. 73. 
186 
 
exhibiting the very traits they were accused of? The words of one of the Skoptsy’s most 
articulate spokesmen offer a poignant conclusion. Nikifor Petrovich Latyshev (1863 – c. 
1939), a self-appointed chronicler of the sect, speculated in later life on the cause of hostility 
toward the Skoptsy. 
Judging by my life, my proper life, I’m a great guy! My exemplary decent behaviour 
admits me everywhere. What qualities are missing for me to be accepted as human. 
Better be a drunk, a hooligan, roué, drifter, loafer or malingerer – but not castrated! 
Nothing is more shameful among humankind. I’ve felt this on my own hide for 75 
years.696 
 
That castration has not always been perceived to make a man less than human – or even 
less masculine – suggests that the topic of sexual self-mutilation in late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century England was related to concerns in a large number of other fields – 
psychiatric, psychological, anthropological and sexological. In the early twentieth century, it 
was still claimed that castration was a common self-operation in “psychotics and sexual 
perverts”, while psychoanalytic writers viewed castration as the fundamental form of self-
mutilation.697 Today, self-harm in men is still often characterised as a feminine disorder, 
supported by ongoing attention to castration, which is now framed around the concept of 
gender identity disorder.698 The creation of this very diagnosis required certain other shifts 
in thought, in particular that outlined here: the re-framing of the “sexual instinct” from 
something that ought to be repressed and controlled to a vital force seen to uphold social, 
as well as individual and moral, life. 
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Chapter Five 
The Hysterical Malingerer: Attention-Seeking and the Unconscious 
At the Turn of the Twentieth Century 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 Modern texts on self-harm often refer to a level of seeming manipulative intent 
within self-inflicted injury, generally from the viewpoint of clinicians and relatives.699  Such a 
view, it is suggested, may deny those who self-harm access to many treatment 
opportunities, stigmatising acts as inherently selfish, encapsulated in the negative concept of 
“attention seeking”. But how did the suggestion that inflicting damage on one’s own body 
might be manipulative of others arise? As this thesis has already indicated, the correlation of 
self-inflicted injury with selfishness was a complicated construct within late nineteenth-
century psychiatry, entangled in a variety of other concerns. At the turn of the twentieth 
century, this ethos was most commonly articulated as a craving for sympathy, strongly 
associated with the medical diagnosis of hysteria. This concept was founded on 
preconceived notions of the traits exhibited by hysterical individuals, subsumed within late-
nineteenth-century attention to the topic of malingering, which, as we have seen in chapter 
three, was increasingly extended from military to civilian populations across Europe in this 
period. This model assumed that the malingerer inflicted injury on him or herself in the 
pursuit of gain, an association that was extended to so-called “hysterical self-mutilation” 
through prior (masculine) notions of the emotional needs of women. In the early twentieth 
century, medical texts often differentiated between male and female self-mutilation. The 
former was portrayed as outright deception (for the purpose of avoiding duty or economic 
gain) and the latter as “unconscious malingering”.700 Nonetheless, as this chapter will show, 
such a distinction does not appear to have led to significant differences in treatment (in 
civilian populations at least), and the “malingerer” and the “self-mutilator” were viewed as 
equally problematic.  
 In addition, I here explore the tensions between so-called somatic and psychological 
views of hysteria. While historians have generally viewed concepts of hysteria as 
“progressing” from the former to the latter, I question this process by indicating that mental 
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and bodily symptoms were frequently bound up together in nineteenth and early twentieth-
century accounts of illness.701 The distinction between mental and physical is often 
retrospectively imposed by historians, in particular through attention to certain elements of 
psychological medicine in isolation from other fields, ignoring the connections between 
psychiatry and other areas of medical practice. In this chapter, then, I approach concepts of 
the mind/body relation more generally, through a perhaps unexpected field: that of 
dermatology. Dermatologists were often interested in exploring possible mental elements to 
skin conditions, and many seem to have promoted links between their own field and 
psychological medicine. The distinction between mental and physical illness, however, was 
by no means an easy or obvious one to make. By exploring dermatological records, I indicate 
just how much might be missed by the historian specialising on too-narrow concepts of 
psychiatry or psychological medicine in earlier periods. 
 This chapter begins by exploring the creation of a link between the diagnosis of 
hysteria and self-inflicted injury, and the way in which this connection built on, but also 
shaped, understandings of the hysterical individual. The notion of hysterical self-injury 
appears to have emerged from attention to the “fasting girls” of the mid-Victorian period, 
where abstinence, lesions (such as religious stigmata) and associated mental states were 
increasingly explained in physiological and behavioural, rather than spiritual, terms. These 
often contradictory explanations stemmed from a prior understanding that such cases must 
(and therefore could) be explained as “natural”. In reports of so-called “needle girls” in the 
later decades of the nineteenth century, it will be shown that these concerns promoted an 
increasingly gendered view of self-inflicted injury as an essentially female act. A physiological 
understanding of self-mutilation often minimised any claims made by the patient as to the 
meaning of his or her acts, portraying behaviour as resulting from nervous impulses beyond 
the patient’s control. The association of self-mutilation at the turn of the twentieth century 
with “unconscious” or “subconscious” impulses, however, did appear to advance exploration 
of the psyche by some practitioners. Yet, despite the explicit rejection by these practitioners 
of a somatic model of self-injury, the mental model they adopted showed many similarities 
to the neurological one. Unconscious motive, like nervous impulse, could be understood 
only by the doctor, and not the patient, from whom it was claimed to be hidden. However, 
those doctors who adopted a mental model of hysterical self-injury also related it to their 
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own efforts to change medical practice more generally. In rejecting materialism, doctors 
who emphasised the “psychical” nature of self-inflicted injuries also explicitly rejected 
physical treatment for hysteria, correlating the self-inflicted injuries of their patients with 
the “mutilating” operations supposedly carried out by surgeons. This attitude had certain 
points of contact with the asylum cases previously cited: in particular, the shifting position of 
self-mutilation from surgical “puzzle” (whereby detective-work in uncovering “deception” 
was equated with cure), to something deemed to hold emotional and social relevance above 
and beyond any physical damage to the body. By the 1920s and ‘30s, for writers in a variety 
of medical fields, self-mutilation was perceived as directly expressive of the inner life of the 
individual: “a reflection upon the skin of a disordered condition of the mind.”702 
 
5.2 Self-Mutilation and Hysteria: From Sacred to Pathological Symptom 
 The connection between self-inflicted injury and the diagnosis of hysteria emerged 
in the mid nineteenth century, from medical re-evaluation of certain individuals whose 
behaviour might previously have been interpreted in spiritual terms. This section will explore 
the investigation of two cases of supposed religious phenomena, and the way in which these 
were claimed by doctors to indicate medical pathology. By rooting their explanations in the 
disorder of hysteria, doctors commenting on the cases of “Welsh Fasting Girl” Sarah Jacob, 
and Belgian stigmatic Louise Lateau emphasised a correlation between self-injury and 
nervous disorder. Their explanations, nonetheless, incorporated a wide variety of ideas, 
including efforts to explain this connection physiologically (in relation to the nerves) or 
psychologically (via the character of the individual). As has been repeatedly emphasised in 
this thesis, these ideas were not mutually exclusive and, in fact, can often be found side by 
side in texts. What’s more, treatment tended to emphasise a social and pastoral approach 
which continued to incorporate elements of the religious interpretation of behaviour, which 
thus remained bound up in medical understanding of so-called hysterical self-injury. Indeed, 
rather than necessarily indicating a conflict between science and religion, the adoption of a 
medical approach to phenomena previously regarded as spiritual might equally suggest a 
broader change in religious practice, whereby the belief that mortification of the flesh might 
purify the soul was discarded for the view that, instead, it damaged the inner self of the 
individual.703 
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 The concept of hysteria has a lengthy history, which some historians have dated 
back to the oldest surviving documents in medical history, circa. 1900 B.C.704 It is also 
argued, however, that the concept of hysteria as a constant disease entity is problematic for, 
throughout the centuries, models of hysteria, and the symptoms presented by patients, 
have shifted. Indeed, the very term hysteria may be questionable. Helen King has noted that 
the attribution of the word to ancient texts was often added in nineteenth-century 
translations, reflecting the keen interest in both hysteria and the use of retrospective 
diagnosis in this period.705 In Ancient Greek medicine, according to King, there was no 
concept of hysteria, although later writers assumed that the Greek term had long been 
applied to a disorder thought to reside within the female reproductive anatomy. By the 
seventeenth century, however, doctors certainly regarded hysteria as a disease entity, and 
began to explore a neurological aetiology, setting hysteria as the female counterpart to male 
hypochondriasis (which was discussed in chapter two). Hysteria thus became a “neurosis”: a 
disease of the nerves, rather than the womb. By the nineteenth century, this “nervous” 
model was well-established, and hysteria was regarded by many as a distinct and 
unchanging disease. Nonetheless, the medical concept of hysteria remained extremely 
broad: general practitioners, alienists, neurologists and surgeons were all involved in the 
treatment of hysterical patients, whose symptoms might vary from mild malaise or 
weakness to complaints of paralysis or cutaneous anaesthesia and the grand fits made 
famous by Charcot at the Salpêtrière in late nineteenth-century Paris.706 In practice, hysteria 
was often used as a means of explaining any phenomenon that did not fit neatly within an 
organic model of disease, and competing models of the disorder were often used in 
combination, so that practitioners might suggest a mix of neurological, behavioural and 
psychological interpretations of their patients’ symptoms.  
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 Many of these explanations have been deemed essentially secular, a notion 
promoted by Charcot’s famous retrospective diagnosis of hysteria in cases of magic and 
witchcraft in past centuries.707 It is instructive, therefore, to examine in greater depth the 
efforts of nineteenth century medical men to provide naturalistic explanations for certain 
phenomena, which subsequently became assumed to be self-inflicted injuries. An interest in 
explaining human behaviour as natural (rather than supernatural) has been viewed by many 
historians as central to scientific ideals of the mid and late nineteenth century, from 
evolutionary theory to anthropology.708 While it has been previously noted that such a shift 
should not be over-emphasised, it should also not be assumed that, where it did occur, 
these new frameworks were necessarily progressive. The teleological way in which historical 
accounts are often framed has tended to cast religious theories as unenlightened and 
repressive, while scientific ideas constitute a new “truth.” Yet such a shift can equally cause 
the reverse, whereby an act that previously might have had positive spiritual meaning 
becomes viewed as pathological, and thus something to be prevented. After all, outside the 
medical realm, self-imposed abstinence did continue to receive a certain level of acceptance, 
as in the case of “fasting girls”, although it is the medical diagnosis of “anorexia nervosa” 
that will be explored here.709 Named in 1873 by William Withey Gull in England and Charles 
Lèsegue in France, anorexia nervosa was viewed by physicians as somewhere between 
hysteria and outright insanity, although not conforming exactly to either state.710 Although 
noting the patient’s desire to refuse food, diagnosis of anorexia nervosa concentrated 
predominantly on physiological symptoms. Thus, in addition to a loss of appetite and 
emaciation, patients were described as suffering from absence of menstruation 
(amenorrhoea), low body temperature and hyperactivity.711 As Joan Jacobs Brumberg has 
noted, the emphasis on female symptoms (such as failure to menstruate), and the uncertain 
relationship with hysteria, meant that anorexia nervosa was frequently presented as a 
female disease. The best known “fasting girl” in Britain was Sarah Jacob, who became 
nationally famous in December 1868, having reportedly taken no food since October the 
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previous year. Her case was frequently outlined in the medical press as an incidence of 
fraud, and investigated by a team from Guy’s Hospital. During the investigation Sarah Jacob 
died, and a widespread refusal to accept the spiritual explanations put forward by Sarah’s 
parents and other believers was legally endorsed when the parents were found guilty of 
manslaughter.712 
 The case of the Welsh Fasting Girl was effectively concluded by Sarah Jacob’s death, 
regarded by many as incontrovertible proof that she was, indeed, bound by natural laws, 
even if no one had been able to discover the means by which Sarah had been kept alive prior 
to the investigation. The British Medical Journal went so far as to uphold Sarah as a martyr 
of science, suggesting that her death was “almost necessary” in order to dispel the 
convictions of the “ignorant and unreasoning multitude.”713 This indicates a ready 
acceptance within the medical profession to transport religious concerns wholesale into the 
medical arena. Thus, self-imposed abstinence or other forms of “martyrdom” were cast as 
pathological, encouraging emphasis on physiology rather than motive. This can be seen still 
more clearly in the investigation of religious stigmata, which caused more explicit 
associations between self-inflicted injury and religious phenomena. In the year Sarah Jacob 
died, the Belgian medical profession began to investigate a strange case of supposedly 
miraculous bodily transformation: the stigmata of a young seamstress, Louise Lateau. Born 
in January 1850 to a “humble” family in the village of Bois d’Haine, Louise had grown up in 
poverty after the early death of her father: all medical accounts described the privations the 
family had faced, as well as the hard work Louise in particular had undertaken, from caring 
for a crippled neighbour at the age of eight, to entering service at eleven.714 This, it was 
widely believed, had caused the “low” state of Louise’s nervous system, such that 
remarkable physiological changes could occur. Louise was sixteen when she began to exhibit 
stigmata, first bleeding from the side, then the feet and, in a few weeks, the hands as well; 
soon, this was accompanied by ecstatic trances.715 As in many similar investigations of the 
period, including that of Sarah Jacob, the investigation here was prompted by the Church, 
apparently concerned by the excitement provoked by a “miracle” in an uneducated peasant 
girl. The investigator appointed was an alienist from Louvain, Dr Lefebvre, suggesting the 
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existence of the preconceived idea that the symptoms were associated with mental or 
nervous illness. 
 The assumption, as in the Sarah Jacob case, was that Louise’s stigmata were 
evidence of fraud, and such challenges continued to be made throughout the debate; 
Lefebvre stated that his own initial hypothesis had been one of deceit.716 Yet the physician 
quickly changed his mind, through a combination of intuition and experiment. He regarded 
Lateau as reliable and hardworking, and therefore unlikely to resort to deliberate deception; 
what’s more, her lack of education (she could barely read or write) suggested to the doctor 
that Louise would be incapable of deceiving an intelligent, scientific physician: a conclusion 
accepted by many medical commentators in England.717 Lefebvre also found great difficulty 
in reproducing the phenomena Louise exhibited. In a series of what The Lancet thought 
“rather cruel and very unnecessary tests”, Lefebvre applied various caustics to Lateau’s skin, 
yet was unable to create a wound similar to those from which she bled.718  The suggestion 
implicit in these tests was, of course, that the wounds were self-inflicted, and much of the 
medical profession refused to accept Lefebvre’s conclusion that they were not. 
 The case provoked much interest, in Belgium and France, but also across the channel 
in Britain. In France, a pervading anti-clericalism frequently encouraged parallels with 
hysteria. Désiré Bourneville, a supporter of the famous neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot, 
compared Louise to one of Charcot’s hysterical patients who suffered from a similar form of 
bleeding.719 Other writers in the next few decades similarly dismissed the religious context of 
mortification by comparing ancient Saints to modern criminal cases of self-mutilation.720 In 
British responses to the Lateau case, the suggestion of self-inflicted injury was frequently 
explicit. The British Medical Journal, for example, criticised one of Lefebvre’s tests – that of 
securing Louise’s hands in thick leather gloves before the stigmata appeared – by reference 
to a case of self-mutilation treated by Henry Lee, a surgeon at St. George’s Hospital. Lee’s 
patient was an unmarried teenage seamstress, admitted with a discoloured bleeding patch 
on the right leg. Observing “fresh red spots and effusion of blood” each time he saw his 
patient, Lee ordered a sheet of lead to be secured over the skin. He reported: 
                                                 
716
 ibid. See also J.M. Ferdinand, Lefebvre et al. Louise Lateau of Bois d'Haine, her Life, her Ecstasies, 
and her Stigmata: A Medical Study, trans. Charles J. Bowen and E. MacKey, ed. James Spencer 
Northcote (London: London, 1873), p.35. 
717
 Day, "Louise Lateau: a Biological Study", pp. 494-5. 
718
 "Louise Lateau", p. 543. 
719
 Désiré Magloire Bourneville, Science et miracle: Louise Lateau, ou la stigmatisée belge, (Paris, 
1875). 
720
 Ward A. Holden, "Self-Mutilation of the Eyes by an Ancient Saint and a Modern Sinner," 
Proceedings of the Charaka Club, 2, (1906): 55-57. 
194 
 
On the next visit, when the dressings were removed, there were few spots and little 
blood, but the sheet of lead was found to be pierced with holes large enough to 
admit a needle. When asked how this had happened, she was silent, and she was 
discharged as a convicted imposter.721  
 
That a needle could, similarly, have been used by Louise Lateau to perforate her leather 
gloves and injure her hands was the writer’s obvious claim: thus, he remarked, the minute 
points of blood on the girl’s forehead were “probably needle-points” (although he had no 
evidence to prove this). Thus Lee used comparison with proven cases of self-mutilation to 
cast doubt on Lefebvre’s conclusion that, when Louise’s gloves were removed and found to 
be filled with blood, this proved that the stigmata were not self-induced.722 
 Writers in this journal seemingly remained wedded to the thesis of hysterical 
imposture: four years after the initial case was reported, a further suggestion was printed 
(with no reference as to the source) that Lateau “frequently rubs and scratches with her 
nails and with a rough cloth ... and keeps up on these spots, even mechanically during 
sleep.”723 Moreover, a full two decades later, a review of Gould and Pyle’s Anomalies and 
Curiosities of Medicine complained that: “In speaking of “stigmata,” the case of Louise 
Lateau is quoted, but nothing is said of the scientific controversies which make the case 
celebrated in the records of hysterical imposture.”724 Such a firm declaration was made 
despite the fact that, neither in the British Medical Journal nor anywhere else, was it ever 
determined how Louise might be (if indeed she was) inflicting wounds upon herself. This 
certainty that the stigmata were the result of fraud was not, however, shared by writers in 
The Lancet, and publications within psychological medicine also tended to the latter view. 
Although the BMJ was at pains to admit “the great influence of the nervous system upon the 
circulation”,725 their writers insisted that stigmata could not be produced by this effect 
alone. In this respect, they took issue with the explanation posited in The Lancet, which 
ascribed all of Louise Lateau’s symptoms to the effects of the imagination upon the human 
body: 
The general law is quite clear, that the direction of attention upon any part or parts 
of the body may be followed by all manner of nervous and vascular changes; that 
this attention, in order to be effectual, must be automatic and complete; and that it 
most readily becomes so in uneducated persons, who have never gained from 
mental training the power to control the operations of the mind.726 
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This approach was heavily indebted to the mid nineteenth-century physiology explored in 
chapter one, and the article cited W.B. Carpenter as an influence. Thus, we can view the 
emergence of definitions of hysterical self-mutilation as part of an ethos in which, on the 
one hand, volition and self-control and, on the other, brain biology, were emphasised within 
both scientific and popular language. Towards the end of the century, many of these 
concerns were incorporated into the concept of hypnotic blistering: various writers in 
Continental Europe claimed to have produced blisters on the skin of their patients by making 
the suggestion that a burn had been received during hypnosis, an approach that emerged 
from the “self-suggestion” of well-known hysterics like Louis Vivé, who had caused his own 
stigmata.727 These experiments, as we shall see, formed an important backdrop to later 
interest in feigned skin disease, the so-called dermatitis artefacta. 
 Yet physiological and neurological explanations of the connection between mind and 
body held an uneasy status, for critics claimed they failed to allow for the existence of free 
will.728 Evolutionary explanations, such as those described in chapter two, offered a new 
perspective, which allowed volition (characterised as the ability to control the operations of 
the mind) to form one of the “higher” functions, thus lacking in the uneducated, like Louise 
Lateau. This view was emphasised in The Lancet’s physiological explanation while, in the one 
BMJ article that gave the role of imagination a greater emphasis, Louise was described as 
“accustomed from her earliest infancy to the more than frugal regimen of the Hindoos.”729 
Thus, despite the fact that those who had met Lateau invariably described her as 
“unemotional and unimaginative”,730 English and American doctors repeatedly endowed her 
with the impulsive and emotional tendencies attributed to savages. These traits, it was 
believed, were exacerbated by religious teaching. American specialist in mental diseases 
Meredith Clymer insisted that such afflictions were most common in persons “of warm 
imagination, of delicate frame, and of excitable temperament, and who have prepared 
distempered and willing nervous centres by persistent medication of religious matter, 
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together with the discipline of long fastings and general mortification of the flesh.”731 Thus, 
religious belief was, for many doctors, the cause of the strange physiological changes in 
Lateau’s body, just as church commentators might have argued. The major difference 
between the two explanations was that, rather than having been created by a deity (and 
therefore being of mystical significance), for doctors the stigmata were evidence of 
internally-produced pathological change, and thus undesirable. 
 This led some doctors to the conclusion that religious belief itself contradicted the 
laws of health. While some physicians, like Clymer, emphasised the relation of stigmata to 
Catholicism, others suggested that religion might cause self-mutilation in Catholic countries 
(through an emphasis on mortification) and Protestant ones (via the introspective nature of 
religious observance, which led to an excessive focus on the self).732 The Protestant 
perspective was reflected in claims by The Lancet that Lateau’s “reserved temperament” had 
led her to fix her mind so strongly on her religious devotions that stigmata had been the 
result, for, “in her little world, ... [religious devotion had] nothing else to contend [with].”733 
The extreme effect of religious observance upon the body was again asserted in an article 
three years later, when a Dr Richardson reported to the Medical Society of London “that in 
certain ... cases [of stigmata] the influence of the mind upon the heart was quite sufficient to 
excite such an over-action of the circulation as would cause a temporary exudation of 
blood.”734 There were, of course, dissenting voices to this pathologisation of religion. Certain 
alienists, for example, continued to regard religious pursuits as an important element of 
human life. For such writers, religious observance was portrayed as an intellectual, rather 
than an emotional, exercise. In the second edition of Illustrations of the Influence of the 
Mind Upon the Body, Daniel Hack Tuke added the Lateau case to his examples of the 
influence of the intellect on the involuntary muscles (and not, as might have been expected, 
in his far larger section on “the emotions”). Rather than viewing Louise’s uneducated and 
emotional state as responsible for her stigmata, Tuke saw them as evidence of her deep 
devotion and faith. Although he, nonetheless, interpreted the physical change as 
pathological, his report indicates that even among the medical profession, religious faith in 
this period was not always viewed as emotional and irrational, but could instead be 
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regarded as an intellectual exercise, closely associated with the imagination which “stirs, 
through the operation of Sympathy, the whole being to its depths.”735 
 Although differing interpretations of the Louise Lateau case were thus possible, even 
within a medical context, the suggestion that Lateau might have inflicted injuries upon 
herself caused many doctors to form a direct link between cases of stigmata and self-
mutilation, albeit one that was complicated by physiological explanations: even Tuke 
separated “genuine” stigmata from those “caused by mechanical irritation”.736 It was from 
this background that a distinction between intentional and nervous self-injury emerged: a 
physiological model that later became transported into the psychological distinction 
between conscious and unconscious injury. In 1873, a case in California was reported by 
several newspapers, which declared – in a rather tongue-in-cheek manner – that it had been 
discovered that a certain Miss Collins was “herself the author of the stigmata, which she 
produced by a free use of her nails.”737 In the same year, another article in The Lancet 
cemented the link between stigmata and self-mutilation in a report claiming that 
stigmatising had become “a trade”.738 These links were made even by those who regarded 
Louise’s stigmata as the physiological manifestation of hysterical disease, for Lancet writers 
retained their emphasis on the imagination in Louise Lateau’s case. The assumption was that 
only certain types of individuals were susceptible to the direct manifestation of mental 
phenomena on the surface of the body, whether produced consciously or not. These traits 
were often attributed to a hysterical temperament, which increasingly became an accepted 
explanation for self-inflicted injury, in cases regarded as intentional and otherwise.739 Thus, 
while historical accounts of “malingering” have emphasised the importance of intentional 
deception, this tended to be less of an issue in concepts of hysterical self-mutilation. 
 
5.3 Needle Girls: The Foreign Body and the Motiveless Malingerer 
 The highly publicised cases of Sarah Jacob and Louise Lateau encouraged attention 
to self-mutilation in the medical records. The emergence of this interest from the re-
interpretation of religious concerns, as well as contemporary physiological debate over the 
relationship between body and mind, is an important factor often lost in historical 
discussions of malingering, which tend to over-emphasise the role of economic and military 
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concerns. While the concept of malingering was certainly associated with both these 
contexts, as outlined in chapter three, it was also part of medical debate over the way in 
which body and mind functioned, and the relation of volition to health. In 1870, inspired by 
the death of the Welsh Fasting Girl the previous year, the British Medical Journal published a 
series of articles by practitioners on the topic of feigned disease and malingering. An 
editorial remarked that investigation of this topic had hitherto been confined to the 
simulation of disease in order to escape military service. Although this was not strictly the 
case,740 these articles certainly pre-dated any of the economic legislation outlined in chapter 
three. The majority of writers in the 1870s and beyond regarded “motiveless malingering” 
(as the BMJ termed it) as an entirely new topic of medical enquiry.  The very terminology 
used here indicates an important element of the debate. Motiveless malingerers were to be 
distinguished from those in whom the reason for self-inflicted injury was deemed obvious: 
evasion of duty or financial gain. By analogy to such contexts, however, the assumption was 
made that the hysterical patient must have an underlying motive for his or her injury. The 
term “motiveless malingering” was thus adopted for distinction’s sake, while: 
by no means intending to imply that the will ever really acts without motive, but 
merely that in these cases the motive cannot be quoted beforehand as explaining 
the act, but has to be sought after the fact has been established by other means.741 
 
Uncovering this motive, however, was a more complicated task than physical treatment of 
the wounds. 
 Prior to the Lateau and Jacob cases, surgical authors had given little thought to the 
reasons behind their patients’ actions, as indicated in many of the cases collated in Gould 
and Pyle’s Anomalies and Curiosities of Medicine. Within a short section on “self-mutilation”, 
the American doctors drew attention to the practice of so-called “needle girls”. This name 
was, it seems, coined by the authors to play on widespread interest in the afore-mentioned 
“fasting girls” (on whom they also included a section): medical and popular editions were 
published in close proximity. Needle girls, Gould and Pyle stated, exhibited a “peculiar type 
of self-mutilation ... sometimes seen in hysteric persons” of “piercing their flesh with 
numerous needles or pins.”742 The descriptions included focused on the work of the surgical 
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detective, rather than the patient, and any motives deemed to underlie self-inflicted injury 
were incorporated under the broad banner of hysteria, in itself regarded as sufficient 
explanation. In 1862, for example, Ernest Hart, surgeon to the West London Hospital 
reported a case under the telling title “Hysteria: Wilful Self-Infliction of Injury”. Hart 
described a “young girl of good appearance and superior education”, who entered the 
hospital with an abscess of the forefinger. From this abscess, the surgeon removed several 
pieces of needle and, although “no suspicion was then excited as to her peculiar habit ... 
there is little doubt that the needles were wilfully introduced and broken into the flesh.” The 
end of the finger was eventually amputated; however, the patient continued to return 
regularly to the hospital, presenting damage to the stump. As evidence of her fickle, 
manipulative nature, Hart complained that: “At the same time she managed to have several 
of her teeth extracted, and was taking medicine as a physician’s out-patient.” Although his 
patient “energetically” denied producing the symptoms herself, Hart was convinced, and 
solved the problem by sealing the bandages.743 
 In Hart’s analysis, as in other “needle girl” reports, the manipulative patient is clearly 
presented as controlling her situation. Even when she could be regarded as the passive 
recipient of damage inflicted by another – as in the surgical extraction of her teeth – Hart 
describes her as the active subject, “managing” the situation, until she is eventually 
outwitted by the surgeon’s ingenious technical ability and forced to submit to medical cure, 
whereupon her moral management is off-loaded onto her relatives. Other surgeons 
continued to describe patients as “highly neurotic, sly, and deceitful,”744 and some 
concluded that any such case was evidence of “hysterical deception”,745 making self-inflicted 
injury synonymous with deceit. This approach stemmed from the nineteenth century 
concept of the hysterical temperament, defined by such negative character traits.746 
Ultimately, it was the ingenious nature of the protective surgical treatment – or the skill in 
removing foreign bodies – that was of more interest than the patient herself. Meanwhile, 
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any explanations for such acts tended to be rooted in character and situation, and did not 
necessarily offer a diagnosis of nervous illness. 
[M]otiveless malingerers ... are almost invariably of the class of those known as 
“hysterical”. In other words, they are of the female sex, arrived at the age of puberty 
and unmarried. Hysterical in any more definite sense they seldom are; on the 
contrary, those guilty of these tricks have often been previously considered by their 
friends to be of remarkably calm and well-balanced temperament.747 
 
The absence of nervous symptoms or a disposition to deceit caused problems for the 
physician in detecting such forms of malingering. Unlike the male malingerer, who might 
give himself away with his suspicious manner or expression, the only way of uncovering the 
hysterical malingerer was often in the wounds themselves: hence images, like figure 19 
(below), focused on the objects removed, rather than the patient. 
 
Figure 19: Image from Nicoll's 'A Remarkable Case of Persistent Ingestion of Needles'748 
 
 It is thus in the records of general hospitals and specialist nervous institutions, 
rather than asylums, that we find early discussion of hysterical self-mutilation. Surgeons, not 
alienists, wrote most of the papers on the topic of foreign bodies, within which “needle girl” 
texts were subsumed, and it was surgeons who avidly added foreign body specimens to the 
collections of pathology museums.749 Although most surgeons, as has been seen, showed 
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little interest in understanding the behaviour of their patients, the cases were later picked 
up in psychological medicine, and incorporated into the literature on self-mutilation. 
Moreover, a small number of elite practitioners did show some interest in attempting to 
explain the existence of foreign bodies in their publications. I thus explored the surgical case 
notes of the Royal London Hospital, from 1893 (when registers were first introduced, 
allowing “foreign bodies” cases to be easily isolated) until 1910, giving a total of 775 cases. 
This investigation quickly pointed to one discrepancy with the published reports, which 
assumed “needle girls” to be almost invariably female: in fact, more male than female 
patients were admitted to this hospital with foreign bodies (409 compared to 366). Unlike 
the cases treated by Chevalier Jackson in early twentieth century Philadelphia and described 
in Mary Cappello’s fascinating work of literary non-fiction, Swallow, the majority of foreign 
bodies cases admitted to the Royal London Hospital were teenagers or adults, even though 
the Hospital claimed to treat more children annually than “at the largest Children’s Hospital 
in London”.750 This meant that patients certainly could be considered capable of providing 
an explanation of the way in which the foreign body had been ingested or otherwise entered 
the body. Yet patient accounts appear to have been of little interest to most surgeons at the 
Royal London, who rarely took detailed case histories before attempting to remove the 
foreign body. These surgeons, it seems, almost never regarded the swallowing of foreign 
bodies as explicit evidence of “malingering”, and very rarely as a sign of insanity, nervous 
disorder, or other mental disturbance. 
 This makes it difficult to pick out cases that a modern reader might interpret as self-
inflicted injury. Nonetheless, 46 instances most likely to be self-inflicted were extracted from 
the records by including cases in which multiple foreign bodies were removed from the 
same adult; repeat visits by a patient; reference in the notes to mental state; and all objects 
removed from urethra, vagina or rectum. Some of these latter cases were claimed to be – 
and perhaps were – accidental. In others, such as when a tallow candle was removed from 
the bladder of Elizabeth Waller in 1898, it is unclear whether the insertion of the object was 
carried out by the patient or someone else (with Elizabeth’s consent or not), and surgeons 
do not appear to have enquired. While recognising such issues, closer examination of these 
case notes does provide a useful comparison to published material. Fourteen of the cases 
(30%) were male, and most were relatively young (half were under 30, and ninety per cent 
under 40), and predominantly single (72%). This does appear to support the contentions of 
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Gould and Pyle and others that “needle girls” (and, by extension, “hysterics”) were more 
likely to be young, unmarried, and female – although it should nonetheless remind us that 
there were certainly those who injured themselves while fitting none of those criteria.751 
Moreover, the overall numbers are very low, lending little support to the idea that “needle 
girl” phenomena were widespread. Indeed, it was rare for surgeons to draw explicit 
connections between the ingestion and insertion of foreign bodies and insanity, hysteria or 
other nervous disorders. Just one of all 775 foreign bodies cases in this period was referred 
to the Hospital’s physicians as a possible case of hysteria. This was a 66-year-old woman 
who had tried to relieve constipation by inserting a pen-holder into her rectum, which she 
claimed she had been doing for ten years – hardly conforming to the “needle girl” 
stereotype.752 One other patient was suggested to be insane in 1898, a diagnosis that – as 
we shall shortly see – was queried on later admissions.753 
 Overall, surgeons showed little interest in the causes of their patients’ foreign 
bodies. “Foreign Body” was a diagnosis, not an exploration of the patient’s state of mind. 
When Rachel Taylor was admitted in 1900 – after swallowing a pin and a tin tack – and again 
in 1906 having swallowed two nails “the night before last”, it was not even noted whether 
either instance was accidental or intentional.754 Despite published concern over the abuse of 
charitable treatment by malingering, in practice this does not seem to have been a 
significant issue for either surgeons or physicians at the Royal London Hospital; for the 
latter, cases of “artefact injury” were treated without question whether or not the patient 
was receiving free treatment.755 Diagnosis appears to have been the topic of most interest to 
surgeons. Many of the foreign bodies case histories in the London Hospital (after 1896, 
when the X-ray was introduced) concentrate on the use of the “Röntgen Rays” or 
“skiagraph” to locate the object in question. In 1898, for example, little interest was shown 
in the fact that the X-ray images of 38-year-old domestic servant Elizabeth Quaife did not 
tally in the slightest with the history she gave. 756 Elizabeth claimed that she had suffered 
pain in the knee joint ever since a long hat pin had run into her leg while she was sweeping 
under a bed: in hospital, however, five separate needles were discovered in the joint. Unlike 
published cases, the surgeon made no reference to the potential use of X-ray imagery to 
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detect fraud, but instead used the case to evaluate the usefulness of the technique itself.757 
This, it was deemed, had been successful in locating and removing four needles but “the 
fifth needle shewed by the skiagraph was ... not found. It is probable that the figure shewed 
in the skiagraph was due to a shadow of the other needles. This, once more, shews that the 
skiagraph may be deceptive.” 
 There were, however, a minority of surgeons who were interested in explaining the 
presence of foreign bodies. In 1844, elite surgeon Sir Benjamin Collins Brodie published a 
paper on the topic, which included a great deal of discussion of subcutaneous needles, again 
suggesting this to be common. Brodie stated that there were two important points to be 
deciphered in such cases. Although he concentrated primarily on the first of these – the 
techniques for removal – he laid only a little less weight on his second: “how the needles got 
there.”758 Brodie’s interest in psychology (broadly defined by him as the “mutual relations of 
the physical organization and the mental faculties”) appears to have been an unusual one in 
surgery.759 Moreover, his efforts at explaining motives were not particularly subtle: most 
foreign body cases, he remarked disparagingly, occurred through carelessness or 
foolishness, and he dismissed one patient as a “monstrous blockhead”!760 As in the cases 
discussed by Mary Cappello, this emphasis on stupidity and accidental injury is not always 
borne out by the records, where a much wider variety of interpretations appear (including 
self-inflicted wounds and intentional violence by others).761 However, the existence of such 
assumptions led many surgeons to ignore the issue of causation entirely. Even the writer of 
the British Medical Journal article on “motiveless malingerers” did not, it seems, expect to 
find the answer as to why patients “assume their maladies without any ostensible object in 
sight, and often to the destruction, apparently, of their social happiness”.762  
 There are, however, two case histories in the Royal London Hospital Archives in 
which we gain a fuller description of the background to the patient’s injuries: simply because 
both patients returned to the Hospital on a number of occasions. Daniel Prendergast763 was 
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first admitted to the Royal London in November 1906, and returned for further treatment in 
1909 and 1910. Thirty-five years old when first admitted, Daniel claimed a history of fits, 
which had begun in 1900 while he was in South Africa, serving in the Boer War. Invalided 
home in 1901, it appears that the former soldier struggled to make ends meet: his 
prescriptions were stamped “no means” on every visit to the Hospital and, by 1909, he was 
recorded to be homeless. Perhaps this provoked scepticism over his shifting story: his 
reports to have “fallen among needles” are invariably reproduced in inverted commas. In 
1906, Daniel claimed that he had had a fit while holding a packet of needles and “got some 
needles into himself”, an explanation Brodie, at least, would have dismissed, for “[i]t is 
ridiculous to suppose that a paper of needles could run in by themselves”.764 Two needles 
were discovered in the patient’s thigh via a radiograph, although an operation failed to 
locate and remove them. Initially claiming the needles had entered only his hand and leg, 
when he returned to the Hospital in 1909, Daniel reportedly said that he had “[g]ot some 
into back, got some into legs, got some into left arm.” Since his first visit to the Royal 
London, the patient had had needles removed at Birmingham, Guy’s, Fleetwood and Pipton 
Hospitals.765 
 Had he been female, it seems posible that Daniel would have been regarded as 
hysterical. However, although male hysteria was a topic of some discussion during the 
nineteenth century, it was rarely emphasised in medical reports.766 This is apparent in the 
varying way in which patients were diagnosed at the Royal London Hospital, depending on 
gender. Figures 20 and 21 show the differing diagnoses of male and female patients. We can 
see that far higher numbers of male patients were deemed to be suffering from “mental 
diseases” (i.e. insanity) than from so-called “nervous diseases” (hysteria and 
hypochondriasis): this pattern is reversed in female patients.767 What’s more, the higher 
number of male “malingerers” includes some patients diagnosed with nervous symptoms. In 
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1904, for example, of the 11 male “malingerers” at the Royal London Hospital, two were 
cases of “hysterical vomiting” and one had “hypochondriasis”: both of which could have 
been incorporated under nervous disorders (as they always were in women). 
 
Figure 20: Graph showing diagnoses of male medical patients at the Royal London 
Hospital, 1893 - 1910 
 
Figure 21: Graph showing diagnoses of female medical patients at the Royal London 
Hospital, 1893 - 1910 
Thus, it may well have been because he did not fit the “needle girl” profile that it was never 
explicitly suggested that Daniel Prendergast was intentionally inserting needles into his 
body. Either way, his story is a tragic one. Over the years, Daniel suffered repeated 
operations to remove twenty-seven needles. In 1905, his front teeth and a portion of his 
tongue were removed after he had bitten it during a fit while in 1909, the extent of his 
operations (which had several times required skin grafts) led to the amputation of his left 
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arm. Small wonder that the doctors regularly found the “thin and haggard” man “in very 
poor spirits.”768 We will never know whether Daniel Prendergast’s experiences were a tragic 
consequence of epilepsy, a desperate effort by a homeless and friendless ex-soldier to put a 
roof over his head, or the result of mental imbalance. Either way, his case indicates the 
importance of the charitable hospital system to many impoverished individuals in a pre-
welfare state, as well as the potentially devastating consequences of repeated medical 
intervention. 
 Like Daniel, Beatrice Alliston had a number of foreign bodies removed at the Royal 
London and other hospitals. Beatrice, however, readily admitted that she had intentionally 
inserted hairpins into her bladder. Between 1898 and 1909, Beatrice was admitted into the 
Hospital on four occasions, and it was noted on her first admission, then aged 24, that she 
“[h]as had foreign bodies removed thrice before.”769 Initially a waitress and later a milliner 
by trade, Beatrice appears to have been fairly educated: her letters, it was claimed, are “very 
skilfully done”.770 In 1898, the motive for the patient’s injury was regarded as obvious. 
Beatrice was the patient previously alluded to as insane: she is as “[m]ad as a hatter (Sister 
Mary says so)”!771 This diagnosis was presumably made on the basis that she admitted 
intentionally inserting a curling pin and doubled-up hairpin into her bladder. Nonetheless, 
Beatrice was discharged cured without being referred to a hospital physician or an asylum 
and, when readmitted in 1906, absolutely no reference was made to her mental state. 
Again, the hairpin was extracted and she was discharged: the rapid solution of a surgical 
puzzle evident in museum specimens, where more interest is often shown in the way in 
which the foreign body has been transformed by its journey than the patient’s experience of 
it. The below photograph, of a specimen from St Bartholomew’s Hospital Pathology 
Museum, shows a hairpin retained after its removal in 1882, because a calculus had formed 
around it while it had been in the bladder of a seventeen-year-old girl. 
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Figure 22: Photograph of hairpin, removed from a patient’s bladder in 1882, in the St 
Bartholomew’s Hospital Pathology Collection 
In 1909, Beatrice’s case was described more extensively. Hinting in moralistic tones at 
malingering, following the statement that no symptoms of insanity had been observed, it 
was noted that “[t]his patient writes letters describing her case & purposely to be seen by a 
medical man. Once admitted & the hair pin is removed she will make full confession & 
solemn promises not to do it again.” Since it had already been indicated that she returned 
repeatedly, this note suggests the patient to be deceitful. Yet the description does not end 
here, for Beatrice was candid now that she was being asked about her behaviour. She 
informed the surgeons: 
that she formerly suffered from an impulse to throw herself out [of] windows & 
once did it. Many years ago however she gave this up for the now harmless 
amusement of putting hairpins into her bladder. She was quite willing to discuss her 
mental state, says she has no other peculiarities and that the introduction of the 
hairpin has no relation to sexual feelings.772 
 
This slightly odd explanation appears to have perturbed Beatrice Alliston’s surgeons, located 
as it was somewhere between the rational and the irrational (inserting hairpins did indeed 
seem less dangerous than falling from a height: but why might she need to do either?). The 
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next time Beatrice appeared in the Receiving Room (about a month later), she was told she 
would not be admitted, and an offer was made (seemingly punitively) to remove the pin 
immediately, without anaesthetic. The patient refused and was sent away, seemingly lost to 
the medical record. 
 Again, it is impossible to draw any conclusions as to the psychological factors 
underlying Beatrice Alliston’s peculiar “harmless amusement”. What we can state, however, 
is that this record serves as a rare occurrence of surgical interest into the reasons behind 
self-inflicted injuries. In later decades, such cases led surgeons to suggest that the story of 
the foreign body offered “a wide field for the study of human nature”.773 In 1909, however, 
the association of exploration of Beatrice’s mental state with complaints about her failure to 
keep her word suggests that interest in her psychology was bound up in notions that the 
behaviour of the female (hysterical) patient was rooted in a “peculiar perversion of mind” 
for, as Brodie explained of needle girls, “[w]e know that hysterical women cheat in all 
manner of ways”.774 Such concerns coloured much of the debate around hysterical 
mutilation, and were further complicated by the difficulty of drawing a line between hysteria 
and feigned illness, even in psychological texts. In the index of his 1905 textbook, Bethlem 
physician Maurice Craig linked self-mutilation directly with hysteria.775 Yet his remarks were 
off-hand and vague: 
Suicide is often threatened, but rarely attempted On the other hand, hysterical 
individuals not uncommonly inflict injuries upon themselves, probably from a desire 
to obtain the sympathy of others.776 
 
Craig, like his colleagues at Bethlem, was a lecturer in psychological medicine and, soon after 
the publication of his textbook, left the hospital to go into private practice. Like George 
Savage and Theo Hyslop, Craig was consulted by Virginia and Leonard Woolf, and was widely 
known as an elite practitioner specialising in the treatment of nervous diseases, including 
hysteria.777 Yet, even though his textbook began with a chapter on normal psychology, and a 
declaration that “sanity and insanity are both relative terms”, Craig’s comments on 
hysterical self-mutilation paid little attention to explaining or understanding the 
behaviour.778 He simply declared that it existed, and gave a “probable” explanation, 
couched, like those above, in preconceptions about the nature of the hysterical patient. 
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 In retrospect, we might well find the absence of much interest in why patients 
presented with swallowed or otherwise inserted foreign bodies surprising: particularly given 
the keen attention to the relation of mind and body within purported religious phenomena. 
Yet, although attention to Lateau and Jacob appears to have encouraged speculation about 
so-called needle girls, the latter cases were generally presented in a purely surgical context. 
For the surgeon, dealing with the immediate bodily problem was the concern, after which 
the patient could be discharged as cured. The separation between medical and surgical 
cases in the Royal London Hospital exacerbated this divide, and it was relatively rare for 
patients to pass from surgeon to physician and vice versa. For many of these surgeons, 
claims that their patients were hysterical seem to have been used simply to explain the 
difficulty in curing the immediate problem. Indeed, such an approach might also be taken by 
alienists, like Maurice Craig, who regarded the injuries themselves as outside their field of 
practice. Nonetheless, there are certain hints at a wider puzzle in some of the cases 
discussed. The example of Beatrice Alliston in particular indicates a growing belief that the 
question as to “why?” could not necessarily be answered by the patient, and solutions 
instead needed to be sought elsewhere. For certain physicians and alienists, if not 
necessarily surgeons, the concept of the unconscious became an increasingly popular 
response to this problem. This is most apparent in the treatment of so-called dermatitis 
artefacta. 
  
5.4 The Psyche on the Skin: From Motiveless to Unconscious Malingering 
 In 1937, London dermatologist Henry MacCormac reviewed approaches to self-
inflicted skin damage over the previous four decades. He suggested that “autophytic 
dermatitis” (more commonly called dermatitis artefacta or dermatitis factitia) was “by no 
means a modern phenomenon” although he nonetheless felt that “the strain and increasing 
effort which characterize present conditions have very clearly increased its incidence” - a 
frequent claim about self-inflicted injury throughout the twentieth century.779 MacCormac 
divided patients into four groups: Hysterical, Malingering, Mischief (predominantly 
attributed to children) and “Phantom Dermatoses” (this last was a patient’s belief that a 
complaint was more extensive than the doctor perceived it to be). However, he spent far 
longer exploring the first class than the other three, in which, he claimed, investigation was 
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relatively easy. “Hysterics” – whom he regarded as exhibiting both intentional and 
unintentional (“unconscious”) injuries – were a far more complicated issue.   
Recognition and disclosure of the true state of affairs, far from bringing the matter 
to an end, in most cases only raises new and perplexing problems … for these 
eruptive processes are not skin diseases as ordinarily understood, except in the 
malingering class, but rather a reflection upon the skin of a disordered condition of 
the mind.780  
 
Unlike the surgeons of the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Royal London 
Hospital, who regarded a case as closed once physical damage to a patient had been 
repaired, this opened up an entirely new realm, whereby physical and mental cure were no 
longer one and the same thing. Such a claim about the nature of self-inflicted lesions was by 
no means the only or most obvious one. Indeed, even within the context of asylum 
psychiatry, self-inflicted injury was not necessarily regarded as indicative of a patient’s state 
of mind. Nonetheless, this suggestion formed an increasingly popular means of 
understanding self-inflicted skin lesions in hysterical patients in the early twentieth century. 
 Many cases of dermatitis artefacta were collected by Frederick Parkes Weber, 
whose extensive papers are held in the Wellcome Library. Born in 1863, Frederick was the 
son of Sir Hermann Weber, a German who had moved to London and trained in medicine. 
Frederick followed his father into medical practice, training at St Bartholomew’s Hospital 
and, in 1894, gaining a post his father had also previously held as physician to the German 
Hospital in Dalston. Rather than separating material written by himself and others, much of 
Weber’s collection is organised by subject. These topics grew up around his own writings 
and interests, each bundle headed by a lengthy description, which often appears to have 
been added to over the years.781 The collections thus span much of Weber’s career: his 
folder on self-mutilation includes newspaper and journal cuttings, case histories and other 
handwritten notes spanning the period 1894 – 1956. Self-mutilation did not form Weber’s 
only or main interest: the folder is just one of 360 “subject collections” in his papers. What’s 
more, like much of the nineteenth-century literature on self-mutilation already discussed, 
the collection was extremely broad. Weber’s full title incorporates: 
Self-Mutilations for various purposes, Needle-swallowing &c. Hysterical Malingering, 
and Simulation or Aggravation of Symptoms without Hysteria. Psychasthenia and 
Morbid Impulsions, “Relief” or “Release” Phenomena of various classes, Dipsomania, 
Sitomania, Geophagia, Trichotillomania &c. Supposed Hysterical Skin-Eruptions, 
Hysterical Skin-Gangrene, &c. Skin eruptions and physical (bodily) changes of psychic 
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origin. Also the subject of “foreign bodies” (for comparison). Rejuvenation 
operations and the question of the illegality of self-mutilation (Italy). Symptoms in 
skin, subcutaneous tissue, lungs &c. from mineral oils – “Siphoid pneumonia” from 
mineral and other oils. Male and female infibulation, “circumcision” &c. (for 
comparison).782 
 
This broad array of references to self-inflicted injury and comparative cases (in which 
physical damage was either caused by others or thought due to the influence of the mind 
upon the body) indicates a far wider field than that covered by self-harm today. 
 Unlike the published material by alienists, which, as we have seen, tended to 
concentrate on major mutilations (however rarely such acts were, in fact, witnessed in 
asylums), the Weber archive includes a greater proportion of “minor” mutilations, in both 
dermatological publications and his own notes. When cases “for comparison” in which no 
self-inflicted injury occurred are removed from the list, we can see in Figure 23 (below) that 
the bulk of Weber’s notes deal with foreign bodies, trichotillomania,783 and – most 
prominently and dating back earliest – dermatitis artefacta.784 
 
 
Figure 23: Graph showing the relative occurrence of different types of self-mutilation in 
the Parkes Weber Collection, c. 1894 – 1956 
So, what was dermatitis artefacta, and why do these cases dominate Weber’s collection? 
The diagnosis appears to have emerged from the same debate that saw the collation of 
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needle girl cases. Of the papers on “motiveless malingerers” published in the British Medical 
Journal in 1870, three dealt with “feigned or hysterical diseases of the skin”. 785 Similar 
examples appear in dermatology textbooks and, at the end of the century, this form of self-
inflicted injury was the only one to receive a special entry in Allbutt’s System of Medicine.786  
Some physicians claimed that cases “were nearly always of the nature of mechanical or 
chemical irritation of the skin”, although others considered that lesions might appear 
spontaneously through a condition of mental distress: the effect of a peculiarly delicate 
state of both skin and imagination in neurotics.787 
 Indeed, even in 1936, the spontaneous emergence of skin lesions remained a 
consideration, as Holger Haxthausen noted in an article on “The Pathogenesis of Hysterical 
Skin-Affections”: 
Even if the possibility be conceded that cutaneous affections of such “endogenous” 
causation may occur in hysteria, there is, however, no doubt that by far the majority 
of hysterical lesions of the skin are of external traumatic origin and belong to the 
group appropriately labelled pathomimia.788  
 
Haxthausen’s emphasis here indicates that self-inflicted injury was strongly regarded as the 
most likely cause of unusual skin lesions by the 1930s. In tests similar to those The Lancet 
had called cruel in the Lateau case some 65 years earlier, Haxthausen tried six different 
irritants on the skin of his patients, claiming that in no instance was a different result 
obtained from that which would have occurred in the skin of normal persons (although he 
does not record how he verified this). In conclusion, he drew attention to a suggestion that 
had been regularly made throughout the literature on hysteria since the mid nineteenth 
century: “The intensity however with which the traumatization is conducted may be 
dependent perhaps upon the hyp- or analgesia so frequently to be noted in these 
patients.”789 This association of self-inflicted injury with cutaneous anaesthesia was a 
common assertion, although it had been discarded by many by the early twentieth century, 
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who claimed that anaesthesia was not as frequent a symptom of hysteria as had been 
previously claimed.790 
 The diagnosis of dermatitis artefacta produced two major topics of discussion 
among dermatologists. As with surgeons, the first issue was how to discover that lesions had 
been self-inflicted. Doctors pointed to the need for discovering the agent used, or surprising 
the patient in the act. However, the methods employed might be more ingenious. James 
Galloway claimed that lesions could be “interpreted readily”, preventing the need for relying 
on the character, mental condition and articulacy of the patient. Thus, lesions inflicted by a 
right-handed individual would be commonly found on the left side and in areas readily 
accessible. Sometimes they might display a pattern “as if the irritant had been applied by a 
bandage, or, conversely, had been used where the skin was left uncovered”; they might 
show the marks of nails or other instruments used. A fluid irritant might evidence spots or 
streaks where the liquid had dripped during application, as suggested in the diagram below, 
published by John Collie in 1916.791 
 
Figure 25: Diagram showing the pattern of a self-inflicted chemical burn792 
This image, Collie claimed, showed the “typical trickle tail” pattern produced in self-inflicted 
chemical burns, where the caustic substance had run after being deliberately placed on the 
flesh. Collie himself had little interest in the many “physiological and psychological reasons 
... why reasonable sane girls are found wilfully to produce troublesome, irritating diseases”, 
although he was sure that reasons existed.793 The very tone of this statement indicates his 
overall concern: putting a stop to the trouble and irritation caused by such patients, 
generally by proving that a wound had been self-inflicted. Unlike more general texts on 
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malingering, Collie laid little emphasis on examining the patient’s manner and expression to 
uncover deception. This was likely due to the belief that the hysteric was capable of 
manipulating everyone around her, including her doctors, and thus the only clue as to the 
“real” nature of the injury was in the wound itself.794 Others claimed that even the patient 
might be unaware that the injuries were self-inflicted, meaning that attention to her wounds 
might be the only way of uncovering the artefact. 
 Indeed, “artefact” injuries were often treated in a very similar manner to other 
medical cases. Physicians concentrated on healing the wounds and, even when they 
instituted measures to prevent the patient from continuing to injure herself, this rarely 
seemed to involve confronting the patient directly. In 1905, twenty-nine-year-old 
dressmaker Esther Harwood was admitted to the Royal London Hospital under Dr F.J. Smith 
for possible “Congenital Aphasia of Aorta”. Her case was quickly re-evaluated as “Factitious 
ulcers of leg & Hys etc”. The order of the diagnosis indicates that while hysteria was 
considered to be an accompaniment of the factitious wounds, the ulcers themselves were 
the main focus of treatment. It seems to have been the number of times Esther had been 
admitted to the Hospital that aroused suspicion, as well as the shape of the ulcers 
themselves – oval, with “edges sharply punched out”.795 Following her previous discharge in 
June 1904, Esther had been under more or less continual medical treatment, having spent 
four months at St Thomas’ Hospital, followed by a period in a convalescent home. This time, 
her leg was put into plaster, a common technique to prevent a patient interfering with an 
injury, and it quickly healed. Esther was discharged on 11th May, after exactly a month in the 
Hospital: at no point in the case notes is it indicated that Smith or his deputies confronted 
her with the suspicion that her wounds were self-inflicted, and it seems entirely possible 
that this was never mentioned.796 
 Even patients suspected of malingering were often, as at Queen Square, treated as 
medical cases. When fifteen-year-old servant Rose Liddiard was admitted in September 
1907, it was noted that “Dr Linnell of Poplar says that she is a fraud as she is able to dance & 
sing in the wards. When leaving Poplar she is said to have been heard to affirm "Well it 
doesn't matter they will take me at the London."” Indeed they did and, although a querying 
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note on her case file suggests “?Malingerer” and that the “oedema of legs” might be 
“?artificial”, Rose was nonetheless diagnosed with Hysteria and remained at the Royal 
London for seventeen days. Her treatment was similar to other cases: diet, rest, and various 
medications (including Bromide, Strychnine and Magnesium Sulphate), as well as the 
application of the battery to her legs, a method commonly used at Queen Square.797 Rose’s 
case, stamped “free – no means”, also indicates that although malingering in published 
reports frequently held a class dimension, this is less obvious in practice. Published reports 
by those concerned about insurance fraud often judged working class patients more harshly 
than middle class hysterics as the former were regarded to have something more obvious to 
gain (charitable aid). Although we cannot judge how many patients who presented at the 
Royal London with injuries thought to be feigned were not admitted (or treated as out-
patients, records for which do not survive), the fact that some were – and were treated even 
after their deception was uncovered – suggests that, in practice, working class patients with 
artefact injuries often received medical treatment. 
 In neither of these cases were attempts were made to provide a psychological 
explanation for the “deceitful” actions or nature of the malingerer. However, new 
psychological theories emerging on the continent appear to have been attractive to many 
dermatologists. There appear to be several reasons for the existence of this interest. First, 
the profession at this time was small but well-organised, particularly in London. A regular 
group, including Parkes Weber and MacCormac, among others mentioned, attended 
meetings of the Royal Society of Medicine Dermatology Section, where they discussed 
puzzling cases, including those of artificial dermatitis. In addition, these specialists frequently 
had difficult cases referred to them, which had been unsuccessfully treated by a variety of 
general and other practitioners: a number of these patients were subsequently diagnosed 
with dermatitis artefacta. Finally, there was a large body of literature on the connection 
between mind and body in skin diseases, frequently considered to be caused or exacerbated 
by mental conditions. Indeed, the interest in dermatitis artefacta seems to have arisen from 
this field, for many of the early writings focused on the topic discussed by Haxthausen, 
above, that neurotic patients might suffer a peculiarly sensitive skin that was easily 
damaged. Thus, dermatologists were often particularly interested in new psychological 
theories of hysteria. 
 While interest in the physical symptoms of dermatitis certainly continued, two 
important (and inter-connected) ideas which emerged from this approach to hysteria came 
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to be associated with self-inflicted injury in Britain. First was the suggestion that self-
mutilation might be performed “unconsciously”, so that the patient himself was not actually 
aware that he had done it. As we have seen in chapter three, these notions were firmly 
rooted in new psychological explanations for behaviour that attributed an important role to 
mental stimuli and contexts of which the patient was unaware. Today, this is most 
frequently attributed to Freudian psychoanalysis: however, it was in the psychotherapeutic 
approach of Pierre Janet that the connection of unconscious states to self-inflicted injury as 
explicitly made by British practitioners.798 Debate increased in the early twentieth century in 
relation to malingering, when it became assumed that this involved “conscious” simulation 
of illness, while the feigned element in hysteria was its counterpart in the “unconscious”. 
These concerns later became bound up in discussion of war neuroses during the First World 
War, a topic which has been extensively covered by Joanna Bourke, so will not be further 
explored here.799 I would like, however, to make the important point that psychological 
approaches to hysteria and self-inflicted injury in England certainly pre-dated the First World 
War, destabilising the position of the war as a watershed in British psychiatry and 
psychology.800 I will concentrate, however, on the second, closely related, implication of the 
use of Janet’s model of psychasthenia (obsessional behaviour) in hysterical self-injury: the 
concept of double personality.  
 This notion (variously called “double consciousness” or “multiple personality”) was 
explored within British psychiatry in chapter three. The idea that dermatitis artefacta was 
associated with “double personality” was promoted in England by dermatologist George 
Pernet.  Born in London, Pernet was educated in Bonn, Edinburgh and Paris, and received his 
M.D. from the University of Paris in 1908, where he was no doubt exposed to French 
teaching on hysteria: he had certainly read Janet’s dissertation, L’automatisme 
psychologique.801 An early member of the Dermatological Society of London, Pernet showed 
a number of cases of “dermatitis factitia”, and assisted others in the diagnoses of such 
cases.802 By 1909, he claimed to have been interested in “the psychological aspect of 
dermatitis factitia” for “a good many years.” Invited to speak at a meeting of the American 
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Dermatological Association, Pernet indicated the difficulty of untangling the underlying 
motive in such cases. His solution was to look to contemporary research on hysteria and 
unconscious acts, citing, in particular, Janet on multiple personality and the related concept 
of dissociation as taken up by Morton Prince and others.803 While a number of the physicians 
in the discussion following disagreed with such an interpretation, preferring to view their 
patients as manipulative, others accepted it whole-heartedly. The attribution of multiple 
personality in such cases accounted for the failure of many physicians to secure confessions 
from their patients, and the hostility of patients and their families to a diagnosis of artefact. 
A hysterical patient, it was suggested, might not be aware that her wounds were self-
inflicted and “should be looked upon as mentally rather than physically ill. They mutilated 
themselves because they could not help it.”804 Rather than being “motiveless”, such cases of 
malingering were now deemed to be unconscious: it was assumed that a motive existed, but 
was hidden from both patient and doctor. 
 Thus, when Pernet presented several cases of dermatitis artefacta to the 
Dermatological Section of the Royal Society of Medicine in 1915, much debate focused on 
the “mysterious mental element in these cases.”805 A Mr Samuel suggested a Freudian 
interpretation, based on the view that self-mutilation provided evidence of mental 
repression. From such a perspective, self-inflicted skin lesions could be regarded as a 
conversion hysteria: the alteration of an idea into physical stigmata. Samuel recommended 
treatment with psycho-analysis or hypnosis: if the acts themselves were unconscious, 
treatment needed to access the patient’s unconscious mind.806 Pernet himself was in broad 
agreement with this psychological interpretation, although he (like many dermatologists and 
alienists) preferred a Janetian explanation to “Freudism”. He again suggested “that in some 
of these cases there was perhaps an alternation of personality”, a contention that appears 
to have been more attractive to many of his colleagues than the Freudian interpretation put 
forward by Samuel. Frederick Parkes Weber agreed, suggesting that: 
of all diseases related to disorders of the psychical system, artificial eruptions in 
young women most deserve ... study from the psychical point of view, and it would 
have been a great advantage if the followers of Freud’s teaching had concentrated 
upon this subject much of their psycho-analytic investigations.807  
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Ten years later, Weber was still grappling with the notion of double personality when a case 
was reported to the Royal Society of Medicine by S.E. Dore. Dore’s patient, a 19-year-old girl 
with linear excoriations on her arms, had been under his treatment for five months. 
Confused by the case, Dore sent the girl to Dr Stoddart at St Thomas’s Hospital. Stoddart, a 
former medical officer at Bethlem: 
said that the case was one of dual personality, and that the patient was unaware 
that she produced the lesions herself. Dr. Pernet had mentioned the association of 
dual personality and artefact, but this is the first case which I have seen in which the 
diagnosis had been definitely made by an alienist.808 
 
Many of Dore’s audience seemed struck by this diagnosis, as well as the prospect of 
collaborating with psychiatrists. The president, Dr J.H. Sequeira, “said that many cases of the 
kind showed mental stigmata, and ... [he] frequently raised the question in his department 
as to whether such cases should not be sent to the mental specialist rather than to the 
dermatologist”.809 Pernet, Weber, Sequeira, Dore and MacCormac (some of the most active 
contributors to the Dermatology section of the RSM during this period) all strongly 
supported this connection between double personality and self-inflicted skin lesions, 
indicating that patients were “unconscious” of the lesions they produced. But what 
implications did this model have for the treatment of patients? Or, indeed, more broadly for 
medical theories in England? These questions can be answered through a close analysis of 
the changing views of Frederick Parkes Weber himself. 
 
5.5 Self-Mutilation and Mutilating Operations: Psychological Views of Hysteria 
 In 1943, Weber and his colleague Dr Schwarz discussed what they considered to be 
hysterical symptoms in women due to an unhappy marriage. Schwarz had related the story 
of a consultation he had in 1910, with a young woman whose puzzling abdominal symptoms 
had been operated on three times without any obvious benefit. Weber transcribed the 
story: 
Suddenly the patient disappeared from England – she had run away with a man, 
deserting her husband and children. Twenty-two years afterwards Dr. Schwarz met 
her in a London hotel, and she asked him whether he thought badly of her. He 
answered that he did so 22 years ago, but later experience had modified his views 
and now he thought otherwise than he did then. This critical incident in the patient’s 
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life had apparently completely cured her of her abdominal complaint! – and Dr. 
Schwarz [and I] think the case a typical one.810 
 
What had changed in the intervening period, to shift Schwarz’s view of the patient’s actions 
from unjustified (a moral condemnation of her abandoning her family) to justified (having 
directly cured her illness)? We have already seen some signs of the emergence, in the late 
nineteenth century, of a perceived connection between organic conditions – including self-
inflicted injury – and the inner life of the individual. This became still more apparent in the 
early twentieth century, when the topic of “dermatitis artefacta” became the centre of 
debate.  
 In such examples, mental and physical symptoms are hard to distinguish, the mind 
and body being regarded as part of an inter-connected system. This difficulty is particularly 
evident in Janet’s main work on self-mutilation. “On the Pathogenesis of Some Impulsions”, 
published in 1906, recorded observations of patients exhibiting “certain useless, bizarre and 
even dangerous acts”, which they found extremely difficult to resist. Janet was a pupil of 
Jean-Martin Charcot, and his efforts to find “a psychological unity in these diverse 
phenomena” may well have stemmed from the influence of his tutor.811 Charcot himself, 
however, does not appear to have had any particular interest in self-injury, a topic absent 
from his clinical lectures. Like the British surgeons referred to earlier, the French neurologist 
instead emphasised the simulation and “desire to deceive” in hysterical cases, and it is 
probable that he saw self-mutilation as evidence of this trait.812 Janet certainly regarded 
himself as departing from the thoughts of his teacher who, he felt, had laid far too much 
emphasis on the role of anaesthesia in hysteria. Anaesthesia, Janet declared, was not 
causational but only held diagnostic relevance, a shift in view that was important for 
regarding self-inflicted injury as holding meaning other than a response to a lack of physical 
sensation.813 Rather than a physical basis for the acts, Janet’s explanations for self-inflicted 
injury increasingly focused on mental phenomena: what’s more, those that were outside the 
conscious control of the individual.814   
 In his earlier works, Janet had described two cases of self-inflicted injury as “tics”. In 
1898, he reported the case of a ten-year-old girl who was dominated by an idée fixe, under 
which she tore at her skin, despite showing every sign of intelligence and possessing a 
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normal degree of cutaneous sensation.815 Five years later, he connected such tics with 
psychasthenia, through the example of a young girl who pulled out her hair to such an 
extent that she was required to wear a wig, suggesting that a state of nervous malaise 
prevented patients from resisting ideas of self-injury.816 By 1906, self-inflicted injury appears 
to have achieved greater prominence in Janet’s framework for understanding imperative 
ideas: the former examples are simply two among hundreds of case studies judged to suffer 
psychasthenic symptoms. In 1906, however, he described a young girl of twenty, Ne., who 
“cannot stop herself from burning her hands and feet; her pleasure, when she is alone, 
consists in taking a kettle of boiling water, and pouring it, drop by drop, on the skin of her 
extremities.” The gratification of impulse here, for Janet, produced pleasure for the patient, 
even when it also caused pain, thus requiring the rejection of a simplistic physical model of 
self-inflicted injury. This Janet made explicit by directly refuting the explanation he thought 
likely to be made by his contemporaries: 
We have here, you will say, an insane person who has a mystical delirium and who is 
anaesthetic. By no means; she is a young girl, intelligent and instructed, who is not 
at all delirious, at least when she is being examined, and who has preserved all her 
sensibilities. 
 
Ne., then, could not be regarded as insane – or even necessarily hysterical – and the physical 
symptoms of hysteria (including cutaneous anaesthesia) could not be used to explain her 
injuries. 
 Janet regarded the physical pain felt by the patient as a secondary result of her 
injuries: the gratification of impulse was the primary reason for Ne.’s self-mutilation. But 
from whence did the impulse spring? The French doctor associated various forms of impulse 
– including obsessions with food, walking, alcohol and self-mutilation – with mental 
depression, which, he claimed, produced a feeling of incompleteness for the patient and 
could only be broken by exciting acts. He illustrated this with several lengthy accounts from 
Ne.’s letters, seemingly impressed with her insight which, nonetheless, had not cured her 
condition. Ne. apparently declared that her state of depression made mental effort difficult 
for her, and thus she could only obtain pleasure from the impact of physical change on her 
body, which she described as “awakening” her and giving her a sensation of control and 
independence. Finally, she was reported as having written: 
Why do you speak of my desire for mortification? It is my parents who believe that, 
but it is absurd. It would be a mortification if it brought only suffering, but I enjoy 
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this suffering; it gives me back my mind; it prevents my thoughts from stopping; 
what would not one do to attain such happiness?817 
 
For Ne, it seems, self-mutilation was both a physical and a mental therapy for her 
unpleasant state. Janet himself laid greater emphasis on the mental aspect of her 
symptoms. Since he regarded her self-inflicted wounds as pathological, and her underlying 
illness as mental, this supported the contention that any physical intervention into her 
condition must constitute improper treatment. 
 Indeed, artefact injury did often result in serious surgical intervention, as we have 
already seen in the case of Daniel Prendergast. In 1908, Georges Dieulafoy, professor of 
pathology at the Hôtel-Dieu de Paris, gave a lengthy report of an unusual case.818 Dieulafoy’s 
patient was “un garçon” of thirty, who had suffered from a gangrenous affection of the skin 
for two and a half years. He had consulted numerous doctors and surgeons before ending up 
at the Hôtel-Dieu. On one occasion, the patient had even agreed to have most of his arm 
amputated, and had contemplated further operations. Despite this drastic treatment, 
Dieulafoy came to the conclusion that the man’s injuries were self-inflicted. In order to 
prove this diagnosis, he had portions of the skin tested for the presence of corrosive 
substances and, when these tests proved positive, arranged a confrontation with the patient 
with the assistance of his employer. The patient’s confession was, it claimed, eventually 
secured when Dieulafoy assured him that he would not be regarded as responsible for his 
actions, which were the result of a morbid mental state, but that if he persisted in the 
deception now that it had been discovered he would become a dishonest man. This call to 
honour – whereby patients were considered deceitful only once an “unconscious” process 
had been revealed – appears to have been common in this period. Even in those diagnosed 
as mentally ill, doctors often expected patients to give – and keep – their word that they 
would not injure themselves.819  Apparently shocked, Dieulafoy’s patient readily agreed, 
stating that he had been compelled to create the wounds just as a morphinomaniac was 
compelled to inject morphine. 
I was, he said, dominated by a fixed idea, of which I could not rid myself. I allowed 
my arm to be amputated, and I well believe that one day would come when, in order 
to continue the deception, I would have allowed the amputation of my leg.820 
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Unlike Janet’s cases, Dieulafoy claimed his patient easily cured: all that was needed was for 
the doctor to reveal the true nature of the wounds, and the patient recovered. Thus, the 
Standard’s correspondent in Paris regarded the case as “A Medical Puzzle Solved”.821 
 Other doctors, however, were beginning to doubt that cure was so easy, and 
suggesting that lengthy psychotherapy was instead required, to reveal the unconscious roots 
of the patient’s need to injure him or herself. By the 1920s, Weber began to refer many such 
patients for psychotherapeutic treatment. This allowed the general practitioner to absolve 
himself of responsibility for his patient, who instead, became “a psychological problem”.822  
Although there were few places in early twentieth-century Britain where such treatment 
might occur, this did not prevent some doctors looking for other sources of emotional 
support for their patients: sympathetic family members and nurses were both thought to be 
well placed to discuss “troubles” with a patient.823 What’s more, physicians began to show 
an increased interest in the outcome of hospital treatment. In 1925, Henry MacCormac 
found himself embarrassed by a student’s innocent question as to what ultimately 
happened to patients presenting with self-inflicted lesions. Accordingly, he set about a 
follow-up study. The dermatologist wrote to all patients treated for artificial dermatitis 
during the years 1913 – 25. The small number of patients (just ten cases in twelve years) 
once again reminds us that it was not self-evident that dermatitis artefacta should be a topic 
of interest to physicians. MacCormac’s patients were all unmarried women, the majority 
between the ages of 17 and 26, and half showed signs of hysteria “such as anaesthesia of 
the palate and patchy anaesthesia and numbness of the skin.”824 Of course, as indicated 
previously, the extraction of “genuine hysterical eruptions” (which MacCormac claimed had 
been his criteria for this study) from those patients deemed to have self-inflicted injuries 
was frequently made along lines of gender and age; a male patient was more likely to be 
viewed as either a malingerer or suffering a “true” dermatitis. The division of malingering 
into hysterical and unconscious on the one hand, and conscious and manipulative on the 
other was thus very often made along gender lines.825 
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 MacCormac received replies from just half his patients, while one more had been re-
admitted since her first visit. Many, MacCormac claimed, seemed to have mis-remembered 
or even entirely forgotten their hospital experiences. One young kitchen maid, who had 
married since her admission aged 17, asked: 
if you would inform me if being a married woman as I now am will it affect my leg or 
will I ever have any trouble with it later on in life? … I should also like to know if it 
will have any effect on my future children.826  
 
Deciding that the patient’s query was genuine, MacCormac suggested that this could only be 
explained either by double personality or “the habit of burying the memory of unpleasant 
events in the subconscious mind.”. Several decades earlier, this would not have been a 
foregone conclusion, for the notion of “habit” explored in chapter two suggests that it would 
have been perfectly possible, in the late nineteenth century, to view the young patient’s 
moral affliction as potentially inheritable. Another patient insisted that she had never been 
in the Middlesex Hospital, although her “name is an uncommon one.” The mysterious 
mental aspect of these cases, MacCormac concluded, meant that, although all the patients 
from whom he had received news “appear to have recovered, or at least discontinued 
damaging the skin … it is hardly likely that they will eventually become normal 
individuals”.827 If the patient’s issues were unconscious, this meant they could re-emerge at 
any point.  
 Indeed, physicians who viewed self-inflicted injury in psychological terms were often 
more inclined to focus on the gendered nature of self-inflicted injury in relation to 
“hysterical temperament”. When Frederick Parkes Weber published an article on the 
relation of hysteria to malingering in 1911, he claimed hysteria to be a disorder of the 
“tertiary sex characters”, by which he meant the psychological characteristics thought to be 
common to men or women. From this, he provided an evolutionary explanation for the 
existence of hysterical self-mutilation. 
In past ages ... simulation or deception of various kinds must often have been 
serviceable to the weaker female in protecting herself from the stronger (and 
sometimes cruel) male, as well as in enabling her sometimes to get her own way ... 
therefore, at the present time the facility (instinct) for deception is probably greater 
in the average female than in the average male.828 
 
                                                 
826
 MacCormac, "Self-Inflicted Hysterical Lesions of the Skin", p. 373. 
827
 Ibid., p. 375. 
828
 Frederick Parkes Weber, "The Association of Hysteria with Malingering," The Lancet, 178, no. 4605 
(1911): 1542-1543, p. 1542. For a similar suggestion some years earlier, see “Motiveless Malingerers”, 
p. 16. 
224 
 
Weber’s interest in the psychological nature of self-inflicted injury led him to view it as a 
female behaviour, rooted in the morally dubious context of deception, even when he 
thought that social and environmental factors enhanced this manipulative tendency.829 This 
belief that women were naturally deceptive was widespread in this period, and is 
particularly evident in the attitudes of many medical men to rape: as George Savage put it, “I 
have come to the conclusion that though there are evil men there are more evilly-minded 
hysterical women”.830 The concept of hysterical deception thus relied on preconceptions 
about the nature, not just of hysteria as an illness, but of women in general. This caused 
physicians to minimise the possibility of sexual or physical abuse; emphasising the “self” in 
self-inflicted injury ensured that a third party was rarely considered. This attitude has been 
highlighted by feminist historians, in particular Lisa Cardyn’s association of self-mutilation 
with the construction of female sexual trauma in turn-of-the-century America. Although 
Cardyn’s article is problematic, in that she invariably reads late nineteenth-century cases of 
self-injury in the light of modern claims about the relation of self-harm to sexual abuse 
(whether there is any evidence of the latter in the texts or not), she is right to draw attention 
to the complete absence of such explanations in the writing of contemporaries.831 When 
patients referred to “family troubles”, or even detailed their experiences of rape or assault, 
practitioners nonetheless divorced any self-inflicted injuries from this external origin instead 
locating self-mutilation in the medical diagnosis of hysteria, and female psychology more 
generally.832 
 The emphasis on the mental element of cases of dermatitis artefacta, however, had 
other effects in terms of treatment. In particular, it made physicians move away from 
surgical treatment in cases diagnosed as hysterical. MacCormac wondered about one 
patient who had, seemingly arbitrarily, had her appendix removed shortly after discharge 
from the Middlesex, while another – an “intelligent and highly educated” protozoologist – 
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had been “mutilated” by a surgeon “who found it necessary to perform an amputation of a 
finger”.833 A psychological view of hysteria and surgical intervention were, it seems, 
incompatible, especially for those who followed a Janetian approach. In his Harvard lectures 
on the major symptoms of hysteria, Janet had warned his students:  
Do not count the number of arms cut off, of muscles of the neck incised for cricks, of 
bones broken for mere cramps, of bellies cut open for phantom tumours, and 
especially of women made barren for pretended ovarian tumours.834 
 
Cases such as this would later be classified as “factitious disorder” or “Munchausen’s 
syndrome”, placing the blame for unnecessary operations on the patient, rather than the 
physician. 835 In the early twentieth century, however, the indistinct divide between hysteria 
and malingering might lead to different conclusions. 
 Dieulafoy’s case of pathomimie, which drew explicit attention to the extent of 
unnecessary surgery in self-mutilation, appears to have been influential to Frederick Parkes 
Weber in interpreting his own collection. It still came to mind as an example some twenty 
years after publication, when Weber entered into correspondence with Dr Peter Milligan of 
the Swansea General Hospital over a difficult case. Milligan’s patient was a girl of twenty, 
who for two years had suffered “frequent recurrences of a skin eruption on the right arm, 
r[igh]t leg or right side of the face. … The attacks have no obvious cause.”836 Weber regarded 
the case as, most likely, one of “hysterical simulation – in fact, the evidence on paper is 
overwhelming”, and he provided a range of suggestions for proving and treating such a 
diagnosis. However, his attention to the patient’s state of mind went well beyond the 
standard attribution of a manipulative hysterical character. He suggested: 
The patient is perhaps more or less confused about it herself. One might suppose 
her to be thinking:- “She is doing no harm in puzzling doctors – it is their own fault if 
they are deceived – they ought to know – certainly it is no crime to humbug them – 
moreover, it is rather nice to become the centre of interest.” 
 
Such a description, stemming from the attribution of “unconscious” thought to hysterical 
self-mutilation, assumed that the physician understood his patient’s motivation better than 
she did herself. This encouraged a paternalistic view, and at the end of his letter, Weber 
reiterated that:  
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If my suggestion, however, turns out to be right, she may be much to be pitied. 
More than one patient has permitted amputation (for resulting gangrene, &c.) 
before the secret was detected. I remember reading of Dieulafoy’s “Mythomania” 
case (in a man!).837 
 
Leaving aside Weber’s evident surprise at the existence of male cases (another indication of 
the strong association made between female hysteria and self-inflicted injury by British 
doctors), his return to the Dieulafoy case is an interesting one. His suggestion that the 
patient was to be “pitied” turned her into a passive object of surgical attention – quite unlike 
the manipulative, deceptive hysteric described by mid-nineteenth-century surgeons, such as 
Ernest Hart.838 For Weber, it was the surgeon’s responsibility – and not the patient’s – to 
determine whether an operation was justifiable. In hysteria, it seems, he felt that surgery 
was often precluded by the nature of the case: for Weber (although not for all physicians in 
the early twentieth century) hysteria was a psychological and not a somatic condition, and 
thus could not be cured by surgical intervention. 
 Such a contention explains the presence of a number of cases “for comparison” in 
Weber’s “self-mutilations” collection. These do not include self-mutilation, but instead imply 
surgical mutilation, similar to the warnings offered by Janet. Following the letters to Milligan 
is a lengthy set of private patient case notes, headed “Recurrent abdominal pain and 
vomiting (1925 – 9)”. Weber has indicated that “[t]hese notes are for comparison re cases of 
‘hysterical simulation & multiple operations’”. The patient, a young Russian widow (Mme T.), 
had been treated for recurrent vomiting, for which, at various times, she had had her 
appendix removed, uterus sutured and adhesions between her gall bladder, duodenum and 
omentum removed.  Weber noted rather wryly that the “[p]atient thinks the English like 
operations”. None of these interventions cured the symptoms, and Weber appeared deeply 
sceptical about their validity: particularly on the uterus. Indeed, he commented on the effect 
of the multiple operations on Mme T’s quality of life: “Patient used to gain money in 
America by Russian popular dances, but since the operations she cannot dance.”839 Indeed, 
Weber was a strong advocate of a combined psychological and sociological approach to 
hysteria, which may well have been associated with his political views, grounded in 
socialism. In his paper on hysteria and malingering, he concluded that: 
When a woman is depressed and altogether discontented with the life she has to 
lead, she is more likely than a man would be to try to attract attention or pity by 
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simulating disease or injury. A man usually has much more open to him; he can seek 
a new country or (if he does not endeavour to obtain relief by drink or gambling) he 
can take part in dangerous ventures of various kinds which bring excitement and 
temporary relief.840 
 
Weber’s assumptions about the psychological nature of women were thus situated within 
his understanding that, in contemporary society, women had few options open to them. 
Their injuries thus became evidence of wider social problems, and the attention of surgeons 
to female bodies represented the subjection of women to male brutality. 
 Several years later, Weber angrily annotated an off-print of David Forsyth’s “The 
Place of Psychology in the Medical Curriculum” with the note: “See page 6 in regard to 
multiple operations wrongly performed in cases of psycho-neurosis (“conversion – hysteria”, 
&c.)”.841 By the 1940s, his belief that operations continued to be wrongly performed in cases 
that ought to be regarded as psychological caused the handwritten reflections which began 
this section, titled:  
Multiple abdominal operations (nothing pathological found, unless adhesions – 
probably from a previous exploratory operation – or one for supposed “chronic 
appendicitis” &c., at which possibly a normal appendix was removed) – in women, 
notably Jewish women, whose married life is unsatisfying or unhappy or who cannot 
get married.842 
 
The assumption in this title is that the illness of these women resulted from their unhappy 
social circumstances, relating to unfulfilled sexual and emotional needs (Weber explained his 
emphasis on Jewish women through his perception that early marriage was expected of 
them). These needs were thought to explain self-inflicted injury, as well as what we might 
regard as psychosomatic symptoms, for which “mutilating surgery” had been carried out. 
Thus we can see a close relation, for Weber and others, between the topic of self-inflicted 
injury and the treatment of hysteria. Just as he came, in the early decades of the twentieth 
century, to regard hysteria as a psychological state, so too he regarded the physical infliction 
of injury by the patient on herself to be evidence of a traumatic state of mind. As Dr Ingram 
noted in a dermatological discussion in 1935, no “patient should be bullied out of an artefact 
dermatitis; the artefact might be cured in that way, but some other psychological 
disturbance would follow”.843 This explicit association of self-mutilation with psychological 
turmoil appears to be new to the twentieth century. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
 This chapter has explored the emergence of “hysterical self-mutilation” at the end of 
the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. There are aspects of this topic 
that may seem more familiar to us today than other elements of nineteenth-century texts 
on self-mutilation. A presentist perspective can mislead us into seeing hysterical self-
mutilation as familiar, and thus failing to acknowledge the many ways in which it was not. 
We tend to assume that a psychological approach must be “progressive”, because it aligns 
more neatly with modern understandings of self-harm. However, the particular context 
within dermatology might equally indicate a rejection of other methods of treatment: in 
particular, widespread concern over a perceived increase in surgical intervention for a 
variety of illnesses, associated with advances in technique and equipment in the nineteenth 
century. What’s more, a comparison with the previous chapter indicates clearly the way in 
which such a psychologisation of self-mutilation was perceived in gendered terms. In men, 
as in the debate around self-castration, self-inflicted injury was considered to be evidence of 
a more general national decline, economic unrest and social change. In women, as in the 
cases of so-called hysterical self-mutilation outlined above, self-mutilation was generally 
rooted in individual pathology, rather than environmental causes, explicitly connected to the 
perceived emotional needs of women.844 
 As this chapter has shown, the apparent psychologisation of self-injury meant that 
wounds were thought to say something specific about an individual: perhaps proving the 
pathological nature of symptoms previously judged to be spiritual; indicating a manipulative 
and deceitful temperament; or showing the troubled state of the inner psyche. In the mid-
Victorian period, I have shown that a connection between self-mutilation and hysteria 
emerged through the creation of naturalistic explanations for supernatural phenomena. 
These concerns indicate the complex relation of mind and body for writers at this time, for 
whom physiological and behavioural explanations existed side by side. Such concerns are 
indicated in the contemporaneous surgical records on “needle girls”, which emerged from 
the same complex interplay of assumptions around the emotional context of physiological 
change and intentional fraud.  The latter concept promoted a relation between hysterical 
self-mutilation and malingering in the later nineteenth century, which increased attention to 
the motive behind an injury. The widespread assumption emerging from this idea – that self-
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mutilation must have a motive – caused a circular method of reasoning. Physicians found a 
“gain” (whether financial or emotional) for their patients because they assumed there must 
be one, while the assumption of a benefit might lead to the “discovery” of artefact in the 
first place. Nonetheless, malingering continued to be treated, in practice, as an illness. 
 All of these factors, however, played a part in the creation of the early twentieth-
century model, whereby the physical nature of injuries became regarded as less important 
than their context. Hysterical self-mutilation shifted from being “motiveless” to 
“unconscious”: in other words, even when the patient was unaware of the motive, it was 
assumed to exist. Such an understanding complicated the notion of cure: physical 
intervention was rejected, but physicians had great difficulty in accessing the presumed 
psychological content of their patients’ injuries. Moreover, concerns over the association of 
self-mutilation with manipulative behaviour continued through the perception that self-
inflicted injury necessarily resulted in a gain for the individual and the continued acceptance 
of the concept of hysterical temperament. It was in an early twentieth century address given 
to the British Medical Association, that George Savage referred to “the Self-Mutilator” as a 
particular category related to the hysterical. By using a proper noun, Savage suggested that 
self-mutilation was the result of both a temporary state of illness and an innate 
constitution.845 Attention to the mixture of hereditary constitution and acquired 
psychological turmoil in the individual case in fact emphasised the notion that the “self-
mutilator” was not only a particular type of hysteric but a particular class of person. 
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Conclusion: Reflections on the Modern Meaning of Self-Harm 
 
 Modern psychiatric textbooks tend to refer to self-harm as if it were a natural, stable 
category, which has, however, only relatively recently been recognised as such by clinicians. 
Yet assumptions about the meaning of self-harm are often incorporated into the initial 
definition of the behaviour. Although the 2012 NICE (National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence) guidelines use the term self-harm “to refer to any act of self-poisoning or self-
injury carried out by an individual irrespective of motivation”, most definitions pay close 
attention to motive.846 The section on self-harm in Bird and Faulkner’s Suicide and Self-
Harm, for example, begins with the statement that: 
A great many people, both men and women, hurt themselves in various ways (such 
as cutting, burning, scratching or bruising) as an expression of distress and often as a 
means of coping with that distress.847 
 
Such a claim assumes that not only the occurrence of the acts described, but also a 
particular motive for carrying out these behaviours is required in order to define an act as 
self-harm. Similarly, the National Self Harm Network website, despite quoting the NICE 
definition above, goes on to state that self-harm “is primarily a coping strategy and can 
provide a release from emotional distress and enable an individual to regain feelings of 
control.”848 This idea is common across various fields of research. In one particularly 
revealing example, the remit of Adler and Adler’s recent sociological study of self-injury was 
shaped by these assumptions. Having defined self-injury as a private expression of inner 
turmoil, the authors thus excluded from their survey those people who carried out acts 
which seemed to them to have alternative goals, such as body decoration or what they call 
“deceptive” efforts to “garner medical attention”.849 
 As I noted in the introduction, none of these studies questions the notion that self-
harm is, in itself, a category that can be measured, even though all of the texts cited above 
differ slightly in what acts they include. The NICE guidelines explicitly exclude anorexia 
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nervosa, but the National Self Harm Network, by deeming eating disorders to constitute a 
“coping strategy”, include them within their remit. Both of the latter organisations, however, 
claim self-poisoning to be a means of self-harm, while Adler and Adler and Bird and Faulkner 
do not. This should lead to questioning of the category itself, and yet in does not, in part 
because all of these definitions do have several important similarities. First, as already 
stated, there is a preconceived notion that self-harm exists and can be defined. In addition, 
however, all these writers assume that self-harm is an intentional act carried out by an 
individual and all assume, from this, that self-injurious behaviour must therefore have some 
meaning for the individual. As we have seen, neither of these assumptions are implicit in the 
term self-harm, and we cannot necessarily take either for granted. Indeed, both assumptions 
rely on the prior existence of another seemingly stable category: that of the self. The terms 
self-harm, self-injury and self-mutilation gain a large portion of their meaning from the 
assumption that a self exists, and that it may be mutilated. To refer to a wound as a “self-
injury” does not necessarily imply that the wound has any psychological meaning or, indeed, 
that the infliction of the injury was even intentional. However, all three terms are most often 
used to refer to an act, and it is this application that appears to be new in the late 
nineteenth century, as outlined in this thesis. While people had certainly intentionally 
injured themselves in a variety of ways prior to this period, the late nineteenth century was 
the first time these diverse acts became regarded as equivalent behaviours. To combine all 
these acts under the umbrella of self-mutilation prompted the idea that some form of 
universal meaning might also be discoverable. The recognition of self-mutilation as an act 
assumed the existence of a self carrying out that act, and thus a meaning behind the act for 
that self. From this, various other assumptions about the nature of self-mutilation easily 
followed. It became viewed as an act that might have meaning beyond the physical nature 
of any wounds inflicted or the immediate sensations they might cause; an act that revealed 
something of the character of an individual; and, in addition, an act that might help to 
explain the relation between individual and environment. 
 In this thesis, I have argued that all of these assumptions can be undermined by a 
historical perspective on self-inflicted injury. In chapter one, I explored the way in which the 
concept of self-mutilation was created within a psychiatric context in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. I showed that modern clinical and historical approaches which assume 
that it was only in the twentieth century that self-inflicted injury became considered 
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separately from suicide are deeply flawed.850 Psychiatrists in the nineteenth century 
frequently argued that self-mutilation was not carried out for suicidal motives, although they 
differed in their method of applying alternative meaning to such acts. For many, definitions 
in this period relied on a somatic model of mental illness, whereby self-mutilation might be 
explained by a disorder of the nervous structure of the body and resultant impulses of which 
the individual was unaware. However, within British psychiatry, I have shown that this 
somatic model of self-injury was rarely the only or even main explanation offered. Indeed, 
without additional interpretations, suggesting that self-inflicted injury was of individual 
psychological or general social importance, the topic would not have received attention as a 
particular psychiatric symptom.851 Historians of this period have often been misled by their 
tendency to over-emphasise the role of brain biology and heredity in accounts of late 
nineteenth-century psychiatry. While these concerns are certainly evident in published texts, 
close attention to asylum archives indicates that, in practice, such accounts might be of little 
relevance to the way in which the asylum functioned and symptoms were managed and 
treated. While neither archival sources nor published works can give a “true” picture of how 
asylums functioned in this period, the contradictions between the two provide an interesting 
opportunity for analysis. From this, I argued that the definition of self-mutilation did not 
emerge from a top-down model (in other words, one created by alienists in published 
material and then disseminated to their staff, patients and a wider public). All the 
psychiatrists writing on the topic were in asylum practice and their beliefs were formulated 
in the asylum – and often shaped as much by their patients’ words as their acts. Overall, this 
chapter argued that we cannot see the historical creation of self-mutilation in purely 
physiological terms or as a definition created and imposed theoretically. Instead, it was 
located firmly within the practicalities of asylum functioning. 
 In chapter two, I built on these ideas to move beyond the asylum context, showing 
how anthropological and evolutionary concerns encouraged a tendency to draw parallels 
between acts of self-inflicted injury in psychiatric patients and the so-called mutilations of 
savages. This had even broader consequences for the understanding of self-mutilation in 
psychiatry, in that the use of an evolutionary model of mind suggested that self-inflicted 
injuries might be interpreted as the physical evidence of an individual’s mental state. This 
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perspective was often interpreted through a pessimistic, degenerationist idiom, which 
caused broad assumptions to be made about the character and heredity of an individual, 
drawn directly from the self-infliction of a wound. In addition, this led to the direct 
association of certain traits (introspection, selfishness, excitability and a lack of emotional 
control) with the act of self-mutilation. Even more broadly, the evolutionary model of self-
mutilation furthered the view that an act of self-harm said something not just about the 
individual, but about his or her relationship to the external social environment. From such a 
perspective, self-mutilation was viewed as evidence of more than just a failure of 
physiological function, but indicated a general state of physical and moral degeneration, in 
both individual and race. This chapter indicated that arguments from outside the asylum 
were regularly incorporated into asylum practice and vice versa. These broader concerns 
were largely responsible for encouraging the view that self-mutilation could not be 
dismissed as an insane act, but also held a relation to the evolution of the individual mind, 
and his or her relation to society: in short, self-mutilation became represented as a social 
problem. 
 Chapter three explored an alternative mental model of self-mutilation, in that, as 
well as being viewed as representative of the individual’s relationship to society, self-
inflicted injuries were considered by some to say something about the psychology of the 
individual. I explored the relation of late nineteenth-century British asylum psychiatry with 
normal psychology, a perspective much neglected in the historiography of the field.852 While 
it certainly cannot be argued that all alienists took such a perspective, it is notable that many 
of those writing on self-mutilation did so, viewing self-inflicted wounds in many cases as 
direct evidence of the inner nature of the individual. Almost all of the late nineteenth-
century British alienists writing on self-mutilation explicitly rejected the medical materialist 
perspective that viewed mental illness as a bodily condition (situated in lesions of the brain): 
instead, they tended to view physical acts as representative of mental events, while viewing 
selfhood as a notion situated somewhere between the two. Such an approach prompted the 
assumption that the ideas of the insane, like those of the sane, could be interpreted and 
analysed and, from this, that self-mutilation held intellectual or emotional meaning that 
could shed light on a broader understanding of normal and abnormal motivation. This 
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psychological approach to self-mutilation emphasised the behaviour as an act, and therefore 
a mental event quite distinct from the physical wounds created. While psychological 
approaches to mind are often considered by historians to be progressive, this notion is 
counterpointed here by the reminder that such assumptions could nonetheless lead to a 
pessimistic view of the individual as morally (rather than biologically) inferior, a notion 
clearly indicated in the concept of malingering, which ensured that psychological approaches 
to self-mutilation remained closely bound up with social concerns. 
 In the second part of my thesis, I explored two specific instances in which the ideas 
and theories discussed in part one were applied in medical practice of the period, indicating 
the complex manner in which these concerns were associated in practice. My focus lay on 
the concepts of “sexual self-mutilation” and “hysterical malingering”. Both diagnoses were 
applied within and outside the asylum, and hysterical malingering in particular was in 
widespread use within general medical practice at the turn of the twentieth century. These 
two concepts of self-inflicted injury received attention well beyond their actual reported 
occurrence in asylum and hospital records, something I argue needs to be understood 
through the way both concepts were interpreted and understood in relation to prior notions 
of gender-specific attributes: how men and women could and should behave. Castration was 
a major concern in published texts on the topic of self-mutilation, in the medical field and 
beyond. Yet, as I showed in chapter four, attempted or successful self-castration was 
uncommon in medical records, in comparison to other forms of injury. The emphasis on 
castration thus needs to be seen in relation to specific medical and social concerns. It is easy 
to assume that castration is “about” masculinity, but is this necessarily the case? I argued 
that it is, but perhaps not in the ways twenty-first century readers would expect. In 
psychiatry and psychology, this period saw an increasing emphasis on the role of the sexual 
instinct in individual and racial development, particularly in the case of men who were 
regarded as naturally less altruistic than women. Attention to self-castration in later 
nineteenth-century psychiatry can be read in relation to heightened concern over the 
physical state of British men, alongside the difficulty of reconciling contemporary models of 
masculinity with the elevation of the concept of altruism.  
 So-called hysterical self-mutilation seems far more familiar to us today than does 
sexual self-mutilation. The majority of modern studies emphasise that self-harm occurs far 
more frequently among women than men and, in particular, among young, middle class, 
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educated women.853 This was often the profile assumed by psychiatrists and general 
practitioners treating so-called hysterical women for self-inflicted injuries in the early 
twentieth century which, I argued, indicates that self-mutilation was not solely understood 
in relation to psychiatric in-patients in this period. However, I also argued that this apparent 
proximity to modern views should not blind us to the differences between hysterical 
“malingering” and twenty-first-century self-harm. First, the relation to the social and 
political problem of malingering sets hysterical self-mutilation in a completely different 
context. Turn-of-the-century (male) practitioners also shaped their explanations in relation 
to their understanding of gendered attributes, through the assumption that hysterics – and, 
by extension, all women – were inherently manipulative. I used these prior assumptions to 
show that even the apparent psychological attention to the “unconscious” in notions of 
hysterical self-mutilation can be misleading. The “motiveless” hysterical malingerer was 
often contrasted with the “obvious” pursuit of gain evident in her male counterpart. 
Nonetheless, she was similarly regarded to be deceptive, even when her acts were perceived 
to have been prompted by emotional needs characterised as outside the patient’s conscious 
control. I thus intend the chapters on sexual self-mutilation and hysterical malingering to be 
contemplated together. The latter appears familiar to us today, the former confusing and 
distant, rooted in old-fashioned notions of the perils of masturbation and proper sexual 
conduct. The way in which both notions existed side by side at the turn of the twentieth 
century explodes the idea that self-mutilation has any kind of universal meaning that can be 
discovered, that it necessarily says anything in particular about a person, or that it can ever 
be understood outside the historical and cultural context in which the term is used. 
 By undermining the assumption that self-inflicted injury necessarily says something 
about a person I intend, by extension, to question the very notion of an integrated and 
stable selfhood. As I have shown, in nineteenth-century psychiatry and psychology these 
two concepts were often bound up together. It was in this period that a new view of 
selfhood emerged that regarded the individual as the sum of his or her mental processes 
and feelings, rather than one clear entity that existed from birth. However, this new concept 
of integrated selfhood promoted the assumption that mental illness resulted from either a 
failure to achieve this integration or the disintegration of a self that had previously been 
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ordered. Self-mutilation could thus be interpreted as representing this disintegration, and 
hence saying something very specific about the nature of selfhood. However, as I have 
shown throughout this thesis, these claims were entangled in cultural depictions of the 
individual, including notions of proper physiological functioning, as well as his or her relation 
to wider society. Indeed, one might even suggest that the central conflict of psychiatric 
practice, in the nineteenth century and beyond, lies in the divide between individual and 
collective: psychiatry claims to treat the individual, but only as part of a larger social 
group.854 
 In exploring notions of selfhood in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century 
British psychiatry, I have aimed to rescue this period of asylum medicine from historical 
obscurity, indicating that it is a much more complex topic than is often realised. Alienists 
were not all obsessed with degeneration on the one hand and bureaucracy on the other: 
rather, many of them were well aware of the potential held within their specialty for 
commenting much more widely on mind and behaviour, individual and society. Further, 
however, I aim to question the views of self-inflicted injury that are seen to be common 
wisdom in the western world today. Generalisations about the behaviour abound: that it is 
mostly practised by young, educated, white women; that it is associated with certain cultural 
pursuits (most notably genres of music); that it is connected to sexual deviance; that it is 
manipulative and deceitful. Some of these stereotypes are informed by modern concerns 
about self and society; others may linger from nineteenth-century explanations that became 
attributed with an independent truth and thus remained in psychiatric and other reports 
long after the context in which they emerged had disappeared. Rather than perpetuating 
these assumptions, psychiatrists should aim to challenge them, recognising the normative 
nature of the assumption that self-inflicted injury is inherently “abnormal”. To class self-
harm as pathological is, as Georges Canguilhem has pointed out in other contexts, to depict 
it as “a manifestation of an attachment to some value”.855 In the preceding work, I have 
indicated some of the values incorporated into Victorian definitions of self-mutilation, by 
which I intend to shed doubt on the suggestion that self-harm has any kind of “true” or 
“real” meaning. While in no way intending to negate the experiences of those who feel that 
conceptualising self-harm as an emotional release offers a convincing explanation of their 
own feelings, or to suggest that their experiences are not, somehow, genuine (which is in no 
way my intention), I do suggest that this manner of experiencing self-inflicted injury is 
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certainly not universal or essential. Self-harm, like self-mutilation, is not a given entity but a 
concept that is created by its very categorisation, with certain consequences for those so 
classified. While these might be beneficial (for both individual and society) in some 
instances, in others these consequences may be damaging in themselves: and, what’s more, 
perpetuate the problem they intend to solve by imbuing it with an essential nature. 
Recognition of the way in which the concept of self-harm was brought into being within 
psychiatry is an important step in beginning this debate. 
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